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After Morocco’s and Algeria’s independence (1956, 1962 respectively), the 
governments of both countries sought to replace French with Standard Arabic in 
public administration, education and the media, and that became the official 
language. However, other spoken languages are present in both countries, darija 
(colloquial Arabic) and Berber languages, and French is still taught in higher 
education and a mark of political and economic elites. The countries’ 
multilingualism offers an area for investigating the politics of language in both 
countries. 1999 was also a turning point for cinema in both countries. Politically, that 
year marked the end of the civil war in Algeria and, in Morocco, the accession of the 
new king, Mohammed VI. The year also marked the revival of cinema in both 
countries. 
In examining a selection of films, produced between 1999 and 2015, I will ask 
the following questions: do films broadly reflect and embrace the countries’ 
multilingualism? Which languages are represented in films and to what effect? What 
is the relationship between language and gender relations? How is language use 
perceived by the Algerian and Moroccan public? In seeking to answer such 
questions, I will examine the use of language in films in relation to three themes key 
to this thesis: national identity; religion and politics; and sexuality. The question of 
gender will run through all three themes. Central to the thematic discussion is also 
close reading and thorough contextualization of the films in relation to the conditions 
of funding and filming. In this way I hope to pinpoint some of the ways in which 
language in Algerian and Moroccan films is more than a mere element of mise-en-
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This thesis explores the politics of language in Algerian and Moroccan films 
produced between 1999 and 2015. In doing so, it shines light on how cinema has 
reflected and contributed to the formation of national and private identity through 
language. Language is understood to play a major role in constructing individual and 
group identities. It does not act alone but is related to social, political, historical, and 
cultural factors; these, in turn, shape language.1  
 The role of language in creating homogenous national identities is apparent 
in both Algeria and Morocco. To some degree they share a history of anti-colonial 
struggle, though Algeria won its independence later than Morocco, and only after a 
long and terrible war. This complex history, as well as the area’s longer history, has 
led to different political situations in each country: the maintenance of the monarchy 
in Morocco and in Algeria the establishment of an ‘Arab’ and ‘socialist’ nation, 
under the ruling of the unique party the FLN from 1962 until 1992. For both 
countries the national image is an important political matter and studying these two 
countries in conjunction illuminates the complexity of their relationship to language, 
national identity and France. In both countries, language has played a historically 
significant role in constructing national identity after independence. In both 
countries, a homogenous language, Standard Arabic, was chosen by legislators as the 
official language despite the countries’ multilingualism. In lived experience, in both 
Algeria and Morocco, darija (colloquial Arabic), Berber languages and French are 
widespread. The linguistic landscape is thus quite similar in the two countries – and 
                                               





different from that of Tunisia, a smaller country, which has only a very small Berber 
minority, and where the Arabic spoken by Tunisians is closer to Standard Arabic.2 
This is one reason, besides the need to strike the right balance in this thesis between 
range and depth of analysis (both of films and of contexts), that this study is 
restricted to Morocco and Algeria. Another is that, as we shall see, the politics 
around language, despite the broad similarity of Algeria’s and Morocco’s linguistic 
landscapes, have at times played out quite differently in the two countries – and in 
both countries, debates over the use of French or Standard Arabic have been 
significantly more ‘dramatic’ than in Tunisia.3 Finally, my geographical focus 
(including Algeria and Morocco, and excluding Tunisia) is intimately connected 
with a particular historical focus; in 1999, both Morocco and Algeria saw a revival 
in filmmaking, as censorship was reduced in Morocco, and Algeria’s civil war 
ended. While Algerian and Moroccan filmmakers were always aware of the 
possibilities of film as a political and social medium, after 1999 they were more 
open in addressing political, social and religious issues.  
In this thesis, I seek to unravel how various identities – national, cultural, 
religious, political and sexual – are challenged, contested or confirmed through 
language in a selection of Algerian and Moroccan films. I explore which languages, 
of those actually spoken in the countries, are represented and for what effect, and I 
reflect on how different languages, and their use in specific contexts, are perceived 
by Algerian and Moroccan publics. I also investigate whether or not – and, if so, to 
what extent – the films put forward specific linguistic ideologies. If not, do they 
reflect and embrace the countries’ multilingualism? All of these questions are 
                                               
2 Grandguillaume, ‘L’Arabisation au Maghreb’, p.16. 




addresses by placing the films within the political social and cultural contexts from 
which they emerged.  
Geography locates Algerian and Moroccan films at the crossroads of 
different trends: Maghrebi cinema, Arab and Middle Eastern cinemas, North African 
and African cinemas. Often produced with foreign funding, employing foreign 
crews, with an international cast, Moroccan and Algerian films are also part of a 
transnational trend in filmmaking. Historically, Algerian and Moroccan films are 
also linked to a postcolonial context, whereby the French legacy, as I shall discuss, 
still preoccupies many journalists and critics. Algerian and Moroccan films hence 
often fall and are studied under one of the above cited categories or in relation to 
their themes, such as youth unemployment, emigration to Europe, city life, political 
repression, or women’s oppression.4  
This thesis offers for the first time an original account of Algerian and 
Moroccan films examined through a new prism, that of language. There has not been 
such a study across a mixed body of Algerian and Moroccan films in relation to 
language (and I will later explicit the corpus of the thesis). The films I examine have 
been analysed paying particular attention to their directors, the themes dealt with, or 
categories of analysis as defined above. Equally, this thesis brings to light a body of 
film that has suffered from neglect by scholarly research, particularly those that use 
darija, many of which have been neither subtitled nor widely circulated. Hence, I 
offer original readings of Algerian and Moroccan films and open new perspectives 
                                               
4 See Roy Armes, Postcolonial Images: Studies in North African Film (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2005). Lina Khatib, Filming the Modern Middle East (London; 
New York: I.B. Tauris, 2006). Viola Shafik, Arab Cinema: History and Cultural Identity 
(Cairo, Egypt; New York: The American University in Cairo Press, 2007). Andrea Khalil, 
North African Cinema in a Global Context: Through the Lens of Diaspora (London: 
Routledge, 2008). Florence Martin, Screens and Veils: Maghrebi’s Women Cinema 





for the field of film studies, in which, more generally, language has long been 
neglected as a topic, particularly in the case of Algerian and Moroccan films.  
In the rest of this introduction, I provide a brief history of the politics of 
language in Algeria and Morocco in conjunction with the countries’ political 
context; a literature review will then locate my work within academic debate. The 
final section of the introduction outlines my corpus, methodology and the structure 
of the thesis.  
 
Language and Politics in Algeria and Morocco: Brief Historical Context 
Algeria was a French colony from 1830 to 1962; Morocco a French Protectorate 
from 1912 to 1956; after the two countries gained their respective independence – 
after seven years of a bloody war in the case of Algeria (1954-1962) – language 
became closely linked to postcolonial political issues and has continued to play a 
historically significant role in constructing the two nations’ identities. The French 
historian Gilbert Grandguillaume has argued that independence meant, for both 
countries, the restoration of Islam and the Arabic language as fundamental features 
of national identity.5 Islam and Arabic were first utilised as part of the nationalist 
discourse prior to independence, in order to rally support among the masses.6 The 
governments of both countries sought to replace French with Standard Arabic (a 
version of Classical Arabic fusha ىحصفلا , which means clear and eloquent) in public 
administration, education and the media: this constituted the politics of Arabisation, 
and Islam became the state religion inscribed in the Constitution of both countries. 
                                               
5 Gilbert Grandguillaume, ‘Arabisation et langues maternelles dans le contexte national au 





 Over the years, Arabisation became increasingly ideological – moving 
beyond questions of language. It became a central feature of these newly 
independent nations, anxious to distance themselves from the colonial experience 
and to emphasise their cultural specificity as part of the Arabic and Muslim umma – 
that is, the world community of Muslims, a ‘central normative concept which 
appeals for unity across the global Muslim community’.7 Grandguillaume has 
observed that Algeria, ironically, adopted what is essentially a French Jacobin ideal, 
of a national language that symbolizes national unity: the rhetoric of ‘one nation, one 
language’.8 However, shortly after independence, nothing was ‘close’ to the political 
ideal of a ‘national’ language, because of the countries’ linguistic diversity. The 
most widely used languages, Berber languages and colloquial Arabic  ,(darija)  ةجرادلا
were not established written languages; and both countries marginalized such 
vernaculars even if Berbers constitute forty per cent of the population in Morocco, 
and twenty per cent in Algeria and darija and Berber languages share the status of 
mother tongue, the language of the household with which children grow up.9 
Darija means in Arabic ‘rolling’ (so, for example, a bicycle is a darraja), as 
well as ‘to be accustomed’. Darija is the ever-changing language that has been 
adopted, with which Algerians and Moroccans are familiar. The pronunciation of 
darija varies geographically across Algeria and Morocco. Darija derives its words 
and grammar from Standard Arabic but not only; darija is mixed with French, 
Ottoman-era Turkish, Berber, and Spanish vocabulary which is adapted and inserted 
into Arabic grammatical constructions. While darija is not a written language, it is 
                                               
7 Peter G. Mandaville, Transnational Muslim Politics: Reimagining the Umma (London: 
Routledge, 2007), p. 17. 
8 Grandguillaume, ‘La Confrontation par les langues’, Anthropologie et sociétés, 20.2 
(1996), 37-58 (p. 43). 
9 Grandguillaume, ‘L’Arabisation au Maghreb’, Revue d’aménagement linguistique, 107 




gaining in popularity as the main spoken language of almost all Algerians and 
Moroccans. 
Ella Shohat and Robert Stam have argued that the distinction between a 
dialect and a language originated in the colonial era, in the 1930s, when unwritten 
languages were ‘somehow unworthy of the term “language”; thus, Europe speaks 
languages while Africa, for example, speaks “dialects”’.10 Shohat and Stam refer to 
the definition of dialect as ‘a language without an army […] or we might add 
without economic or political power’.11 Agreeing with Shohat’s and Stam’s view I 
have chosen to label darija, in this thesis, as a language and not a dialect as darija  is 
no longer the ‘illegitimate national language’, and bears political power as I will 
argue in this thesis through the films analysed.12  
Indeed, darija has been appropriated by the media, cinema, and music. Even 
Mexican telenovelas, which used to be dubbed in Standard Arabic for distribution in 
Morocco, are now dubbed in darija.13 Politicians and journalists have begun to ask 
whether darija should be used in schools, instead of Standard Arabic, so that 
teaching happens in the everyday language rather than a language hardly spoken by 
much of the population.14 French, on the other hand, represents a ‘linguistic 
compromise’: it remains a symbol of the old colonial power, as well as the mark of 
                                               
10 Ella Shohat and Robert Stam, ‘The Cinema After Babel: Language, Difference, Power’, 
Screen, 26.3-4 (1985), 35-58 (p. 54). 
11 Ibid. 
12 Fouzia Benzakour, ‘Langue française et langues locales en terre marocaine: rapports de 
force et reconstructions identitaires’, Hérodote, 126.3 (2006), 45-56 (p. 46).  
13 Catherine Miller, ‘Mexicans Speaking in Dârija (Moroccan Arabic): Media, Urbanization 
and Language Changes in Morocco’, in Arabic Language & Linguistics, ed. by. Reem 
Bassiouney and E. Graham Katz (Georgetown University Press, 2012), pp.169-188 (p. 169). 
14 Mohammed Boudarham, ‘Enseignement. La darija fait débat’, TelQuel, 26 November 






the new political and economic elites.15 In both countries, French is considered a 
foreign language and does not have an official status, yet it is still the predominant 
language among the educated and is the language of scientific and technical teaching 
at university.16 In 2014, the proportion of Algerians and Moroccans literate in 
French, as per the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie figures was of 
thirty per cent and twenty eight per cent respectively.17 
 In Tunisia and Morocco, Grandguillaume remarks, colonisation did not strip 
the nation of its own identity, so linguistic policies based on French-Arabic 
bilingualism could be adopted.18 Because of Algeria’s colonial past, this distance 
was more difficult to maintain. Considered as the second main French-speaking 
country, Algeria is still not part of the international organisation of the 
Francophonie. Scholar David C. Gordon argues that this is a political stance that 
Algerian state officials have kept, in opposition to France’s hegemony, because they 
consider Francophonie a political rather than a cultural organization. 19 
Francophonie was born out of an African initiative, in 1965, when Tunisian 
President Habib Bourguiba and Senegalese President Léopold Sédar Senghor aimed 
for ‘un Commonwealth à la française’ promoting the idea of francophonie as a 
cultural and economical union between French-speaking African countries, and 
Canada, Switzerland, Belgium and France.20  By 1966, Senghor gained the support 
of the Organisation Commune Africane et Malgache (OCAM), constituted of the 
                                               
15 Grandguillaume, ‘L’Arabisation au Maghreb’, p. 19. 
16 Ibid. 
17 OIF, Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie website, <http://observatoire.Fran 
cophonie.org/qui-parle-francais-dans-le-monde/> [accessed 20 January 2018]. 
18 Grandguillaume, ‘L’Arabisation au Maghreb’, p. 17. 
19 David C. Gordon, ‘The Arabic Language and National Identity: The Cases of Algeria and 
Lebanon’, in Language Policy and National Unity, ed. by William R. Beer, James E. Jacob 
(Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Allanheld, 1985), pp. 134-150 (p. 135).   
20 Pierre Alexandre, ‘Francophonie: The French and Africa’, Journal of Contemporary 




newly independent African countries and Madagascar, but Algeria declined to join.21 
Algeria’s refusal was rooted in  Arab solidarity and the spirit of the Algerian 
revolution against the French. Even the French government did not stand by 
Senghor’s idea of francophonie, fearing accusations of imperialism after the African 
countries’ independence. Yet by 1967, under the impulse of General De Gaulle, 
France took the lead in the project of francophonie, and the adhering countries 
aligned themselves within the French sphere of influence.22 Margaret Majumdar 
argues that Francophonie had become a ‘useful adjunct as another forum through 
which France may assert its influence on the world stage’.23 Algeria continued to 
refuse to join, because of the primacy of the French language and its desire to 
distance itself from the former colonial power and a body whose ‘raison d’être has 
appeared to be based on the ties and relations established by colonialism’.24 The 
official position of Algeria on Francophonie has not shifted significantly since 
Gordon’s essay in 1985. Although in 2002 President Bouteflika attended the 
Francophonie summit in Beyrouth, and expressed Algeria’s openness to the world, 
he chose not to adhere to the association.25 Grandguillaume argues that Algerians are 
still not willing to participate in the francophonie, partly because the place of the 
French language in higher education is still a thorny issue and initiates heated 
debates.26 Linguistic disputes are a recurring topic in Algeria and Morocco, and the 
                                               
21 By 1969 the members of the OCAM were: Central African Republic, Chad, Cameroon, 
Republic of the congo, Benin, Gabon, Burkina Faso, Madagascar, Niger, Senegal, Cote 
d’Ivoire, Togo, Democratic Republic of the Congo (known as Zair in 1969), Rwanda. 
22 Margaret A. Majumdar , Postcoloniality. The French Dimension (New York: Berghahn 
Books, 2007), p. 170. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., p. 171. 
25 David C. Gordon, ‘The Arabic Language and National Identity: The Cases of Algeria and 
Lebanon’, in Language Policy and National Unity, ed. by William R. Beer, James E. Jacob 
(Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Allanheld, 1985), pp. 134-150 (p. 135).   





intensity of conflicts is usually connected to contextual factors that include political, 
religious and social issues, as my analysis shows in a number of cases. Only 
recently, in response to demands from political and civil associations, have Berber 
languages been recognized as official languages in Morocco (2011) and Algeria 
(2016).  
 1999, as noted already, was a turning point for Algeria and Morocco, which 
witnessed political, cultural and social changes. In that year, the civil war in Algeria 
ended, closing what was known as la décennie noire, the Black Decade, from 1991 
until 1999. During this period, confrontation between the Algerian army and armed 
Islamist groups led to the death of over 150,000 civilians.27 Many civilians were 
massacred, including writers, artists, journalists, judges and civil servants. Around 
100,000 emigrated from Algeria during that period, amongst whom were artists, 
filmmakers, and teachers.28 
The civil war began after the cancellation of the first round of the legislative 
elections in 1991, which the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) party had won, a result 
that the state and army generals did not anticipate and were not willing to accept. 
The FIS was formed after the constitutional changes in Algeria in 1989 that allowed 
for the creation of multiple political parties and the end of hegemony of the ruling 
party since independence, the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN). The FIS 
discourse rejected the leadership’s foreign ideologies and demanded the 
establishment of Sharia (the holy law) to rule over social, political and cultural 
                                               
27 Youcef Bouandel, ‘Bouteflika’s Reforms and the Question of Human Rights in Algeria’, 
The Journal of North African Studies, 7.2 (2002), 23-42 (p. 31). 
28 ‘840.000 algériens ont quitté le pays sous Bouteflika contre 110.000 dans la décennie 90’, 
HuffPost Algérie, 26 September 2014 <https://www.huffpostmaghreb.com 




institutions.29		The FIS was an extensive coalition of a ‘small number of radical 
Islamists, a few veterans of the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan, the 
traditionally pious urban classes, and vast numbers of alienated youths’.30  
The victory in the first round saw the FIS garnering 188 seats out of 430 
while the FLN only gathered 16 seats.31 The victory of the FIS not only threatened 
the hegemony of the army, it also worried part of the population fearing a theocratic 
Islamic republic. Then-president Chadi Benjedid resigned and a high state 
committee, mainly composed of military leaders, was created. In January 1992, 
before the dismissal of Benjedid, women’s groups demonstrated against the FIS’s 
disregard for women’s rights.32 Many FIS militants were imprisoned, a state of 
emergency was declared, and the FIS was banned. 
From 1992, calls for armed insurgency against the state and the army were 
issued by the Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA) and the Armée Islamique du Salut 
(AIS). The GIA called for a total war to establish an Islamic state and issued 
communiqués threatening to kill women leaving their homes without wearing a hijab 
(covering their heads). In the parts of Algeria where the GIA imposed its authority, 
they banned French-language newspapers, satellite dishes, cigarettes, music 
festivals, and beauty salons. Cinemas were also the targets of bombs and were 
closed. Those who refused to follow the rulings of the GIA were considered 
‘infidels’, and the GIA justified violence against them.33 Many massacres in the 
                                               
29 William B. Quandt, ‘Democratization in the Arab World? Algeria’s Uneasy Peace’, 
Journal of Democracy, 13.4 (2002), 15-23 (p. 16).  
30 Ibid. 
31 Robert A. Mortimer, ‘Algeria: The Clash Between Islam, Democracy, and the Military’, 
Current History, 92.570 (1993), 37-41 (p. 39). 
32 Zahia Smail Salhi, ‘The Algerian Feminist Movement Between Nationalism, Patriarchy 
and Islamism’, Women’s Studies International Forum, 33.2 (2010), 113–124 (p. 120).  
33 Mohammed M. Hafez, ‘Armed Islamist Movements and Political Violence in Algeria’, 




suburbs of Algiers occurred at the hands of the GIA, whereby entire families were 
decapitated.34  
The election of president Abdelaziz Bouteflika in 1999, and the 
establishment of the politics of national reconciliation in 2000 – whereby those who 
had not committed blood crimes could reintegrate into civil life without being 
prosecuted – led to a period of relative peace and brought an end to violence, 
although unresolved issues remain open (such as the disappearance of Algerians 
during the Black Decade and the refusal of the state to further investigate these 
cases).35 There were few images of the conflict on Algerian television channels, 
which were state owned; Algerians turned to French and Arabic satellite channels 
(such as Al Jazeera) to be informed about the conflict.36 Few films were made during 
that period, due to the exile of filmmakers and technicians as well as security 
concerns. I have included in the corpus of this thesis some of the films that expose 
how Algerians lived throughout the Black Decade and its aftermath.  
A relative peace has reigned in Algeria since 1999. Few political changes 
have been noticeable. President Bouteflika was re-elected four times (until he 
resigned in April 2019), and the FLN is the most powerful political party, winning a 
majority of seats in Parliament in 2014. The Parliament also has deputies form the  
President’s party, Rassemblement National Démocratique (RND), a party created to 
counterbalance the FLN which has been the ruling party since independence, and 
one of the few Islamic parties, Le Mouvement de la Société Pour la Paix (MSP) – 
                                               
34 Hafez, ‘From Marginalization to Massacres: A Political Process Explanation of GIA 
Violence in Algeria’, in Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, ed. by 
Quintan Wiktorowicz (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 2004), pp. 37-60 (pp. 
37-38). 
35 George Joffé, ‘National Reconciliation and General Amnesty in Algeria’, Mediterranean 
Politics, 13.2 (2008), 213-228 (p. 225). 
36 Larbi Chouikha, ‘Satellite Television in the Maghreb: Plural Reception and Interference of 




co-opted by the state and participating in the government.37 Many of the major 
political figures have not changed since independence, and the state continues to 
promote the image of the mujahid (freedom fighter in the Algerian war for 
independence) in political discourse and in the few films financed by the Ministry of 
Culture. Some of the films selected illustrate the political status quo, and how 
Algerians became detached from political life. However, a contestation movement, 
composed of youth, men, women across all ages and social classes, emerged in 
Algeria in February 2019 opposing Bouteflika’s candidacy for a fifth mandate. Well 
attended demonstrations took place across Algeria, and Bouteflika has since 
resigned; although the political outcome remains unclear, the political status quo is 
no longer accepted by Algerians who vehemently reject the old ruling elite. 
In Morocco, 1999 marked the accession of the new king, Mohammed VI, 
after the reign of Hassan II (1961-1999) and of what were known as les années de 
plomb. Hassan II’s reign was marked by the imprisonment of political opponents, 
who were tortured, arbitrarily detained or even ‘disappeared’.38 Mohammed VI, 
Hassan II’s eldest son, established a reconciliation committee, the Instance Equité et 
Reconciliation in 2004. This committee examined human rights abuses under his 
father and aimed at ‘restoring the truth’ to ‘reconcile’ (but not to judge).39 Televised 
public hearings of the victims who were tortured were organised as well as financial 
compensation even if the perpetrators were not named or judged.40  
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Mohammed VI also initiated a wave of political and social reforms to create 
a multi-party system and allowed political Islamic parties to be created, and as a 
consequence the Islamic party Parti pour la Justice et le Développement (PJD) 
emerged as the leading political party, overtaking the socialist and nationalist parties 
and winning a majority in Parliament in 2004. Moroccan Historians Malika Zeghal 
and Khadija Mohsen-Finan survey the emergence and creation of the PJD and 
highlight that the PJD was not constructed upon a homogenous ideology, but on the 
concurrent political ambitions of individuals: Dr Abdelkarim Khatib and Abdelilah 
Ben Kirane.41 Khatib had ties with the monarchy, as the former doctor of King 
Mohamed V, and he founded in 1967 a political party ‘Mouvement Démocratique et 
Populaire’. Ben Kirane however was part of an Islamist movement, Al Chabiba, 
created in 1969, that favoured an Islamic revolutionary approach to seize power. Al 
Chabiba’s ideology was inspired by Sayid Qutb’s manifesto on political Islam.42 The 
actions and ideology of Al Chabiba culminated in the assassination of a leftist union 
member. Ben Kirane decided thereafter that he needed to shift toward a more 
political approach rather than a revolutionary one, in order to allow for changes to 
happen. He then co-founded in 1981 Jam‘iyyat al-jama‘a al-islamiyya (The 
Association of the Islamic Group).  
In 1992, Ben Kirane and other members of his association asked for the 
creation of a political party Hizb al-Tajadid al Watani (The Party of the National 
Renewal), but accreditation was denied by the authorities. Internal divisions in Ben 
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Kirane’s movement lead him to approach Khatib who, to resurrect his own political 
ambitions, agreed to an alliance with Ben Kirane.43 The creation of the PJD as a 
party thus resulted from the union of Khatib and Ben Kirane in 1999. The PJD’s 
participation in the political arena was allowed in the light of Khatib’s proximity 
with the makhzen (the governing institution centring on the king). The existence of 
the PJD was however linked to specific conditions dictated by the authorities, and 
accepted by the PJD, among them the recognition of the King as the Commander of 
the Faithful, the renunciation of violence, and the promotion of the territorial 
integrity of Morocco.44 The PJD thereafter first stamped its presence in the 2002 
elections with 42 deputies elected. It directed its criticisms towards socio-economic 
questions and cultural issues, rather than political matters or the monarchy.  
French historian Pierre Vermeren argues that Islamism recomposes and 
reconstructs an imaginary past, more than it contributes to building a future, though 
he adds that the impoverished and economically insecure population did not 
recognise itself in the values of the elites of the so-called ‘new Morocco’, 
particularly in its secularisation; hence, religion came to serve more strongly as an 
affirmation of Moroccan identity.45 Yet, religion was not used only by the PJD or 
Islamists to shape Moroccan national identity; the monarchy also used Islam and 
Arabic to re-define Moroccan national identity. One of the King’s prerogatives is to 
be the guardian of Islamic values. Hassan II inscribed in the constitution, in 1962, 
the religious duties of the King and confirmed the status of Commander of the 
Faithful, Amir Al-Mu’minin. Zeghal exposes how Hassan II circumscribed the 
Islamic parties and used his status as a Commander of the Faithful to build upon his 
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political authority and to enhance the legitimacy of the monarchy.46 Zeghal explains 
that both Hassan II and his father Mohamed V organized various institutions in order 
to reinforce the monarchy’s religious power: mosques were under state control and 
surveillance, under the Ministry of Religious Affairs, and official discourse on the 
King’s religious authority was promulgated through school programmes.47 The 
PJD’s assumed religious authority encroached on the King’s territory, and since the 
2002 elections, the PJD aimed at censoring works of art which contravene religious 
morality. Some of the films discussed in this thesis were met vehemently by some of 
the PJD members, who criticised the filmmakers, and questioned their religious 
morals and attachment to Moroccan values. 
Mohammed VI also considered economic and institutional issues a priority; 
he was even called the ‘King of the Poor’.48 He granted more political freedom, 
promoted constitutional reform and instigated in 2001 the modification of the Family 
Code, mudawana. The new Mudawana, finalized in 2004, admitted the principle of 
equality in marriage between men and women, including the removal of 
discriminatory text such as the wife’s legal obligation to obey her husband. The PJD 
was opposed to the new mudawana as they considered the reforms to be inspired by 
Western secular ideas, while the old Family Code was constructed on traditional 
religious principles.49 After the Islamist bomb attacks of 2003, directed at upper 
classes and Jewish locations, the PJD’s reputation was weakened, and it did not 
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oppose the reforms. The new mudawana promoted on the international scene the 
image of a modern king who was developing his country.  
By way of comparison, the situation for Algerian women has hardly changed 
since the 1984 Family Code, which is vigorously contested by women’s 
associations. Since 1984, war veterans and younger feminists have united to call for 
an abrogation of the Code, coming together to protest against legislation that 
privileges men over women. The Code has undergone some amendments in recent 
years: from 2005, women were no longer legally obliged to obey their husbands; in 
2014, a decree announced compensation for women raped by terrorists during the 
Black Decade. In this thesis, I will discuss films that expose gender inequality and 
women’s struggles to overcome the limitations imposed by laws and social norms 
within a patriarchal society. 
 In 1999, cinema was revived in both countries. With the end of the era of 
terrorism in the 1990s, Algerian directors could resume work, and many returned 
from France where they were in exile. While Algerian cinema was state funded until 
the 1980s, with over 200 cinemas and 80 films produced, funding and production 
structures were quasi inexistent in 1999.50 Formerly state-funded Algerian cinema 
became a predominantly privately-funded cinema, described by Kamel Salhi as a 
change ‘from state cinema to auteur cinema’.51 Algerian filmmakers mainly sought 
funding from foreign bodies such as the French Centre National du Cinéma et de 
l’Image Animée (CNC) while the Algerian state mainly funded historical films on 
the Algerian war as mentioned above. In Morocco the reverse situation occurred, the 
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Centre du Cinéma Marocain (CCM), the funding body, was reinvigorated by the 
state, which led to the production of more state-led films reaching 20 feature films 
produced per year. National and international film festivals flourished as well and 
one of the many examples is the International Film Festival of Marrakech, initiated 
in 2001 and presided over by the King’s brother.  
Algeria counts 41 million inhabitants, and Morocco 36 million with forty-
five per cent of the population under 25. Youth unemployment is an acute problem 
in both countries reaching twenty five per cent, leading the youth to despair of their 
lives and to try to emigrate, a theme that I will further discuss in this thesis.52 For all 
their shared characteristics, Algeria and Morocco also have a history of political 
disagreements, as the historian Benjamin Stora acknowledges in labelling them 
‘frères ennemis’.53 The non-resolution and perpetuation of the conflict in the 
Western Sahara remains a source of tension in the region and constitutes the main 
area of discord between Algeria and Morocco, stirring strong reactions from both 
parts. Algeria supports the independence of Western Sahara; a former Spanish 
colony where Spanish administrative control was relinquished in 1975 and a joint 
administration between Morocco and Mauritania was established (Mauritania 
withdrew from the territories in 1979). The Sahrawi nationalist movement, 
Polisario, then proclaimed the independence of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic 
Republic, a decision that was followed by Algeria’s recognition of the new state, 
while Morocco claimed its ownership of the land. This led Morocco to break off 
diplomatic relations with Algeria in 1975. Despite the United Nations’ intervention, 
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the question is still acute, and Morocco is backed by French diplomacy which 
considers that ‘Western Sahara is an integral part of the Kingdom of Morocco’, 
while Algeria supports the Sahrawis considering that self-determination is one of the 
fundamentals of Algeria’s foreign policy.54  
Recent political disagreements between the countries also led to the closure 
of terrestrial borders in 1994. The closure was triggered by the attack that four 
French nationals of Moroccan origin launched against a hotel in Marrakech. 
Moroccan authorities accused Algeria’s army services of having backed the attacks. 
Morocco imposed visas on Algerian visitors, and the Algerian authorities responded 
by closing the border between the two countries. Heated debates in the Algerian and 
Moroccan press ensued after the incident, and are still recurrent, whereby each party 
accuses the other of distorting their country’s image. The strained relations between 
Algeria and Morocco restrained the circulation of goods and people, as well as 
cultural exchanges, affecting cinema. Algerian films are rarely available to the 
Moroccan public, either in cinemas or on television, and vice-versa. France, the 
French institutes in both countries, and internet remain the means to access both 
Algerian and Moroccan films.  
 
Language in Film: Review of Literature 
Having established a number of basic points regarding Algerian and Moroccan 
politics and the use of language in the two countries, I will summarise the existing 
research on the role of language in films. This overview will provide context for the 
conjunction at which my thesis is located. It is within sociolinguistics, and journals 
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such as Gottopol and Multilingua, that attention has been initially paid to language in 
films, taking films as a realistic representation of linguistic choices, registers and a 
reflection of cultural and social changes. Socio-linguists have also investigated the 
political implications of using one language rather than another in films (the use of 
English in Québécois films for example), examining ‘choices in film dialogue in 
terms of their underlying linguistic ideologies’ as ‘the film directors’ stylistic 
choices interact with dominant language-ideological discourses, endorsing, opposing 
or in some way negotiating them’.55  
Hence, my discussion of the films will also be informed by sociolinguistics, 
particularly by the treatment of language and ideology informed by the work of 
Mikhail Bakhtin and the sociolinguist Jannis Androutsopoulos. Bakhtin and 
Androutsopoulos are particularly important because they recognise the connection 
between language and ideology, or the ideology of language. Bakhtin sees language 
as ‘never neutral but always ideologically charged’.56 John L. Kijinski describes how 
Bakhtin considers language to be ‘the site where ideological conflict is fought out as 
well as recorded’.57 For Androutsopoulos, ‘language ideology’ is ‘the sets of beliefs 
and evaluations of language structure, language use, and language society/ 
relationship’.58 Androutsopoulos draws a correlation between language and 
ideology: how we use language shapes our understanding of society, at the same 
time as the society in which we live shapes the language that we use; language and 
social relations are thus inherently connected. While analysing films, I will 
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investigate the ideology associated with the languages spoken as well as the effect of 
language choice on the film’s reception and overall message. While discussing 
issues of language and gender I will also provide an overview of some of the most 
relevant concepts in the field of sociolinguistics on language, gender, and power as 
these concepts are at the core of my textual analysis of these films.  
While post-colonial theory and literary studies have paid attention to the 
politics of language in literary texts, few such studies exist in film scholarship. Why 
is this? As the scholar Kamilla Elliott has observed about adaptation studies, words 
‘suffer a pervasive neglect in film history, criticism, and theory’ because the 
discipline has mainly paid attention to the technical side of film-making that 
analyses the role of light, montage, editing, and so on, in the construction of 
narrative.59 Elliott argues that Sergei Eisenstein’s early definitions of editing and 
montage as ‘film speech’ and ‘diction’ have led to film studies neglecting diegetic 
language.60 Eisenstein’s essay ‘Film Language’ (1934) established the analogy in 
academic criticism that montage is the ‘language, diction, syntax, and speech’ of 
film.61  
The work of the French film theorist Christian Metz continued the 
association between film and language. In his influential essay of 1964, ‘Le Cinéma: 
langue ou langage?’, Metz argued that cinema is structured like a language and that 
linguistic paradigms can be applied to films; shots can be likened to sentences and 
films to parole.62 Metz grounded his work in Ferdinand de Saussure’s linguistic 
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theory, the basis of semiotics. Saussure rejected the view that words derive their 
signification from the objects to which they refer; instead he claimed that words 
derive their signification from the mental association between ‘a concept and a 
sound-image’.63  
Afterwards, Metz linked cinema to psychoanalysis in his 1977 book Le 
Signifiant imaginaire: psychanalyse et cinéma, which draws on Freudian and 
Lacanian theory to argue that viewers do not experience film as reality, nor as a 
dream, but as a state that is in the middle.64 Furthermore, the viewer does not 
identify with the protagonist but with the camera and becomes the omnipotent 
subject who perceives all the action, experiencing voyeurism and fetishism. Elliott 
situates the neglect of language within film with the emergence of this type of 
Lacanian psychoanalytic theory in the 1970s, that emphasised the ‘visual and scopic 
cognitive processes in film viewers’; and she argues this view is still influential 
within film studies.65   
Nevertheless, in the 1980s, attention to words, voices, and sounds in films 
increased. In particular, the work of French composer, film-maker and critic for 
Cahiers du Cinéma Michel Chion opened new areas of investigation into sound in 
films. Chion’s 1982 La Voix au cinéma established the importance of voice and 
challenged image-centred approaches to film theory. Chion suggested that sound 
gains power when it is disembodied (on the telephone, as a voice-over, etc.), and he 
defined the concept of ‘acousmêtre’, as the combination of acousmatique (invisible 
sound) and être. Acousmêtre is a diegetic sound that is not related to the character 
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who speaks, a voice that is heard without its source appearing onscreen which is thus 
invested with mysterious, supernatural power.66  
In his subsequent book, Le Son au cinéma (1985) Chion explored how the 
emotional tone of a film is expressed through sound and music, and how they affect 
the viewer’s perception and understanding of the image.67 Chion argued that sounds 
emphasise objects within the frame, and that film sound is an art of rendering ideas, 
emotions and intents. Though Chion paid more attention to the voice and silences 
than to language itself, he established the importance of diegetic and non-diegetic 
sounds in films that intersect with images to create a multi-layered audio-visual 
experience. Chion’s sound theory is key to my thesis, as I too pay attention to sounds 
and silence as constituents of language.   
 In 1985, Shohat and Stam’s ‘The Cinema after Babel: Language, Difference, 
Power’ opened areas of investigation into other languages than English. Shohat and 
Stam pointed to the hegemony of English in Hollywood films of the 1940s, arguing 
that, ‘presuming to speak for others in its native idiom, Hollywood proposed to tell 
the story of other nations not only to Americans, but also for the other nations 
themselves, and always in English’.68 English became not only the dominant 
language in films but also the language of ‘prestige’ that projects the ‘self-
confidence of its speakers’.69 As Shohat and Stam put it, the ‘Indians’ of classic 
Hollywood Westerns, denuded of their own idiom, use pidgin English, a mark of 
their inability to master the ‘civilized’ language’.70 In many Hollywood and French 
films of the 1930s and 1940s, the local, national language is ignored, or an alien 
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language is used. For example, in Pépé le Moko (Dir. Julien Duvivier, 1937), where 
Jean Gabin is a criminal on the run from the Métropole who hides in the Casbah of 
Algiers, Arabic is only an ‘indecipherable murmur’ while French is the main 
language.71 Shohat and Stam called for attention to the power play between 
languages in films: which language dominates, and which one is marginalized? 
Shohat and Stam’s approach is crucial to the study of films in my thesis, as I will not 
only investigate the languages used, but also consider which were set aside, and 
which were predominant, and thus their relation to power.  
By 2000, research on language in films progressed further and Sarah 
Kozloff’s seminal Overhearing Film Dialogue opened new areas of research. 
Kozloff looked at dialogue in Hollywood films of the 1940s, including Westerns, 
screwball comedies, gangster films, and melodramas. Like Elliott, Kozloff argues 
that film’s visual aspects have always been the focus of film theorists and directors, 
while dialogue – as part of a script and linked to a character’s performance – has not 
been deemed worthy of attention.72 Kozloff connects the bias against dialogue in 
much theory and scholarship to the anxiety that words will compromise the 
independence of cinema as an art form unto itself: an emphasis on language might 
render film a subdivision of theatre or literature.73 Kozloff also relates the dismissal 
of dialogue in film studies to a cultural association of talkativeness with femininity 
and of action with masculinity – and a bias in favour of the latter. 74  
Kozloff analyses film dialogue and its quantity, the length of speaking turns, 
the use of slang, and how and when the characters talk. She observes that film 
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dialogue has changed from standardized English for stars in the 1940s to the more 
colloquial language in the 1960s and 1970s, alongside the appearance of low budget 
independent productions.75 Kozloff emphasises that dialogue is, of course, generally 
scripted and should not be taken for real speech, stating that dialogue is ‘written and 
rewritten, censored, polished […] and performed’ and ‘apart from cases of 
improvisations, the words have been written, rehearsed’.76 Kozloff also highlights 
the process of scripting film dialogue whereby it is ‘recorded, edited, mixed, 
underscored, and played through stereophonic speakers with Dolby sound’.77  
Kozloff argues that since film dialogue is scripted and polished, it may 
convey the author’s views and may in some sense be addressed towards the film’s 
spectators. Analysing the address of Ted Kramer to the judge in Kramer vs Kramer 
(Dir. Robert Benton, 1979), whereby Kramer denounces a society that would not 
grant him his son’s custody, Kozloff observes that Ted’s language is addressed to the 
viewer conveying ‘an authorial commentary’.78 Film dialogue can also call for 
actions as in Hitchcock’s Foreign Correspondent (1940) when a soldier exhorts the 
viewer to fight the Nazis.79 Language in films also conveys ‘social/moral/political 
messages by the use of allegory or irony’. 80 For example, Force of Evil’s dialogues 
(Dir. Abraham Polonsky, 1948) are an allegory on the evils of capitalism.81 Kozloff 
advances that the viewer is able to draw on the irony or allegories embedded in film 
dialogues by connecting the on-screen characters with the diegesis and the wider 
political and social context.82 In this thesis, I will examine language in order to 
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decode authorial messages and the underpinning political and moral implications 
embedded in film dialogues.  
While it is true that filmic speech adheres to conventions, language in films 
nonetheless reflects the language of the time. Kozloff rightly observes that dialogues 
‘go beyond the script’, so when analysing films, one must ask, ‘Who gets to speak 
about what? Who is silenced? Who is interrupted?’.83 Kozloff also points out that the 
study of film dialogue entails the understanding and mastery of the language, as 
scholars have ‘cavalierly assumed they could analyse films in languages they don’t 
know’. 84 I would argue that this affirmation goes even more strongly for films in 
non-European languages as translation needs to be truthful and complete, and as 
Kozloff states one must not rely on subtitles because these cannot accurately render 
what the original language conveys, since many elements are lost – not least ‘curses, 
repetitions, antiquated diction, regional accents’.85  
For Kozloff, subtitles remove crucial elements linked to the language and its 
national specificities, including jokes, wordplay and irony.86 Kozloff’s point about 
subtitles and how to approach film dialogue is key to this thesis. First, as mentioned 
above, I have selected films in languages that I speak and understand (darija, 
Standard Arabic and French), and I have excluded films in Berber. Second, I have 
whenever possible explained the wordplay and humour, especially when lost in the 
subtitles. Third, I have paid attention to who says what – but also to who is silent. 
While Chion’s early books explored sounds and voices, his later work, Le 
Complexe de Cyrano: la langue parlée dans les films français (2008), more clearly 
assesses the importance of studying language and accents in French films. Chion 
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observes that the various French dialects remain absent from French cinema. The 
few accents that remain are folklorised – for example, the Southern French accent 
(midi-accent) in Marcel Pagnol films, banlieue speech or Parisian slang.87 Chion 
also examines the emergence of multilingual films in French cinema in his more 
recent work Words on Screen (2017) and argues that multilingualism marks a 
‘greater concern for realism’.88 Chion also rightly observes that subtitles render the 
understanding of film dialogue in foreign language difficult, as it ‘demobilizes our 
hearing, to the point where we not only don’t understand the meaning but don’t even 
distinguish the language being spoken at a given time – all the languages seem to be 
a single one.’89 Chion’s observation is key to my thesis, as when subtitled, Standard 
Arabic and darija become indistinct to the non-speaker of the languages, and 
subtitles do not render the degree of formality of each language. Agreeing with 
Chion, the use of different languages reflect more accurately Algeria’s and 
Morocco’s multilingualism, yet it does not always reflect realism as when French is 
too present in Algerian films and stirs heated debates surrounding its use which I 
will later discuss.  
While over the decades, research has focused on English speaking films, 
foreign languages in film have been marginalised or standardised. The scholar John 
Kristian Sanaker has expanded the research on the French language to include its 
interaction with other languages. In La Rencontre des langues dans le 
cinéma francophone: Québec, Afrique subsaharienne, France-Maghreb (2010), 
Sanaker analyses in over a hundred films the interactions of French and English in 
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Québécois cinema, French and African languages in African cinema and French and 
Arabic in French films that dealt with the Algerian war (1954-1962). Like Kozloff, 
Sanaker points to the scarcity of film theory on language in films. Sanaker argues 
that the study of language in film has been concerned with what the protagonist 
says, but little attention has been paid to the language chosen by the protagonist.90 In 
relation to La Bataille d’Alger (Dir. Gillo Pontecorvo, 1966), Sanaker observes that 
French and Arabic translate the balance of power between the French army and the 
Algerian population. The use of French by the military emphasises that French 
cannot be the language of Algerians, and the French the military speak is composed 
of orders and interjections thus enhancing the colonial power of the army.91  
The 2016 collection The Multilingual Screen: New Reflections on Cinema 
and Linguistic Difference is another example of a decentred approach to examine 
language in cinema. The book assembles articles from Tunisia, Italy and Japan and 
offers a historical perspective on multilingualism in films. In its introduction, film 
scholars Tijana Mamula and Lisa Patti trace the politics of language in film to 
‘monolingual politics’ that have suppressed and excluded minority languages and 
dialects in most modern nation-states.92 Thus, in some countries, cinema has 
advanced the ‘country’s linguistic evolution toward a firmer monolingualism’ 
(which is the case of Algerian cinematic policies in the 1970s as I explain in Chapter 
One), and language in films has either marked the hegemony of a language or 
‘cultural protectionism’.93 In 2017, Gemma King highlighted the importance of 
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examining multilingualism in French cinema in Decentring France: Multilingualism 
and Power in Contemporary French Cinema. King demonstrates how, when other 
languages are heard in French films (e.g. Arabic or Tamil), these languages do not 
serve only to mark realism. Multilingualism is rarely ‘arbitrary’; instead, King 
writes, ‘these languages challenge the hegemonic position of French in French 
films’. 94 King’s findings will be tested in this thesis in relation to the status of 
Standard Arabic in Algerian and Moroccan film, and whether Standard Arabic is 
hegemonic and contested in its position as the official language by darija and 
French. 
The review of the scholarly literature has highlighted a growing body of 
research into language in film. Over the years, there was also a shift in interest 
within film studies towards the study of film production, circulation and audiences, 
hence moving away from diverse hermeneutic approaches. In this thesis, my 
attention to language straddles these two critical approaches; language as part of the 
film mise-en-scène needs to be examined; language as part of the circulation and 
reception of films needs to be considered as well. This body of research also asks 
questions about which languages have been set aside, and what those forgotten 
languages reveal about the inherent postcolonial, political, cultural or social issues at 
stake. From this review, I am led to the following questions: how does language 
construct a character’s identity? What social, gender and political issues do 
filmmakers engage with in making decisions about language? Whom do they allow 
to speak, whom do they silence, and which languages do they privilege? Through 
these questions, this thesis will suggest that choices about language in Algerian and 
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Moroccan films reflect the needs of narrative construction and encode the film’s 




Corpus and Methodology 
The corpus of films studied in this thesis is the result of a selection, which I will 
proceed to explain. Moroccan film production is more substantial than the Algerian 
one, with 100 Moroccan films produced in comparison with 30 Algerian films 
between 1999 and 2015. 95 However, I wanted my study to be closer to an even 
balance between the two nations and decided to choose 9 Algerian films and 11 
Moroccan films. In addition to periodisation and national identity, an essential 
category in choosing the films was their language: whether multi- or monolingual. 
To contrast language use in films, I divided my corpus between films that are mainly 
in French, films that are solely in darija (including those using slang darija) and 
others that mix French, darija and Standard Arabic. This selection allows me to 
examine whether there is a thematic difference between films made in French and 
those in darija. Because I am also concerned with the critical and commercial 
reception of the films, and investigate box office results, my corpus includes a range 
of productions: films that were popular with audiences, auteur films, controversial 
films as well as those that received little attention.  
My selection also took into account the type, age and aesthetic project of the 
film directors as well as their gender. Again, I have worked on the basis that a wide 
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variety of films offers the best opportunity to form an overview of the politics of 
Moroccan and Algerian films of this era, and I selected films made by fifteen 
directors; however, when possible I included more than one film by the same 
director to illustrate changes of genre and narrative. For example, Nadir Moknèche’s 
trilogy, included in this thesis, spans from 2000 until 2006, and follows the political 
and social changes in Algeria, as well as a change in Moknèche’s aesthetics from 
comedy drama to film noir. Similarly, I have included two films made by the 
Moroccan Nabil Ayouch and the Algerian Merzak Allouache. Ayouch’s films, Les 
Chevaux de Dieu (2012) and Much Loved (2015) expose the life of those at the 
margins of Moroccan society, respectively those living in the slums and prostitutes 
in Marrakech. Allouache’s films are emblematic of the political changes in Algeria: 
Le Repenti (2012) is concerned with the politics of national reconciliation while Les 
Terrasses (2013) examines the life of Algerians in the aftermath of the ‘Arab 
Spring’. 
In the same way that I wanted to balance Algerian and Moroccan films, I 
aimed at a reasonably balanced selection amongst male and female directors, again 
in the interests of a diversified perspective. Hence, I selected films made by two 
Algerian female directors (out of three female directors who have produced films 
between 1999 and 2015), and films made by three Moroccan filmmakers (out of six 
female directors who have produced films between 1999 and 2015). I also wanted to 
select directors from different generations.96 Stylistically, the selection presents 
different forms as well: some films experiment with form, for example Tareq 
Téguia’s Roma ouella n’touma, with a disjointed narrative, while others use the 
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tropes of film noir, comedy and drama, and differ in terms of narrative structures and 
acting methods, mixing professional and non-professional actors.97 I have also 
deliberately excluded the wider Maghreb as well as films made in France by 
Maghrebi filmmakers as their work is frequently analysed in the abundant literature 
on cinéma beur and émigré cinema.98 I have also excluded from my corpus films 
that mainly use Berber languages because I do not have expertise in the language; 
but I take up the opportunities offered by the corpus to discuss the political and 
cultural issues around Berber languages.  
Given my focus on the relationship between film and language, close reading 
and thorough contextualisation, informed where necessary by works from the field 
of sociolinguistics, are central to the thematic discussion of language in films. I 
examine dialogue and the different languages used, as well as music, diegetic sound 
and the elements ‘omitted’ from subtitles in films as defined by Shohat and Stam: 
‘background conversation, radio announcements and television commercial […] 
written materials such as posters, marquees […] and newspapers’. 99 My close 
reading of films analyses language, but not in isolation. I analyse language while 
also focusing on the films’ images through the examination of mise-en-scène, 
camera work and editing. My close textual analysis is contextualised within the 
historical background of the films, the political issues at stake and the social issues 
that contribute to understanding a scene’s events. I also present, where available, the 
conditions of the film’s production and public reception.  
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For this research, I have gathered materials from different sources. 
Researching the films’ funding, distribution, and box office, I visited the Centre du 
Cinéma Marocain (the CCM, in Rabat) in 2014; the archives however did not yield 
much material; more information is available online on the website of the CCM. I 
also inquired about viewing figures for Algerian films at the Centre Algérien de la 
Cinématographie (Algiers) in 2014, but there were no such statistics as the centre 
was focussing on safeguarding archives from the 1960s until the 1980s. I have 
gathered statistics when available, taking as a primary source the statistics of the 
CCM as well as Algerian and Moroccan newspapers and magazines written in 
French and in Arabic (The Moroccan TelQuel, L’Opinion, Le Journal Hebdo, 
Akhbar el youm, the Algerian El Watan, Le Matin, Le Soir d’Algérie, Al Akhbar). 
There are few cinema journals in both countries; I was able to consult the short lived 
Algerian quarterly Asaru (founded in 2007 by the Amazigh film festival 
commission), and to buy in Morocco issues of the monthly Aflam 21 (founded in 
2013) and of CinéMag, which was founded in 2008, issued as a bilingual 
(Arabic/French) monthly magazine in 2010, and ceased to exist in 2011.    
The Bifi Library (Bibliothèque du film) and the Bnf (Bibliothèque Nationale 
de France) in Paris offered a valuable source for articles on Algerian cinema of the 
the 1980s as well as information on Algerian and Moroccan films released in France. 
I have also visited the Institut du Monde Arabe (Paris) where the only books 
available on Algerian cinema related to the Algerian war. The British Library in 
London provided me with infinite resources of books written on Algerian and 
Moroccan cinemas from the 1960s to the 1980s, in French, Arabic and English. 
Finally, the films of my corpus are mainly available on the internet (YouTube), 




retailers (Roma ouella n’touma, Sur la planche, Barakat!). I was also able to 
purchase many of the Moroccan films as bootlegged DVDs in Morocco. Algerian 
films, on the other hand, cannot be found as bootlegged DVDs due to an enforced 
copyright law that prevents them from being copied (while Hollywood blockbusters 
are widely available).  
Because this thesis deals with multilingual films, I have provided titles in 
French, Arabic, and English. The first time a film is mentioned, its French title is 
given, and its Arabic title and English translation; subsequently I will only provide 
its French title. These films are released primarily under both titles in French and 
Arabic. Director and year of release are also included; the country of production is 
mentioned in my comments on the conditions of funding. The use of Arabic when 
transliterated conforms to the pronunciation of Arabic spoken in Algeria and 
Morocco, and I have tried to be consistent in the spelling of names. I have also 
transcribed in Standard Arabic religious expressions when used in films, to 
emphasise the difference with darija. When dealing with material in French, I have 
provided film and book citations in their context, untranslated.  
 
Organisation of Chapters 
Through my selection of films, a corpus emerged that variously reflects, diverts or 
obscures the social, political and economic realities of the two countries. As I further 
detail, some of the films illustrate important aspects of the countries’ tensions and 
changes; others support social norms. To better investigate language use in the films, 
the need became clear to group the films by theme, rather than chronologically, as I 
want to provide fresh insight into how language is used in relation to specific 




sexuality – all underpinned by the theme of gender. This thematic organisation also 
allows my discussion to move from the public to the private sphere, and to highlight 
the different implications of the study of language in relation to these issues. Some 
of the films will be analysed across different chapters, when the themes are 
entangled. 
 Chapter One is introductory and addresses questions of language, national 
identity and national cinema in Algeria and Morocco. I expand on the politics of 
Arabisation and the political status of the various languages used in the two 
countries. I also provide an account of the history of cinema in both countries and 
demonstrate that language has been essential in defining national identity and 
national cinema in Algeria and Morocco. I historicize how national cinema, in 
general, has been defined and then situate Moroccan and Algerian cinema within 
debates over transnational cinema – not least in relation to Maghrebi cinema, the 
relation to France, ‘world cinema’, and concepts of diasporic and ‘accented’ cinema. 
I also explore the debates over the funding of Algerian films by the French funding 
body the CNC.  
Chapter Two analyses four films in relation to language and national identity:  
two of the films included in this chapter were deemed controversial upon their 
release: Marock ( كورام , Dir. Leila Marrakchi, 2005) and Viva Laldjérie ( افیف يریجیدلال  , 
Viva Algeria, Dir. Nadir Moknèche, 2004). These films were seen by the press to 
distort the image of the nation by exposing taboo subjects such as inter-faith 
relationship in Marock and nudity and sexuality in Viva Laldjérie. The chapter also 
addresses what it means to be Moroccan, through Où vas-tu Moshé? (  ای حیار نیوا
؟ھیشوم , Where Are you Going Moshé?, Dir. Hassan Benjelloune, 2007), and what 




production, cast and director (Goodbye Morocco, برغملا اعادو , Dir. Nadir Moknèche, 
2013). 
Chapter Three deals with politics, alongside religious violence, religious 
discourse and gender. It is further subdivided, beginning with three Algerian films 
dealing with the Black Decade and its repercussion on the population, men and 
women: Rachida ( ةدیشر , Dir. Bachir Chouikh, 2002), Barakat! ( تاكرب , Enough!, Dir. 
Djamila Sahraoui, 2006) and Morituri ( يرتروم , Dir. Okacha Touita, 2007). These 
films explore the traumatic events Algerians had lived through and attempts at 
understanding these events, and the role of language in expressing the trauma lived. I 
contrast and compare the attitudes of young people in Algeria and Morocco and their 
use of language in Casanegra ( ةرجنازك , Dir. Norredine Lakhmari, 2008) and Roma 
ouella n’touma ( اموتنا ىلوأ امور , Dir. Tariq Téguia, 2006). This part examines how 
slang darija opens avenues for youth to express their disillusionment with the 
societies they live in. I then discuss Islamic extremism and the politics of Algerian 
national reconciliation in Le Repenti ( بئاتلا , The Repentant, Dir. Merzak Allouache, 
2012) and the run-up to Casablanca’s 2003 terrorist attacks in Les Chevaux de Dieu 
( هللا لویخ  , God’s Horses, Dir. Nabil Ayouch, 2012). I point out the importance of 
Standard Arabic linked to religious discourse and its influence on the private sphere. 
Finally, I explore the changes that occurred in 2007, in Morocco in relation to 
religion, gender and social class, after the election of the PJD, by way of Amours 
voilées ( بحلا باجح , Veiled Love, Dir. Aziz Salmy, 2008) and Islamour ( روملسإ , Dir. 
Saad Chraibi, 2008). I contrast the reception of these two films and their use of 





Chapter Four investigates the representation of gender and sexuality and its 
connection to language and power. The chapter attempts to isolate the ways in which 
gendered identities are shaped by language – and how such constructions may reflect 
and bear on the roles deemed acceptable for and by the Algerian and Moroccan 
audiences. The chapter focuses also on the situations of men and women across 
different social classes. Much Loved ( كیف يلإ نیز  Dir. Nabil Ayouch, 2015) and Sur ,أ
la planche ( ةفاحلا ىلع , On the Edge, Dir. Leila Kilani, 2011) offer new perspectives 
on language – particularly slang and crude language – as well as materialism and 
social emancipation.  
Much Loved was censored and criticised for its display of prostitution and 
nudity. Les Jardins de Samira ( ةعیضلاف ةریمس , Samira’s Gardens, Dir. Latif Lahlou, 
2007) dealt with extra-marital affairs and male impotence, and Agadir Bombay 
( يابموب ریداغا , Dir. Myriam Bakir, 2011) tackled prostitution; however, these two 
films were widely accepted by the Moroccan public. To help explain why reactions 
to the films were different, the chapter will examine how language creates norms of 
gender and sexuality, and how it differently empowers men and women. Finally, I 
examine the situation for men and women in Algeria and the way that language 
reflects social change in Le Harem de Madame Osmane ( نامصع مادم میرح , Madame 
Osmane’s Harem, Dir. Nadir Moknèche, 2000), Viva Laldjérie (Dir. Nadir 
Moknèche, 2004), Délice Paloma ( امولاب سیلید , Dir. Nadir Moknèche, 2007) and Les 
Terrasses ( حوطسلا , The Rooftops, Dir. Merzak Allouache, 2013). My conclusion 
attempts to answer the questions raised in this introduction, to highlight how 
language is still a ‘potent cultural symbol’, and why the study of language matters in 
relation to Algerian and Moroccan films.100
                                               





Chapter One: Contextualising Language, National Identity and 
National Cinema 
 
La Bataille d’Alger (1966), directed by the Italian Gillo Pontecorvo, is one of the 
most internationally renowned ‘Algerian’ films. It depicts the resistance of the 
Algerian population in the Casbah, an old quarter of Algiers, during the titular battle 
in 1957, based on the memoirs of former combatant Yacef Saadi. Despite its 
Algerian associations, the film was a truly transnational production. Shot on location 
in the Casbah with a team of Italians, Belgians, and Algerians, the script harnessed 
darija and French, and has been described as an ‘authentic mixture of spoken Arabic 
and French’ that would ‘reach, and ring true for those audience members in Algeria 
who were illiterate’.101 The film was co-produced by Saadi’s short-lived company 
Casbah Films, and received Italian funding as well as military costumes and props 
from the Algerian state.  
La Bataille d’Alger represents the pinnacle of a period of nationalist 
nostalgia in Algerian cinema, during which the Algerian war was often glorified. 
However, its transnational production means that Algerian film critics still do not 
consider La Bataille d’Alger an Algerian film; instead, they consider it an Algerian-
Italian co-production.102 La Bataille d’Alger offers a clear example of how difficult 
it is to define national cinema. What, then, are the criteria through which films might 
be admitted into a definition or corpus of national cinema? Who would make such 
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decisions: domestic critics, scholars or international reception? Is it even helpful to 
consider La Bataille d’Alger an Algerian film? What is at stake in such 
categorisations? 
To address these questions, I will investigate the concept of ‘national cinema’ 
as it is used in academic debate and as it has changed through different periods. I 
will explore the cinemas of Algeria and Morocco and attempt to define what the 
concept of national cinema has come to mean for these countries. I argue that 
language is an important constituent of national cinema and will therefore examine 
the language of these cinemas at successive historical stages. Ultimately, I argue that 
the notion of national cinema, which as we will see has been widely contested, is 
still a valid one in relation to Algeria and Morocco, and that language plays an 
important role in giving shape to these national cinemas.  
As discussed in the introduction, in Algeria and Morocco, language relates 
closely to complex national identities. Geographically located in North Africa and 
the Maghreb, these countries are culturally part of the Arab-Islamic world. As 
former French colonies, they were also subject to the imposition of the French 
language and French cultural policies. All of these contexts affect the relationship 
between language and the constitution of a national cinema. I identify three major 
politico-linguistic phases of Algerian and Moroccan cinemas:  
1. Cinema under French colonial rule (1900–1956/1962);  
2. Cinema in newly post-independent countries (1956/1962–1980s); and 
3. Cinema in the globalised era (1980s–present).  
During French colonial rule, most of the films produced in Algeria and 
Morocco were in French, when not silent, and mainly directed by French directors 




Moroccan-French films in Arabic was initiated in 1952 but, as small-scale folkloric 
films, they failed to compete with the widely exported films of the highly developed 
Egyptian cinema industry.  
In the second period, cinema became involved in post-independence politics, 
which aimed, in Algeria, to construct a national anti-colonial narrative and to 
promote Algeria abroad. Standard Arabic, the official language of independent 
Algeria, became a political tool to unify the population and inscribe it into a larger 
Arabic and Muslim identity. Although a few feature films were made in Morocco in 
the immediate post-independence period, mainly documentaries and short films, 
cinema was used with two key purposes: to promote the image of the newly 
independent nation; and to practically inform and educate its people. There was no 
debate about the use of language in Morocco. The films used darija only. Berber 
languages remained in both countries a subject of political debate, as I will elaborate 
in the section on national language in Algeria and Morocco. 
The third period, the globalised era, coincides with political turmoil in 
Algeria, and more political freedom in Morocco with the end of the reign of Hassan 
II. As mentioned in the introduction, a shift in film financing followed the political 
changes and had a dramatic effect on film production and the number of films 
produced in the two countries. In the globalised era, both countries witnessed the 
return of exiled directors and the influx of internationally-trained directors. The 
instability of the political situation in the Middle East over the last two decades also 
allowed Morocco to attract transnational film crews and financing, which increased 
the funding of the CCM.103 These fluctuations in Algerian and Moroccan cinemas 
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will be addressed in this chapter through critical discussions of transnational cinema, 
diasporic filmmakers and, in particular, Hamid Naficy’s concept of ‘accented 
cinema’.104 My conclusion will attempt to determine how far one can talk of 
Algerian and Moroccan ‘national cinemas’, the place of language therein, and the 
relationship between these cinemas to broader academic debates about national and 
transnational identity. 
 
Language and National Identity 
Prior to summarising different theoretical approaches to national cinema, I will 
examine the politics of language and national identity in Algeria and Morocco. 
Language has been a site of political struggle in both countries, as well as a marker 
of cultural identity. While Morocco was a French protectorate retaining its political 
and monarchical systems, Algeria was under French territorial control. The Algerian 
war for independence (1954–1962) was a war to define the future nation, including 
the language it would use. Algeria’s linguistic politics, born out of the war of 
independence, aimed to achieve ‘national homogeneity’.105 Yet the ironies of this 
ambition soon emerged: the Algerian leaders, who fought for independence, 
harnessed the French language to foster international attention.  
 In both Algeria and Morocco, monolingualism was an important means to 
cultivate a single religious-nationalist ideology. Algeria and Morocco sought to 
become reincorporated into the Arab and Islamic world, the umma, a concept of 
nationhood beyond the individual nation. As a core preoccupation of nationalism, 
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establishing a unified language went beyond expelling traces of colonialism. 
‘Arabisation’, the politics of promoting Standard Arabic as the official language of 
education, administration and media, began in Algeria in 1976 and in Morocco in 
1980.  
Arabisation aimed to promote a language as well as a political vision of a 
stable cultural identity and Berber languages and darija were rejected from the 
formation of this stable new identity. Grandguillaume further explains that post-
independence political leaders in favour of Arabisation, considered darija as a 
‘degraded’ form of Classical Arabic, and aimed at teaching Standard Arabic in 
schools as a spoken language mainly to replace darija.106 However, Standard Arabic 
remained unfamiliar for much of the population in both nations; and has not become 
a spoken language.  
The Moroccan sociolinguist and Berber activist Ahmed Boukous identified 
the following different languages in Morocco – a hierarchy that applies to the 
Algerian context:  
1) Standard Arabic, the official national language, whose status is afforded 
by its role in the Islamic religion.  
2) Darija, vernacular Arabic, considered as the maternal language of the non-
Amazigh population, which operates as a lingua franca in the national space, used 
commonly by Arabic-speakers and Amazigh speakers.  
3) Amazigh, historically the first language of Morocco; it functions as a 
native language. Berber languages are usually named Amazigh (singular masculine 
noun) or Tamazight (singular feminine noun).107 Amazigh is almost always used as 
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the equivalent of Berber but with a political connotation: the common definition of 
amazigh is ‘free man’, so the term connotes political demands for liberty expressed 
by Berber movements in Algeria and Morocco. The origin and meaning of the word, 
however, is far from certain according to sociolinguist Salem Chaker, who believes 
the supposed etymological definition of the term as ‘free man’ to be an ‘undue 
extrapolation of accurate, regionally specific data’ – that is, the meaning may 
previously have been associated with high caste, noble Tuaregs rather than free 
men.108  
4) French, perceived as the language of ‘social mobility, modernity, 
enlightenment’, which remains the language of the Moroccan ruling class, though 
the class structure of Moroccan society has evolved significantly in its postcolonial 
period.109 French is still the medium of higher education in universities (medicine, 
technology, biology but not the humanities which are taught in Standard Arabic) as 
well as used in administration alongside Standard Arabic and in the media (radio, 
newspapers, television). 
The role of Berber languages in both countries has changed with their 
political situations. Berber identity itself remains fluid, and many names for Berber 
languages are used by scholars and the media. Boukous explains that the main 
variants of Berber languages in Morocco are Tarifit, Tamazight and Tashelhit.110 
Each language is associated with an ethnic group located in three different areas: 
Tarifit designates the Rif in Northern Morocco; Tamazight, the Atlas region of 
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central Morocco; and Tashelhit, the Chleuh in south-western Morocco, and the 
southern Moroccan coast.111  
In Algeria, similarly, the sociolinguist Mohamed Benrabah defined the 
following Berber languages in relation to a specific geographical spread: Tamashek 
is the language of the Tuaregs of the Sahara; the Mozabites, who live in central 
Algeria, speak Mzab; the Chaouia, who live in Eastern rural Algeria, speak Chaouia; 
Kabyles, who live in eastern coastal Algeria and represent about two-thirds of the 
Berber-speaking Algerian population (totalling six million), call their mother tongue 
Kabyle or Takbaylit.112 Berber languages are oral languages, mainly unwritten even 
if the Tifinagh script is used. Tifinagh is used by the Tuaregs and said to originate 
from the Libyan era (640 BC-146 AD), although there is little proof of its use at the 
time, and it has never been widely used subsequently.  
                                               
111 Ibid., p. 23. 
112 Mohammed Benrabah, ‘The Language Planning Situation in Algeria’, Current Issues in 





Figure 1. Map to illustrate the Distribution of Berber population in North Africa and their 
languages (in French)113  
The distinction between Berbers and Arabs requires context because it is 
used and reused at different times. When the French ruled in Morocco and Algeria, 
they promoted what is known as the ‘Berber myth’, the idea that Berbers were more 
willing to be civilised and were natural allies of the French because they resisted 
Islam and the adoption of Arab traditions after the original Arab invasion.114 In this 
context, the distinction was primarily a colonial political tool to divide and rule. The 
historian James McDougall traces the distinction between Arabs and Berber back to 
the writings of Arab historians working after the conquests of North Africa in the 
seventh century.115 The name al-barbar was used by the Arab conquerors to 
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designate the North African indigenous population. In turn, al-barbar as a term 
constructed this heterogeneous population as a homogenous group.116 The name 
barbar was taken from the Greek and Latin name that distinguished the Barbori tribe 
from the many other tribes of North Africa (Libyans, Numidians, and Maauri). The 
Arab conquest of the seventh century spread Islam, and most of the tribes remained 
non-speakers of Arabic; some of these tribes were arabised linguistically in the tenth 
and eleventh centuries, while others remained Berber speakers.117 McDougall 
explains that spreading Arabic language was mainly a political tool used to subjugate 
tribes, rather than to educate or enhance Islamic observance; indeed, at that time 
Islam was not equated with Arabs or the Arabic language.118  
In the 1930s, the Algerian nationalist movement of the ulemas – a group of 
Muslim religious scholars in Algeria – rejected Algeria’s Berber past and called for a 
return to Standard Arabic. Ibn Badis, a member of the ulemas, defined Algerian 
nationhood as follows: ‘Islam is my religion, Arabic is my language and Algeria is 
my country’.119 The ulemas had a vision of nationhood that was detached from local 
linguistic realities, linked instead to the Arab ‘nation’ under Islam. The 
abovementioned motto influenced the cultural politics of Algerian nationalism, and 
the Algerian war and, by extension, ‘official’ culture. The tendency to associate the 
Algerian nation with the Arab world by harnessing Standard Arabic would persist in 
independent Algeria.  
In relation to Morocco, Mickael Bensadoun argues that the Moroccan 
nationalist movement under the influence of Arab nationalism in the 1940s similarly 
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presented Berbers as potential allies of the French.120 The persistence of this belief 
relates to the Royal Decree of the 1930s, dhahir, which allowed Berber regions to sit 
under French jurisdiction, and to use their customary law rather than Moroccan 
Islamic laws.121 However, the customary law was not specified, and the Berber tribes 
were not clearly defined. The Protectorate settled the question by declaring ‘Berbers’ 
to be the tribes that had submitted after the campaigns of ‘pacification’ carried out 
by the French in the King’s name – that is, the Berbers were defined without relation 
to any cultural identity.122  
The recognition of Berber languages was part of the political agenda of 
activists, who themselves identified as Berbers, in Algeria and Morocco. In 
Morocco, Berber groups were staunchly repressed by the future King Hassan II in 
1958, especially in the Rif in Northern Morocco, a focus of anti-colonial resistance 
and anti-monarchical protests. In Algeria, pro-Berber protest was rife throughout the 
1970s, but culminated in 1982 when general strikes and demonstrations led to the 
arrest of many activists, mainly in the Kabyle region. Other Berber Algerian 
minority groups, speaking a range of non-Arabic languages – such as the Chaouia or 
the Tuaregs – were more politically co-opted, and were awarded key positions in the 
post-independence military. Although Amazigh has now been recognised, protests 
have not ceased in Algeria, and they remain closely connected to demands for 
improved social justice and youth employment. 
In a significant shift, after years of political protest, the 2016 Algerian 
constitution now recognises Amazigh as a national and official language alongside 
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Standard Arabic.123 Yet this recognition only means that Amazigh will be taught in 
schools and used in the media; it will not be used in administration or for official 
statements.124 Five years previously, the 2011 Moroccan constitution also recognised 
Amazigh as an official language and a ‘common heritage to all Moroccans without 
exception’.125 Yet this progress is not without its own issues of co-optation. A 
number of Amazigh activists have refused such co-optation and have decried the 
state’s actions as a ‘folklorisation’ of Berber culture, implying that the state was 
promoting Berber languages and cultural practices, such as dance, craft, and music, 
while ignoring specific political demands.126 Bensadoun points out that Moroccan 
Arab nationalist intellectuals in Morocco as well as leaders of Islamic parties were 
opposed to the official recognition of the Amazigh language and identity because it 
endangered the unified image and identity of Morocco under Arab tutelage.127 All of 
this shows that language is still very much at stake in Moroccan politics and is 
closely controlled by the state as a means to balance power between different 
political parties and groups. 
 Darija, though widely used in Algeria, was not at the heart of debates even 
when Arabisation policies were strengthened in 1997 during the Black Decade. 
French was completely removed from administration, court laws, official discourses 
even if laws are written in both languages. These changes aimed at reinforcing the 
political power and ideology of Algeria as an Arab Muslim country and counter 
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Islamists by proving that the elite was in favour of Standard Arabic.128 In Morocco, 
darija became widely used in the media in the late 2000s. Darija remains a national 
language that is more used than the official languages and is the language that 
accomplishes more clearly a cultural unity in both nations, as Berbers have mainly 
spoken darija since the 1970s in both countries. In both countries, the French 
language, on the other hand, illustrates the ‘linguistic compromise’: French remains 
symbolically linked to the colonial power and is also the mark of the political and 
economic elite’s power.129 French retains its association with the upper classes, who 
use it more frequently, and is also used in administration, private and state banks, 
media (newspapers, state and private radio and television channels) and is officially 
supported by the state in some educational institutions such as universities and 
technical institutes. Darija and French are also incorporated into everyday life, 
public signage, and artistic and media productions.  
Filmmakers, meanwhile, have consistently harnessed linguistic diversity to 
capture that dimension of cultural diversity, and, arguably, to challenge state 
authority, monolingualism, and the myths of nation-building. They have, at different 
periods, either contested the use of Standard Arabic, as in Algeria, or promoted the 
use of French, darija, and Berber languages in films. When Berber was recognised 
as a national language, films in Berber appeared in Morocco and Algeria, for the first 
time, though they were mainly distributed locally in DVD format, without subtitles, 
and remain a niche for Berber speakers. Thus, while these films support local links 
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between minority language and cultural identity, they have not yet been incorporated 
into the larger culture. 
 
National Cinema: Scholarly Debates 
National cinema could be seen as a self-explanatory concept: cinema that emerges 
from a defined nation. Film scholars, however, have disputed the concept and its 
presuppositions. What constitutes nationhood? Is nationhood a geographical 
boundary, or a linguistic unity? Is a national cinema constituted by all the films 
made in a particular country? In an era of globalisation, when funds and film crews 
are transnational, is the concept of national cinema still valid? This section will 
review the history of the concept of national cinema by way of academic debates and 
attempt to answer the questions raised. 
From the advent of sound in cinema in the late 1920s to the late 1980s and 
the emergence of globalisation, national cinema was largely categorised by country 
of origin, and national cinemas were tied implicitly to the nation’s first language: 
French cinema was in French, German cinema in German, Italian cinema in Italian, 
etc. To take the example of France, as it is closely tied to the Algerian and Moroccan 
cases, the vast literature on French cinema as a national cinema has covered almost 
uniquely films in the French language – from wide-ranging surveys (Sadoul 1962; 
Armes 1985; Williams 1992; Billard 1995; Frodon 1995; Hayward & Vincendeau 
2000; Hayward 2005 among others) to sociological readings (Reader 1981; Buss 
1988; Ross 1995; Gaston-Mathé 1996) or gender readings (Tarr with Rollet 2001; 
Sellier 2008; Rees-Roberts 2008).130 The same goes for studies of specific periods, 
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which are too numerous to be detailed here – including works on silent cinema, the 
1930s, the war years, the New Wave, the May 1968 period and up to the 
contemporary era. Similarly, work on films made by filmmakers of European origins 
(e.g. Phillips 2004) and those of Maghrebi origins (Tarr 2005; Higbee 2014) 
concentrate on films in the French language.131 Even studies that advertise 
themselves as about the cinema that is popular with French audiences, that is 
including Hollywood and other national cinemas, end up discussing films in French 
(Jeancolas 1979; Waldron and Vanderschelden 2007).132 Among the few exceptions 
are Vanessa Schwartz’s study of cosmopolitan filmmaking in her book It’s So 
French! Hollywood, Paris, and the Making of Cosmopolitan Film Culture (2007) 
and works dedicated to French cinephilia, as scholars examine the object of French 
film critical practice, that is often Hollywood cinema (de Baecque 2003; Montebello 
2005) or British film (Wimmer 2009).133 
                                               
Billard, L’Âge classique du cinéma français: du cinéma parlant à la nouvelle vague (Paris: 
Flammarion, 1995). Jean-Michel Frodon, L’Âge moderne du cinéma français: de la nouvelle 
vague à nos jours (Paris: Flammarion, 1995). Susan Hayward and Ginette Vincendeau, eds., 
French Film: Texts and Contexts, 2nd edn (London: Routledge, 2000). Hayward, French 
National Cinema, 2nd edn (London: Routledge, 2005). Keith Reader, Cultures on Celluloid 
(London: Quartet, 1981). Kristin Ross, Fast Cars, Clean Bodies: Decolonization and the 
Reordering of French Culture (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1995). Catherine Gaston-Mathé, La 
Société française au miroir de son cinéma: de la débâcle à la décolonisation (Condé- sur-
Noireau, France: Arléa-Corlet, 1996). Carrie Tarr and Brigitte Rollet, Cinema and the 
Second Sex: Women’s Filmmaking in France in the 1980s and 1990s (New York: 
Continuum, 2001). Geneviève Sellier, Masculine Singular: French New Wave Cinema, 
trans. by Kristin Ross (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008). Nick Rees-Roberts, 
French Queer Cinema (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008).  
131 Alastair Phillips, City of Darkness, City of Light: Émigré Filmmakers in Paris, 1929–
1939 (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2004). Tarr, Reframing Difference: Beur 
and Banlieue Filmmaking in France. Higbee, Post-Beur Cinema: North African Émigré and 
Maghrebi-French Filmmaking in France since 2000. Jean-Pierre Jeancolas, Histoire du 
cinéma français, 2nd edn (Paris: Armand Colin, 2005). Darren Waldron and Isabelle 
Vanderschelden, eds, France at the Flicks: Trends in Contemporary French Popular 
Cinema (Newcastle, UK: Cambridge Scholars, 2007).  
132 Vanessa R. Schwartz, It’s So French! Hollywood, Paris, and the Making of 
Cosmopolitan Film Culture (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007).  
133 Antoine de Baecque, La cinéphilie: invention d’un regard, histoire d’une culture, 1944–




The debate over national cinema – its definition and usefulness – began in 
Anglophone academic discourse with Andrew Higson’s seminal article ‘The 
Concept of National Cinema’, in Screen in 1989.134 Taking British cinema as his 
starting point, Higson was the first to argue that cinema categories should not be 
strictly restricted to territories. Higson recognised the difficulty of strictly national 
definitions of cinema, because cinema is an industrial and cultural practice. 
Furthermore, the means by which films are distributed, exhibited, and how audiences 
engage with national or Hollywood films must form part of the definition of national 
cinema. Higson argued that cultural allegiance to Hollywood was an important part 
of the British public’s taste, and Hollywood films became part of British cinema and, 
more generally, British culture. For Higson, the reception and circulation of national 
and foreign films within a given country construct and re-define its national cinema.  
Hollywood subsequently remained the focus of debates over national cinema. 
In 1993, Stephen Crofts approached national cinemas in terms of the strategies that 
nations developed to engage with Hollywood.135 Firstly, Crofts observed that certain 
nations do not depend on Hollywood productions. In India, for example, national 
productions outsell Hollywood films.136 Secondly, he considered the nations that 
imitate Hollywood style and integrate it into more vernacular styles – such is the 
case in Britain and Canada.137 Thirdly, Crofts identified nations that clearly opposed 
Hollywood films, as represented by the Third Cinema manifesto.  
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Third Cinema, defined by the Argentinian filmmakers Fernando Solanas and 
Octavio Getino in the 1960s, called for a post-colonial, revolutionary view of 
filmmaking and distribution, rejecting the ‘bourgeois’ values of Hollywood, which 
offer only escapism.138 Fernando and Getino argued that films should raise political 
consciousness and represent the masses rather than the individual. Crofts’ analysis 
also extended to the auteur-director cinema, which presented a different model of 
filmmaking to Hollywood. Crofts argued that the auteur-director is identified with 
the nation he or she emerged from and is opposed stylistically to Hollywood films.139 
On this basis, European film critics often associate Iranian cinema with auteurs such 
as Iranian filmmaker Abbas Kiarostami. 
In a 1996 article, film scholar Martine Danan contends that a ‘postnational’ 
cinema has emerged in France in the late 1980s. Danan argues that the aggressive 
policy advocated by the French Ministry of Culture in the late 1980s to promote 
French cinema abroad and target a global market supported high budget co-
productions in English which led to a ‘postnational mode of film practice’. 140 
Postnational cinema was to capture international audiences and compete with 
Hollywood  with ‘commodified postnational productions [L’Amant (Dir. Jean 
Jacques Annaud, 1992), Indochine (Dir. Régis Wargnier, 1992), Valmont (Dir. Milos 
Forman, 1989)], transforming the national culture into pleasurable spectacle for 
domestic and foreign audiences’.141 With high budget films, French stars and 
English, postnational cinema would overcome linguistic and cultural barriers 
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reaching American audiences – reluctant to dubbing and subtitles – by downplaying 
or eliminating cultural references. 142 By 1993, the Ministry of Culture tightened its 
funding rules favouring films made in French over those in English, and 
‘postnational’ productions receded.143  
Postnational cinema exposes French ambition to offset Hollywood’s 
hegemony, while the reinforcement of French language in French productions 
outlines the desire to maintain a national cinema with cultural specificities. More 
recently Jonathan Buchsbaum (2017) and Chris Meir (2019) have developed the 
international/transnational/postnational dimension of French film production 
investigating how French cinema challenges Hollywood domination and maintains 
its market share through market regulation, European coproduction and targeted 
funding policies towards French and foreign directors.144 
In the late 1990s, the concept of ‘transnational’ cinema emerged in response 
to the perceived insufficiencies of national cinema in an era of globalisation. By 
2002, for example, Higson had revised his stance on national cinema and was 
arguing more clearly for transnational cinema. He argued that national cinema 
cannot capture ‘cultural diversity or cultural specificity’.145  Referring to Benedict 
Anderson’s concept of defining the nation as an ‘imagined community’ Higson’s 
revised thesis is that the ‘nation’ is not limited to the borders of the nation-state, and 
common national characteristics cannot be ascribed to the populations who live 
within the nation’s borders. Higson acknowledges the porosity of geographical 
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borders, the shifting definition of the nation and the circulation of filmmakers who 
have always been itinerant, and the internationalisation of production and funding.146 
Within debates about transnational cinema, national cinema as a sole 
category had a resurgence. In 2000, Susan Hayward asserted that the concept of 
national cinema remained useful because films can be understood through and 
against this term: they can be read in order to recognise the ‘symbolic practices’ of 
national discourses; they can also be read as sites of contestation, as ‘anti-
assimilationist [and] anti-integrationist’.147 The subsequent ‘new’ definitions of 
national cinema argued against the equation of ‘national’ with the geographical 
boundaries of the nation-state. In 2006, for example, Jinhee Choi took issue with a 
‘territorial’ approach to national cinema.148 Because film is an industrial product, 
resulting from international funding and co-production, the production company is 
more likely to determine the film’s nationality. When co-productions operate across 
nations, the film’s nationality becomes difficult to identify. However, Choi did not 
discuss the importance of language in defining national cinema in the territorial 
approach, and thus did not recognise the persistent socio-cultural and political 
significance of the underlying links between nationhood, nation and language. 
In 2011, JungBong Choi critically examined how English-speaking film 
scholars characterised national cinema. He asserted that over the past decades, film 
scholars assumed that national cinema was associated with ‘identity/uniqueness’.149 
JungBong Choi maintained that film scholars understood national cinema’s raison 
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d'être as carrying an exclusive and distinct identity, closely tied to a particular 
nation.150 JungBong Choi argued that to regard national cinema as a unique 
representation of difference is to limit its possibilities: national cinema is not 
concerned only with identity. JungBong Choi emphasised that Hollywood style has 
an influence on national filmmaking, but this does not prevent national cinemas from 
retaining individual characteristics: the notion of ‘pure’ national cinema is outmoded 
and should be dismissed.151  
Film scholars’ habitual assumptions about the uniqueness of national 
cinemas, in JungBong Choi’s view, also shed a negative light on nationalism. For 
JungBong Choi, film scholars sought to redefine national cinema by redefining the 
‘nation’.152 JungBong Choi explains that the negative views of nationalism followed 
the Second World War and led Anglophone film scholars to distance themselves 
from it. Nationalism came to be considered by many film scholars as a ‘source of 
evil’ since it was the ideology behind colonial rule, WWII, and even more recent 
ethnic conflicts.153 JungBong Choi, on the other hand, proposed a positive view of 
nationalism: one that contributes to nation-building, as was the case for newly 
independent countries. Nation-building is for JungBong Choi the sense of unifying 
disparate peoples and potentially healing conflict.154  
But the question must then be asked: can nationalism only be a positive 
concept for newly independent (or not yet independent) countries? It must also be 
acknowledged that nationalism has different meanings across different geographies 
because not all nations are on the same ‘historical clock’.155 Certainly, the concept of 
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nationalism has different meanings in Algeria and Morocco, and what becomes of 
nationalism linked to language is a question that JungBong Choi does not answer in 
his analysis.  
In 2010, Will Higbee and Song Hwee Lim, in their introduction to an issue of 
the journal Transnational Cinemas, argued that the prolific use of the term 
‘transnational’ has rendered it void of meaning.156 Higbee and Lim called for a 
‘critical transnationalism’ that would encourage English-speaking academics to be 
wary when analysing complex and diverse transnational films.157 For Higbee and 
Lim, the following elements needed to be taken into account when discussing 
transnational films: issues of migration, diaspora, and the political, economic, and 
ideological differences between nations.158 Higbee and Lim correctly draw attention 
to the geographical and ideological position from which academics speak, and insist 
that academics’ focus on means of production and distribution can lead them to 
overlook linguistic and national complexities – such as the language in which the 
films’ characters speak, or the representation of specific political events – in 
transnational films.159 Higbee and Lim’s observations are accurate in the case of 
Algerian and Moroccan films: film scholars often overlook their linguistic 
complexities. This is illustrated in relation to Goodbye Morocco, discussed later, a 
truly transnational film made in Morocco by an Algerian-French filmmaker, whose 
national characteristics are not immediately apparent and were missed or 
misrepresented by some critics due to a lack of attention to language.  
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Scholarly approaches to the problem of national cinema have moved away 
from the unquestioned link between cinema, language, and the nation – whereby 
national cinema is bound to national languages and borders – towards diverse and 
multiple definitions. Globalisation raised questions about nation and nationhood, and 
the debate has expanded to questions around means of production, distribution and 
reception, as well as transnational, regional, postnational or even supra-national 
cinema. While national cinema is defined in relation to the nation, one of the 
constituent elements of a ‘national’ cinema, language, is too often set aside – that is, 
too often absorbed into the characteristics of the ‘national’ – even though language 
can be a site of contesting the ‘national’.160  
Having indicated the debates around national cinema and language, I will 
now turn to the more specific historical features of Algerian and Moroccan cinemas. 
 
History of Algerian and Moroccan Cinemas  
 
Cinema Under Colonial Rule (1895-1956/1962)  
Between 1900 and 1956, over fifty years of French colonial rule in North Africa, a 
total of 210 films were shot in the Maghreb: 80 in Algeria, 20 in Tunisia, and over 
100 in Morocco.161 While this is a small percentage of the total number of French 
films made during the colonial period, among the North African films were various 
commercial successes. These films gained interest from scholars in the 1970s; 
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beforehand they were generally included under a director’s filmography or classified 
by chronological order without the colonial aspect being discussed. French film 
scholar Pierre Boulanger first sketched out the history of colonial cinema in an 
anthology published in 1975.162 In 1991, French scholar Pierre Sorlin continued 
Boulanger’s work and examined the films made during the colonial era.163 Unlike 
Boulanger, Sorlin found it problematic to define the cinema of the colonial period as 
cinéma colonial. Sorlin argued that not all French films made in the colonies bear a 
colonial ideology.164 Prior to Sorlin’s book, Algerian scholars agreed that the cinema 
of this period should be thought of as cinéma colonial and not cinema made in the 
colonies. The Algerian political researcher Lotfi Maherzi, in his exhaustive 1980 
book-length survey of Algerian cinema, exposed how French films made in Algeria 
emerged from colonial policies, particularly as propaganda and as a demonstration of 
French modernity and progress.165 For Algerian sociologist Abdelghani Megherbi, 
who examined colonial films made in Algeria, this cinema is undeniably colonial.166 
Megherbi argued that colonial cinema perpetuated colonial views when films 
represented the natives as cruel savages who needed to be educated and 
controlled.167  
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Sorlin’s view was also contradicted by Abdelkader Benali, a French film 
scholar of Maghrebi origins. In 1998, Benali produced a comprehensive study of 
colonial cinema which considered all the films made in the colonies irrespective of 
the directors who shot the films. Benali defined the cinema of the period as colonial 
and traces its origins in the Maghreb back to French Orientalist painting of the 19th 
century. For Benali, colonial cinema took the themes developed and institutionalised 
by these paintings – the harem, the violence of the indigenous man, his religious 
fervour, his cultural decadence – and constructed an imaginary world.168 Benali 
pointed out that these films were adapted from novels and therefore the impression 
they gave of the colonial experience was already imprinted on the public 
consciousness.169 Benali considered colonial cinema as a medium used to achieve 
and promote a common representation of colonial space. Benali’s work demonstrates 
that colonial cinema derives from and reinforces pre-existing stereotypes and 
confirms Edward Said’s view that the West depicted the Orient as an ‘irrational, 
psychologically weak, and feminized, non-European Other’.170 
In 2001 the American historian David Henry Slavin contributed to the debate 
by comparing and examining the practical conditions of filmmaking in Algeria and 
Morocco.171 Although Algeria and Morocco were both under French colonial rule, 
the different forms of colonial governance and the countries’ different histories gave 
rise to differences in their filmmaking. French films made in Algeria sought popular 
support from the Empire, were promoted by a ‘colonial lobby’, and were aided by 
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the Foreign Legion in western Algeria who provided means of transport and material 
aid to filming locations.172  
French films made in Morocco followed the assimilationist policies of 
Maréchal Lyautey – Resident General of Morocco (1912 to 1925) – and offered 
fairer depictions and employment of Moroccans than in Algeria. Lyautey believed 
that France should keep Morocco’s king in power, to preserve Morocco’s traditional 
society, and to promote collaboration between the natives, local administration, and 
the army.173 Under Lyautey’s reign and influence, a film industry prospered in 
Morocco. Fiction films, ethnological documentaries, and travel accounts were 
produced.  
While Lyautey’s reign was a less authoritarian colonial practice, he 
nonetheless adopted the ‘Berber myth’ also deployed in Algeria which dominated 
during the colonial era.174 As mentioned earlier, the ‘Berber myth’ was constructed 
to create or exacerbate a division between Arabs and Berbers in Morocco and 
Algeria, pushing the idea Berbers were closer to Europeans than the Arabs, and were 
ripe for the French mission civilisatrice.175 The Berber myth is evident in some of 
the French films made in Morocco and Slavin provides the example of Itto (Dir. Jean 
Benoit-Levy, Marie Epstein, 1934), a film that Lyautey helped to produce. For 
Slavin, Itto encouraged audiences to identify with the supposedly European-like 
Berbers, presented as potential allies of the French colonial enterprise.176  
Adapted from the novel Itto, récit marocain d’amour et de bataille (1923), 
Itto was written by Maurice Le Glay, one of Lyautey’s advisers. The plot revolves 
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around the young woman Itto, daughter of Hamou, a Berber tribe leader fighting the 
French. Hamou forges an alliance with Hamid, another tribe chief whose son Miloud 
is in love with Itto. However, Hamid’s allegiances shift to the French army after a 
French doctor cures his cattle; Itto and Miloud’s love affair is consequently opposed 
by Hamou, and Miloud is shot by Hamou’s men when Itto and Miloud try to elope. 
Later, Itto gives birth to a daughter, while Miloud is nursed and saved by the French 
doctor, who cured Hamou’s cattle, leading Miloud to pledge allegiance to the 
French. Ultimately, Itto returns to her father, standing beside him against the French 
and they both die protecting the fortress. Through the figures of Hamid and Miloud 
Itto appears to celebrate Lyautey’s integrationist policies and those Berbers who 
work alongside the French ‘pacifiers’. 
Although Lyautey may have promoted protectorate policies and protected 
indigenous rights, films produced in Morocco still served a political agenda and 
rarely depicted the lives of the indigenous peoples, just like the films from colonised 
Algeria. There was also an issue of inauthentic representation – when the ‘natives’ 
were represented in these films, they were mostly played by French actors, and 
appeared subordinate and grateful to have been ‘civilised’. The language spoken by 
these ‘natives’ was an invented one, vaguely sounding like Berber or Arabic; and 
sometimes they spoke French. 177 The absence of local dialects or Arabic in these 
films demonstrates how the filmmakers paid little attention to the existence of the 
natives, who occupied only secondary roles.  
The indigenous population in Algeria and Morocco scarcely had the 
opportunity to view French films, nor did they understand them. The indigenous 
Algerian and Moroccan population was thus doubly excluded from the cinema of the 





nation they lived in. Indigenous populations were allowed to attend Egyptian films, 
which began to arrive in 1932, under strict control by the French colonial power. 
Educational French films were also brought to Algeria and travelled in cinébuses to 
remote areas to reach out to the indigenous rural community.178 These cinébuses 
were controlled by the French governing body Le Gouvernorat Général and they 
supplied films about folkloric and ethnographic events. Since the local population 
mainly did not speak French, a translator travelled with the buses and dubbed the 
films with a voice-over in local dialects.179 The translator was under the strict 
surveillance of a French supervisor, which suggests that the French authorities were 
conscious of the importance of language choice and translation and sought to control 
the messages delivered. 
Egyptian films were successful with local populations in Algeria and 
Morocco. These films were mainly comedies or dramas, often with appearances 
from popular Egyptian or Lebanese singers. They were tolerated because they were 
light-hearted comedies that did not criticise the Egyptian monarchy or foreigners. 
The ulemas encouraged Muslim Algerians to attend Egyptian film screenings.180 
Even if the Arabic spoken in the Egyptian movies was not understood by all 
audiences, the ulemas saw Egyptian cinema in line with their vision of an Arab 
Algeria. 181 Another surprising fact is that Egyptian films of the period depicted, for 
example, cabaret dances, not compliant with the ulemas’ strict views on mores; this 
suggests that when faced with a choice between different values, the importance of 
language, both practical and ideological, was paramount. The ulemas saw in these 
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films the opportunity to familiarise audiences with the Arabic language, which was 
otherwise not widely taught. 182 This indicates the ulemas’ preference for linguistic 
unity over cultural unity when it came to consolidating nationhood at this point. 
Egyptian films, however, were only available in urban areas and did not reach 
Berber speakers. Because the colonial powers were scared that such films might 
disseminate nationalist ideologies – Egypt was the centre of Arab nationalism – 
French filmmakers were encouraged to produce films in Morocco at the Studio 
Souissi in Rabat. These films were inspired by myths and legends and occluded the 
realities of colonisation. Scriptwriters and technicians were all foreigners; and the 
films encountered little success with the Muslim public.183  
The French film critic Guy Hennebelle explains that the French failure to 
produce ‘Arab’ cinema related to an inability to reproduce two popular forms of 
cinema: Egyptian melodrama, which offered an important opportunity for catharsis 
for the indigenous population; and social realist dramas, which reflected the realities 
of their lives.184 The Moroccan film critic Mustapha Mesnaoui, meanwhile, notes 
that French films, produced with Moroccan actors, tended to reproduce Orientalist 
ideas in the same vein as the tale of One Thousand and One Nights.185 When they 
failed to capture popular interest, the French authorities simply increased the custom 
fees for Egyptian films in Algeria and Morocco, to reduce the number of Egyptian 
films that were distributed. 186 
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The Algerian war and cinema 
Cinema became a site of profound struggle for national identity – both as an art form 
and as a physical space for disseminating ideas. With the outbreak of the war in 
1954, Algerians realised the importance of images to publicise their cause abroad. 
The main political body fighting against the French army, the Front de Libération 
Nationale (FLN), prohibited the local population from attending cinemas. The FLN 
considered that French newsreels and films broadcast in cinemas not only embodied 
the colonial presence but also presented negative images of the fighters as 
terrorists.187 In 1957, the Farid group, constituted of Algerian and French 
filmmakers who joined the FLN, began to produce films and documentaries to 
promote the cause of liberation abroad and counteract French propaganda. Some, 
such as Djazairouna (Notre Algérie, Dir. Pierre Chaulet, Djamel Chanderli and 
Mohammed Lakhdar-Hamina,1959) and Yasmina (Dir. Djamel Chanderli and 
Mohammed Lakhdar-Hamina, 1961) were broadcast at the United Nations assembly 
when the Algerian question was discussed, and the films had an impact, albeit 
limited, in publicising the Algerian cause. These collectively made films were in 
French, which may seem ironic, but the use of French was logical since the leaders 
of independence were mainly educated in that language; and French provided a 
means to engage with international audiences in the West. A linguistic compromise 
was reached at the time: using French to defend independence. 
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Immediate Post-Independence Period (1956/1962-1980s) 
The aftermath of French colonial rule saw Algeria and Morocco attempt to rebuild 
themselves economically, politically, and culturally. The newly independent 
countries needed to present an image of their rebirth. In Algerian cinema, this effort 
eclipsed most other social and political questions. National cinema needed to unify 
the nation around the myth of the Algerian war and build a shared memory of its 
glory. After independence, more than 450 cinemas remained in Algeria and 200 in 
Morocco, continuing the French infrastructure, with institutions like the Centre du 
Cinéma Marocain (CCM) founded in 1944 and modelled on the French Centre 
National du Cinéma (CNC).188 
Another legacy was the practice of sending films back to France for post-
production. In the 1960s the nationalised Algerian film industry still sent 35mm 
films and newsreels to France for developing. This practice was not considered 
controversial, and it only ended when the increased cost could no longer be 
justified.189 Algeria was dependent on France due to a lack of skills, and even though 
filmmakers were critical of the colonial presence, many were sent to France for 
training. In this respect, there was an uneasy dependency between the two countries. 
France was both the source and antithesis of Algeria’s independent identity forming 
in film. Moroccan cinema, meanwhile, maintained the employment of French crews, 
and remained under supervision by the Ministry of the Interior even until the mid-
1990s, with strict control and censorship.  
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Algerian Cinema 1962-1980: Glorious Days 
In Algeria, cinema from the period from 1962 to 1972 was known to critics as 
mujahid cinema: freedom fighter cinema, with many films documenting the heroic 
efforts during the war against the French. Maherzi offers two types of hero from 
Algerian films of this period: the mujahid, noble, virtuous, proud, and intellectual; 
and the fellah, the peasant.190 Both of these heroes projected positive images of men. 
Women rarely appeared on screen, and when they did it was typically as victims of 
the oppressor rather than heroines of the war.191 Algerian filmmakers accepted the 
ideology behind the Arab-socialist rebuilding of the country. Algerian filmmakers, 
and the crew (actors, technicians), were employees of the state and had to follow the 
ideological directive to use Standard Arabic in films, which in these early days of 
Arabisation, few Algerians understood or mastered. Algerian cinema in this period 
was not popular, as reflected by ticket sales. As Maherzi observes, of the 30 million 
cinema tickets sold in 1968, only three percent were for Algerian films, which were 
poorly attended.192 Algerians were more drawn to French, Hollywood, and Egyptian 
films.193 
The Algerian authorities continued to use cinema as propaganda after 
President Houari Boumediène gained power in the coup of 1965 overthrowing 
President Ahmed Ben Bella. The 1960s and the 1970s saw spectacular festivals that 
brought Algeria widespread recognition and influence in international cinema. At 
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this time, many co-productions were initiated, involving directors from Egypt 
(Youssef Chahine), France, and Italy. Costa Gavras’s Z (1969) was one of the most 
well-known Algerian-French co-productions of the era. The diversity of languages 
did not disturb Algerian film critics, as these films were co-productions and did not 
bear an Algerian label. These films were distributed in Algerian cinemas and at the 
Algerian Cinémathèque – an institution that played an important role in promoting 
international films. 
After a decade of mujahid films, according to Hennebelle, a new era in 
Algerian cinema began: cinéma djidid, or new cinema, films made in darija and 
Standard Arabic.194 Hennebelle places the beginning of this period in 1972, 
immediately after the agrarian revolution, which aimed at the nationalisation of 
agricultural lands and the end of feudal exploitation. Cinéma djidid was named in 
relation to Brazil’s cinema novo, which emerged in 1959 and rejected the Hollywood 
commercial style in favour of social realism, proletarian struggle and political 
edification. Cinéma djidid sought much the same. Hennebelle described this cinema 
as an attempt to ‘pave the way for an authentic Algerian cinema language’ and 
ultimately to ‘defeat […] cultural colonialism’.195 It is interesting that Hennebelle 
makes use of ‘cinema language’ rather than discussing language in itself; he stresses 
the conception of cinema as an ideological tool, in the same vein as Third Cinema, 
viewing language only as a component but not an essential one since the main aim 
was to awaken the public and find a new Algerian cinema that would break with the 
mujahid era and the remains of colonialism in culture.  
Le Charbonnier (Dir. Mohammed Bouamari, 1972) is an example of cinéma 
                                               
194 Hennebelle, ‘Cinema djidid’, p. 30. 




djidid which narrates the difficulty for a former combatant, Gacem, of fitting in with 
independent Algerian society upon his return from the war. Gacem witnesses gender 
changes: his wife was hired in a nearby factory and his position as the breadwinner 
is shaken. Gacem’s coal business is threatened by the appearance of gas. When 
Gacem seeks aid from a former combatant, in town, to find work, he finds his friend 
changed into a bourgeois bureaucrat. Towards the end of the film, Gacem accepts 
the political and social changes Algeria is witnessing. He participates in the agrarian 
reform initiated by the political authorities and encourages his wife to take off her 
veil as a sign of modernity. Shot in black and white, with traditional Algerian music 
that enhances the dark mood of the film, the film is quasi-silent. Television voice-
overs are in Standard Arabic. Gacem’s friend, the bureaucrat, speaks darija when 
ordering coffee but uses Standard Arabic to remember heroic actions, or to describe 
the future of Algeria in ideological terms. The film denounces class struggle and 
attacks the feudalists and bureaucrats as neo-colonialists. Even if the film uses 
darija, Standard Arabic remains the main language spoken and heard, apparently so 
as to keep the ideology of a united language that carries Algerian ideologies. 
By 1976, Algerian national cinema was used to reinforce Algerian national 
identity and promote ‘Algérianisation’, the political project started by the President 
Ben Bella, Algeria’s first President, that sought to replace foreign employees with 
Algerians. Algérianisation went hand in hand with Arabisation and aimed at 
educating the Algerian people about the Algerian nation and its history, promoting 




Algerians.196 The government’s strategy, announced in 1976, was to produce ten 
films and twenty short films annually by 1980 to reinforce ‘Algérianisation’.197  
The Algerian thinker and politician Mostefa Lacheraf tried to provide a new 
definition of Algerian national identity or what was called ‘Algérianité’, and to 
oppose the political ideology that inscribed the Algerian identity and tied it uniquely 
to the ‘Arab Muslim’ identity.198 Lacheraf believed that culture was the hostage of 
nationalism, at the expense of progress, which he saw to be reflected in films of the 
period. Lacheraf, who was the Minister of Education (1977-1979) denounced the 
replacement of Algerian dialects with Standard Arabic in the media and called for 
bilingualism (Arabic and French) in education. He had to resign from his position as 
the FLN was opposed to his educational programme.  
Cinéma djidid’s ideologically-driven filmmakers were influenced, 
Hennebelle claims, by Lacheraf.199 However, these films encountered little success. 
The djidid films were mainly social dramas that insisted on the difficult conditions 
of the rural population. Algerian journalists considered the films produced as too 
close to the official political doctrine and noted that they did not appeal to the 
Algerian public, who were more attracted to American, Indian, and Egyptian films. 
Sabry Hafez has also argued that the colonial presence and legacy influenced the 
films made post-independence and imprinted upon the ‘national psyche’.200 
According to Hafez, the trauma of French colonialism, and the desire to sever the 
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ties with France through cinema, embedded itself into post-independence films: the 
films’ main theme was the reconstruction of a national image, by which Arabic 
became the instrument of promoting the political ideology of the newly independent 
country.201  
The question of language in films was not evoked in books written in French 
of the time as it seems that after independence film critics and filmmakers were more 
concerned with establishing the foundations of a national cinema. It was not until the 
1970s that film critics, and filmmakers, started to reject Standard Arabic as the sole 
language of cinema and cultural production and sought alternatives such as darija. 
The Arabic-language newspaper El Djeich argued in 1980 that Algerian cinema 
lacked popular support because it leant too heavily on propaganda and failed to 
represent the people in a realistic way.202 El Djeich does not mention the failure of 
Standard Arabic to be understood by audiences and does not link it to the failure of 
Algerian films of the time, probably because it is a journal written in Standard 
Arabic.  
Commercial and critical successes in Algeria tended towards realism rather 
than politics, and the remarkable success of the 1970s is the first feature by Algerian 
director Merzak Allouache: Omar Gatlato, released in 1977. Allouache is one of the 
most prolific and internationally known Algerian directors, and Omar Gatlato 
initiated his career. The film circulated in international festivals (Moscow, Cannes, 
Karlovy Vary). In Algeria, the film drew half a million viewers. People queued to 
view it, an unprecedented event for an Algerian feature. Rumours that the Algerian 
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minister of communication was going to withdraw the film led some youth to 
destroy seats in cinemas as a sign of protest.203  
 
 
Figure 2. Omar Gatlato’s original poster in French, 1977204  
The success relates to the film’s principal theme that differs from the mujahid 
era and deals directly with daily social issues. The film follows the daily life of 
Omar, a young adult, who directly addresses the camera and audience. Omar lives in 
Bab El Oued, a working-class neighbourhood in Algiers, in a crowded apartment 
with his family, and works in the government’s fraud department. Mouny Berrah 
argues that the film’s success was mainly due to its subversive use of darija and 
chaâbi (a popularised version of Andalusian music).205 Through Omar Gatlato 
Allouache broke with the filmic norm to present chaâbi as similar to darija; both had 
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no part in the official cultural policy.206 The film addresses the difficulties of young 
men finding their place in independent Algeria, maintaining relationships with 
women, and existing independently of their family or friends. 
The 1970s also saw a rise in film criticism. Many Algerian critics had been 
educated in France in human sciences and sociology (e.g., Megherbi, Maherzi), and 
many wrote in French (e.g., Mouny Berrah, Abdou Benzaine). In the 1970s and 
1980s political film criticism appeared in ‘leftist’ French-language newspapers such 
as Révolution africaine and Algérie actualités, in film periodicals such as Les Deux 
Écrans, and in official journals such as El Moudjahid in French and El Djaich in 
Arabic. Overall, very little of this writing was in Arabic. Like the FLN leaders 
mentioned earlier, many post-independence scholars had attended schools where 
Arabic was taught only as a foreign language (from the late 1940s), or in Muslim 
religious schools where only religious verses were taught and the teaching methods 
did not allow a complete grasp of the language. 
 
Moroccan Cinema 1956-1980: Shy Beginnings 
Morocco’s film industry differed from that of Algeria, in terms of structure, use of 
language, and criticism. Moroccan film criticism and history was mostly conducted 
by English and American French-speaking scholars. The American Institute of 
Maghrebi Studies (AIMS) and the Fulbright Scholarship Program provided 
American scholars with the means to conduct research (American scholars Sandra 
Carter Gayle and Valérie K. Orlando benefitted from AIMS and the Fulbright 
Scholarship for their research on Moroccan cinema). AIMS, established in 1984 in 
Oran (Algeria), is the publisher of the well-known Journal of North African Studies 





and organises joint events with North African and international researchers of the 
region, gaining recognition and investing in a region that had usually been the 
preserve of French researchers (even if Moroccan (and Algerian) cinema were 
hardly the focus of most French researchers). The scarcity of film studies 
departments in France may partially explain the neglect of Moroccan cinema, as may 
the fact that Moroccan cinema is often still seen as part of Maghrebi cinema and not 
as an independent entity (as in Denise Brahimi’s 50 ans de cinéma maghrébin, 
which discusses films from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia and provides the films’ 
plot, information on the directors’ trajectory, and some personal views of the films). 
In Morocco, film studies departments do not exist in universities, hence cinema 
criticism, history and analysis were undertaken by journalists (writing in French and 
in Arabic).  
  Amongst the books published on Moroccan cinema, Roy Armes’s 
Postcolonial Images: Studies in North African Film (2005) provides a useful 
supplementary insight into the functioning of cinema structures in Morocco, and a 
chronological filmography, but it is mainly descriptive and does not offer an in-
depth analysis of the films produced since independence.207 American scholar 
Sandra Gayle Carter offered the most exhaustive review of Moroccan cinema, in her 
2006 book, in which she traced the history of cinema from independence in 1956 
until 2006, and drew on the archives of the CCM, interviews, and early films.208 
Carter’s book title What Moroccan Cinema? reflects a question she has been 
asked by Moroccans, who doubt that they even have a national cinema. Carter’s 
answer to this question highlights the importance of cinema to the building of the 
                                               
207 Armes, Postcolonial Images: Studies in North African Film. 
208 Sandra Gayle Carter, What Moroccan Cinema?: A Historical and Critical Study, 1956-




Moroccan nation-state after independence. Moroccan cinema, she argues, 
constructed national identity in the post-independence era, albeit through privileging 
Islamic and Arabic identity at the expense of Berber and multilingual identities.209 
Carter also explains that religion and wars were absent from the films made in the 
1970s: to address religion would either alienate or incite Muslim activists, and war 
films would ‘remind the populace of one option of national determination’.210 Short 
Moroccan features and documentaries toured in the rural areas to ‘educate’ the 
population about Morocco’s political ambitions to modernise.211 These screenings 
also contained public health advice. Post-independence Moroccan cinema was 
therefore not aimed at representing everyday life but trying to modernise and inform 
the population.  
Ciné clubs were an important means of distribution in Morocco in this period 
and gathered film aficionados, mainly in cities, and were usually presided over and 
attended by French citizens. These clubs did not, however, disseminate the few 
Moroccan films that were released, either because these films were not available or 
because they were not deemed worthy of interest.212 The ten films made in Morocco 
during the 1970s were mainly distributed in film festivals (Cannes, Venice), and 
were rarely shown in Moroccan cinemas.213 An example is the award winning Alyam 
Alyam (Dir. Ahmed El Maanouni, 1978), the first Moroccan feature to be presented 
at Cannes under the selection Un Certain Regard. Alyam Alyam is a documentary 
that exposes the harsh conditions of a family living in the countryside not far from 
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Casablanca, and the desire of the eldest son to apply for a work permit in France, 
seeking a better future. The film however was hardly seen or distributed in Morocco. 
Despite cinema not being explicitly used for political propaganda, I argue 
that there was a political agenda to the educational films; it was tightly controlled by 
the political authorities. Censorship under Hassan II’s reign was generally very 
active, and film did not escape its grasp. Film policies were geared towards 
Moroccan audiences imagined as either rural and in need of education, or urban and 
only interested in foreign films. However, documentaries were voiced over either in 
darija or its regional variants. Unlike their Algerian counterparts, Moroccan 
authorities did not deny the heterogeneity of languages. Darija, in this instance, was 
a means to inform and educate particularly isolated rural audiences.  
Whether Moroccan cinema remained underdeveloped as a result of deliberate 
policy or simple lack of funding, the result was to encourage filmmakers to establish 
their own production companies. Filmmakers had to seek funding outside of 
Morocco, which would further ‘transnationalise’ cinema and further complicate the 
notion of ‘national cinema’ if the latter is understood to be compromised by foreign 
funding and influence.  
 
The Fall and Rise of Algerian Cinema in the Globalisation Era (1980s–Present) 
The globalised era begins in Algeria with the death of President Boumediène in 
1978. Boumediène had been a proponent of Algeria’s socialist politics during the 
1960s and 1970s, but after his death, and following the decline of the state-
controlled economy, the government adopted more liberal economic policies. 
Directors were dismissed from the Algerian Cinema Office, the state structure of 




cut, and television’s influence grew. In the early 1980s, fewer films were made than 
in the 1970s, and the few films that were produced did not attract critical or 
commercial success.  
 The political and social changes that Algeria witnessed in the late 1980s and 
1990s, however, forced cinema to concentrate on political events: youth protests in 
1988, the emergence of the Islamic party, and escalating violence. Between 1991 
and 1999, when Algeria saw increased violence in the context of civil war, cinemas 
were bombed or deserted; when the FIS obtained a majority of councils in 1990, 
they closed cinemas that were not compliant with Islamic values. As it had been 
during the Algerian war, cinema again became a site of contestation.  
This cinema of contestation allowed silenced groups to speak and challenge 
state narratives through the medium of film. It challenged and sought to provide 
another perspective on Algeria's history and contemporary situation. For instance, 
women filmmakers dealt with the rise of Islamism in Algeria, as in Hafsa Koudil’s 
Le Démon au féminin (1992) or retraced the history of the moujahidates (women 
fighters during the Algerian war) in Djamila Sahraoui’s documentary La Moitié du 
ciel d'Allah (1995). Films in Berber languages were also produced during this 
period: Azzedine Meddour’s La Montagne de Baya (1997) and Belkacem Hadjadj’s 
Machaho (1995). These films did not tackle contemporary issues but used legends to 
denounce the contemporary condition of women or rural life. The use of Berber was 
understood as a political gesture to re-inscribe Berber languages and history in the 
common Algerian history. 
The early 1990s were also marked by the exile of directors, who mainly 
settled in France. Armes rightly points out that Maghrebi filmmakers are ‘inevitably 




for production, directors have to ‘organize production through their own personal 
companies, raise national and foreign backing through a script they have personally 
written, and shoot without the presence of a controlling producer’.214 In the case of 
Algeria, the lack of funding enhanced the directors’ autonomy as they had to 
participate in every aspect singlehandedly: the directors had to produce and distribute 
their films through their own production company and acted as primary spokesman.  
Benziane also observes how those directors who were established in France, 
such as Mehdi Charef and Allouache, could only count on the financial support of the 
French CNC, or European television networks, rather than Algerian authorities. 
Between 2000 and 2008, the CNC funded ten Algerian films, while the Algerian 
Minister of Culture only funded five. This discrepancy is due to the non-existence of 
national cinema structures in Algeria, and the fact that priority was given to films 
about the Algerian war. When other films were funded, grants were minor. The 
continuity of mujahid films can be explained in terms of the unchanged ruling 
political elite, which demonstrates that ‘nationalism’ had itself become a ‘myth’ so 
necessary for the ethos of the governing elite that it constrained film production. 
For Benziane, Algerian directors seeking French funding make up an 
‘indigenous’ quota for the French funding bodies; and their films tend to be treated 
only as political expressions and not artistic achievements.215 Benziane adds that 
these directors’ films had a poor reception in Algeria because they were not made for 
an Algerian public as they had European actors and were in French; instead, they 
were made to circulate in festivals.216 Benziane blames the Algerian authorities, who 
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marginalised Algerian cinema for fear of its subversive potential.217 Algerian 
journalist Amira Soltane also refuses to recognise how Algerian films in French can 
retain an Algerian identity. She observes that such films do not achieve mainstream 
success in France, do not bring money back to Algerian cinema, and are ignored by 
the French public.218 Soltane would prefer a cinema that represents Algerian life 
without recourse to the typical themes – perhaps clichés – of terrorism, corruption, 
and unemployment.219  
Undoubtedly, issues of language and national identity prevail in the debate 
over Algerian cinema and its role in reconstructing the nation’s self-image. I agree 
with Benziane that the Algerian minister of culture does not fund filmmakers unless 
they glorify the actions of the past; I disagree, however, that the use of the French 
language and European actors distance filmmakers from the Algerian public. 
Moknèche’s Le Harem de Madame Osmane, for example, discussed in Chapter Four, 
takes place in Algiers, uses French, and has Carmen Maura, a Spanish star, in its lead 
role. The film succeeds in portraying the start of the civil war and narrates realities of 
Algerian life. It was a critical success in Algeria, despite not being widely 
distributed. Furthermore, French is one the languages spoken in Algeria, blended in 
the daily life, in the media, and it is noticeable that journalists did not question 
whether Algerian Francophone literature is only addressed to a French public and 
distanced from Algerian realities. Clearly there is a relationship between the ‘images’ 
of Algerians in films that use French, which I will further explore in the second 
chapter. 
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As mentioned earlier many of the Algerian films were made by directors 
living abroad returning to film in Algeria, and I ask whether these films belong to the 
category of ‘accented cinema’. Discussing films made by exilic, diasporic and ethnic 
filmmakers living in other countries than their own country of origin, the Iranian 
film scholar Hamid Naficy introduced the concept of ‘accented cinema’, a type of 
cinema closely linked to the identity of those who create them, and are expressed 
with the ‘accent’, or subjective perspective, of the filmmaker.220 For Naficy, 
accented films share a ‘home-seeking’ or ‘home-founding’ nostalgia and are 
opposed to commercial cinema.221 Naficy discusses the split reception of accented 
filmmakers: recognised in international cinemas, but not in their own country of 
origin. Naficy argues that these accented films exemplify the complex links between 
language and ‘regional and national identities prior to displacement’.222 Naficy 
highlights the way in which accented directors cling to their language as part of their 
identity, possibly limiting the international distribution of the film, and using 
language as a ‘marker of belonging and authenticity’.223 Indeed, the complex inter-
relation between language and national identity is one of the key constituents of 
‘accented cinema’. The accented filmmaker maintains an ‘organic relationship’ with 
their audience through the use of their own language, which retains a vital link with 
‘home’.224 Consequently, language remains a signifier of national identity in 
accented cinema.  
 Following Naficy, the film scholar Asuman Suner proposes that the concept 
of accented cinema can be extended to national directors who cannot be regarded as 
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‘exilic/diasporic’ – that is, directors who do not reside in western countries or have 
any attachment with the ‘West’. Suner calls for an ‘accented cinema at large’.225 
These filmmakers reside in their home nation, but they resist the official national 
narratives (which, in Algeria, include the glorification of the war and a homogenous 
Algerian identity). These films still raise issues of belonging and identity, within a 
group or a nation, and describe issues of exile; they can also be multilingual, and 
typically adopt a small scale of production, with limited means. The directors tend to 
write, edit, and shoot the films. For Suner, ‘accented cinema at large’ reads 
differently to transnational films made by either national or exilic directors who deal 
with questions of belonging and identity, because accented cinema at large questions 
the nation beyond and across national borders and critically takes into account 
questions of ‘belonging and identity as their central problematic’.226 Suner argues 
that ‘accented cinema at large’ will re-define national cinema through a ‘subversive 
critique of the hegemony of contemporary neo-colonial as well as nationalist 
discourses’.227 
I argue that language still plays a key role in accented cinema at large, and 
that some Algerian filmmakers can be located as part of this cinema. These include 
Téguia, Moknèche, and Allouache. These filmmakers, in contrast to Naficy’s 
account, do not cling to their national language; instead, the languages that they 
choose for their Algerian films enhance the ‘exilic’ feel, displacing the films from 
the official circuits and bringing marginalised languages to the centre – Berber, 
French, and, most notably, the sort of youthful slang that is never spoken on national 
television. Such slang features in Téguia’s Roma ouella n’touma, discussed in this 
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thesis. Téguia, Moknèche and Allouache are preoccupied with national and global 
issues, and the role of language in connecting cultural to transnational practices. 
These filmmakers use multiple languages to mark both the exile and the accent of 
the filmmakers as well as to mark a political stance.  
The study of Algerian history reveals that the idea of ‘national cinema’ has 
been tied up with a political project to create a sense of national identity. An 
inevitable tension has emerged since 1999 between the official notion of national 
cinema and a notion that documents the true and diverse experiences of a diverse 
population in a large country. It seems that, ultimately, Algerian national cinema – a 
cinema that documents the true experience of the place and its people – has no place 
in the nation itself. 
 
The Revival of Moroccan Cinema: 1980 – the Present  
The place of Moroccan films contrasts with the position of Algerian films in Algeria. 
Not only does Moroccan television fund Moroccan features, it also broadcasts them. 
After 1999, with the change of monarch, the CCM has seen its budget increase every 
year, and although its contributions to films are modest, at an average of 50,000 
euros per film, it grants funds to an increasing number of features.228 Film festivals 
have emerged and promoted national and international productions in Morocco’s 
rural and urban areas; eighteen film festivals are programmed every year ranging 
from the African film festival, the Maghrebi film festival, to the national film 
festival in Tangier.229 While these film festivals may only be accessible to a portion 
of the population, the Moroccan state-owned television 2M has increased its 
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coverage of the film festivals and broadcasts some of the films shown at these 
events.  
Carter argues that  while many of the films of  the 1970s were made in the 
same vein as Egyptian melodramas or Bollywood musicals and did not encounter 
success , in the 1980s Moroccan filmmakers adopted a more ‘simple and accessible’ 
film style and tackled issues inherent to Moroccan society.230 Film such as Un amour 
à Casablanca (Dir. Abdelkader Legataa, 1991), À la recherche du mari de ma 
femme (Dir. Mohammed Abderhamane Tazi, 1993) were box office hits appealing to 
400,000 viewers, reconciling the Moroccan public with its cinema.231 In the 1990s, 
cinema schools opened, and Morocco also trained crews as Morocco hosts foreign 
shoots in different areas, offering more safety for shooting than much of the Middle 
East, thus welcoming transnational film production in order to build a ‘national’ 
industry more effectively. Some film directors also established their own production 
company, such as Nabil Ayouch who created Ali N Productions, which finances his 
films and other Moroccan directors (Hisham Lasris’ C’est eux les chiens (2013)). 
Between 1999 and 2015 over 100 Moroccan films were released in Morocco, which 
indicates the revival of filmmaking; television films were also made by different 
filmmakers and funded by 2M.232 Short features were also granted funding by the 
CCM and 2M and circulated in national film festivals, which allowed for a younger 
generation of filmmakers to emerge. Moroccan films made since 1999 were also 
diverse in terms of genre: comedies, drama, thrillers, and attracted the Moroccan 
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public to cinemas, often gathering more public than Hollywood or Bollywood 
films.233 
While the films made since 1999 have dealt with social and political 
concerns, Carter observed that politics are only present in those films, made since 
1999, that safely criticised the ‘years of lead’.234 Carter maintains that, unlike 
Moroccan literature where fantasy is to be found, Moroccan cinema has relied on 
‘awkward abstraction and intellectualism’, in that way imitating French cinema.235 
Furthermore, the government’s film censorship concurs with the censorship 
‘imposed by other cultural taboos, such as an inability to criticise the Moroccan 
self’.236 Casanegra, Amours voilées, Les Jardins de Samira, which I will discuss in 
chapter three and four, contradict Carter’s generalisations about the inability of 
Moroccans to overcome cultural taboos. Casanegra, not only deals with the youth 
despair and desire to emigrate, it also uses crude darija, abounding with sexual 
language and insults and it was one of the most successful Moroccan films upon its 
release in 2007. Amours voilées is another example of overcoming taboos, exhibiting 
extra marital affairs. These films’ success is proof that Moroccan cinema is diverse, 
and that it investigates social and political issues, though it does not offer solutions.  
The question of language is discussed in relation to Moroccan films, but it 
stirs less heated debates than in Algeria. Post-colonial links between Morocco and 
France are politically less tense than those between Algeria and France. 
Furthermore, fewer Moroccan films are funded by the French CNC compared to 
Algeria. Language is not regarded as such a major determinant of national identity in 
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Moroccan films as in Algerian films – although national identity is discussed, the 
French language does not play a primary role in those discussions, and critics are 
more likely to focus on the characters’ religion than their language. French is used 
by the educated upper- and middle-class characters (see, for example, Marock and 
Où vas-tu Moshé?), but is not used as a site of contestation as in Algerian films.  
 
Conclusion  
This chapter was guided by two related questions: what is the relationship between 
national cinema and the language used on screen, and specifically, how is national 
identity linked to language in Algerian and Moroccan films of the period under 
investigation? The literature review questioned whether national cinema is a valid 
concept, and if so, how it should be defined. Early definitions accounted for the role 
of language although they did not recognise its importance in defining the ‘national’; 
accounts of accented cinema and Higbee’s account of language in transnational 
cinema provide two useful exceptions. Following the survey above of Algerian and 
Moroccan cinema, and the relationship between language and national identity 
therein, how do these cinemas fit within academic debates?  
Algerian and Moroccan cinemas have experienced fifty turbulent and diverse 
years. While Algerian cinema was born during the war of independence to represent 
that experience, post-independence Algerian cinema emerged from nation-state 
politics. The films produced after independence were hardly viewed and were 
commercially unsuccessful. Post-independence Algerian cinema absorbed the first 
definition of national cinema: a limited territorial cinema that consolidated nation-
building, produced and consumed within the national boundaries. However, this 




of the reasons of the failure was the inadequacy of Standard Arabic. The films’ use 
of the official Standard Arabic language failed to connect the audiences to the films. 
The first period of Algerian cinema corresponds to what Hayward built her theory 
against: film that speaks ‘of/for/as the nation’.237 Hayward’s comments on national 
cinema here apply directly to the Algerian example, whereby its national cinema 
arguably should not have sought to construct myths or reinforce an idealised account 
of the nation but focus instead on everyday issues.  
Official Algerian cinema continues to present itself as a spokesperson of the 
nation, and its linguistic choices are supposed to reflect the nation’s identity. Now 
that the state has weakened its grip on film production, Algerian cinema has been 
able to enter a new era and investigate how national identity is constructed and 
contested. Language has become one of the means used by filmmakers to delineate 
Algerian identity. In this sense, recent Algerian films follow Hayward’s view that 
film can also contest and challenge nationalist discourses (although Hayward does 
not identify language as a means of doing so). 
Algerian cinema also contradicts Higson’s view that the reception and 
circulation of films define national cinema and mould the public’s taste. Some 
Algerian films are not available to Algerian viewers, but this does not make them 
less constitutive of Algerian cinema as they are still able to hold a mirror to Algerian 
concerns. Algerian films made in the official circuits also encounter little success at 
the box office even though they are more likely to be broadcast in cinemas and 
discussed in the press. With Algeria’s many languages each have their own political 
implications; and a working definition of Algerian cinema as an ‘accented cinema at 
                                               




large’ conveys more accurately the multifaceted, heterogeneous, and multilingual 
nature of Algerian cinema, which is often ‘other’ even to local audiences.  
Moroccan cinema on the other hand, was quasi inexistent after independence 
and was subjected to political power and censorship in the 1970s until late 1990s. 
Moroccan cinema hence did not comply with JungBong Choi’s definition of national 
cinema allowing independent countries to construct the nation. Only recently has a 
definition of Moroccan cinema emerged, more in line with Higson’s view: Moroccan 
cinema circulates within the territorial boundaries of Morocco and abroad, is seen by 
Moroccans and influences their taste.   
In relation to language, the American scholar Valérie K. Orlando has 
surveyed the ‘new’ Moroccan cinema, films made after 1999, and chosen to use 
language to mark the different categories within its national cinema.238 Orlando asks 
whether there is a dichotomy between, on the one hand, Moroccan film production 
in darija and Berber, only screened in Morocco but still subtitled in French for the 
elites living in Morocco and Moroccans living abroad, and on the other hand, 
Francophone films, which seem to appeal more to Moroccan emigrants, Morocco’s 
elite who speak French, and international audiences.239 Orlando does not answer the 
question that she poses. She only confirms that no matter which language is chosen, 
all films deal with the same social and political issues associated with Morocco’s 
cultural climate. The dichotomy that Orlando identifies between Arabophone and 
Francophone filmmakers was earlier mirrored in debates within postcolonial 
literature about whether the former colonised should still write in the language of the 
coloniser.  
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Carter and Orlando trace a clear dichotomy between French and Standard 
Arabic: for them, French is the language of modernity, and of the upper classes, and 
Standard Arabic is the language of Islam and of the Arab nation.240 I do not agree 
with these clear-cut affirmations, as Carter and Orlando assume languages to be 
separate – Arabic, Berber, French – and do not recognise the extent to which 
languages in Morocco are intertwined. Furthermore, the different ideological 
associations of each language, as defined by Carter and Orlando, serve to obscure 
the fact that all these languages are constitutive of national ‘identity’. The 
combination of French with other languages lends support to the view that one 
nation – and Morocco or Algeria in particular – cannot be equated with one 
language, just as national cinema, in the case of Algeria and Morocco, cannot be 
equated with one language but with a multiplicity of languages. Language, as I hope 
to have shown, has a prominent place in defining national cinema in Algeria and 
Morocco, from early efforts towards nation-building to transnational, accented 
cinemas that contest and resist homogenous, monolingual definitions of the nation. 
                                               






Chapter Two: Narrating the Nation. Language, Identity and 
Belonging 
 
In this section, I will attend to Algerian and Moroccan films of the globalised era 
that explore an aspect of national identity through attention to language use. These 
films bring to the forefront religion as linked to Moroccan identity either in the 
present, as in Marock (Dir. Leila Marrakchi, 2005) a predominantly French-language 
film, or in the past, as in Où vas-tu Moshé? (Dir. Hassan Ben Jelloun, 2007), a film 
that combines darija and French. I will also explore Viva Laldjérie (Dir. Nadir 
Moknèche, 2004) and Goodbye Morocco (Dir. Moknèche, 2013), shot by the same 
director and considered as transnational films. Viva Laldjérie uses the French 
language, which attracted criticism for bringing an inauthentic feel to the film and 
distorting Algerian identity. In contrast, Goodbye Morocco uses darija, is shot in 
Morocco, and features a Morocco-centric storyline, but is considered neither a 
Moroccan nor an Algerian film by Algerian and Moroccan journalists and cultural 
bodies. Goodbye Morocco questions the role of languages in the construction of 
identity. By exploring these different films, I wish to investigate the constituents of 
national identity and the role of language in cementing or challenging it. 
 
Viva Laldjérie: Tous les Algériens parlent français ? 
What happens when a film labelled as Algerian uses French? To answer this 
question, I shall focus on Viva Laldjérie and analyse the implications of its choice of 




Algiers after the Black Decade. Nadir Moknèche (born in 1965) left Algeria for 
France when he was 18 and was part of Ariane Mnouchkine’s Théâtre du Soleil. He 
later attended the New York School for Social Research where he directed two short 
features. Viva Laldjérie is Moknèche’s second film; it is co-funded by France and 
Belgium and it received l’avance sur recettes from the CNC. Moknèche also 
received funding from the Algerian Ministry of Culture and Communication as part 
of the 2003 Franco-Algerian cultural event Djazaïr, a joint political initiative to 
promote cultural exchanges and convey a fresh image of Algeria after the Black 
Decade.241  
Viva Laldjérie is set in Algiers in 2003. It chronicles the lives of three 
Algerian women who together live in a pension in central Algiers: Goucem, a young 
woman of 27 who pursues an affair with a married man, Dr Sassi; her mother, 
Papicha, a former cabaret dancer; and Fifi, a prostitute. The film directly addresses 
the sexuality of these women, with depictions of the women’s naked bodies, 
adultery, and prostitution. André Videau refers to the protagonists as ‘la Maman, la 
fille et la putain’, echoing Jean Eustache’s La Maman et la Putain (1973, France).242 
With a trio of protagonists, Eustache’s film questions the malaise of Parisians in a 
post-1968 Paris.  
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Figure 3. Viva Laldjérie’s poster with Biyouna and Lubna Azabal 
All the film’s characters speak French and as the former coloniser’s language 
it provoked heated discussions about language and national identity upon the film’s 
premiere in Algiers. The film brings the French language under scrutiny: while 
characters’ shared use of French may appear to unite them, such unity is soon 
discovered to be impossible as I will discuss in relation to selected scenes. The use 
of French also brings with it a sense of history; however, I argue that the use of 
French does not demonstrate a nostalgia for a different period of Algerian history; 
instead French in the film represents the hybridisation of national identity and a 
reconciliation of the present with the colonial past. Similarly, the film’s title Viva 
Laldjérie, contains the ‘Algerianisation’ of the French noun L’Algérie. The title 
alludes to a popular football anthem, ‘One, Two, Three, Viva Laldjérie’, which 
squarely locates the film in Algerian mass culture and represents the hybridisation of 




The film revolves around the daughter and mother: Goucem and Papicha. The 
two women have left Sidi Moussa, in the suburbs of Algiers, where massacres were 
numerous during the Black Decade. Papicha’s husband died during that time and 
Goucem is the breadwinner working in a photographer’s shop. Papicha seeks to 
uncover what has become of the Copacabana, a cabaret where she used to work as a 
dancer, and her quest leads her to roam around Algiers’ bars, streets, and official 
buildings (such as the land registry). Fifi the prostitute entertains clients in her room 
and one of her regulars works for the state security. Fifi calls him Chouchou – an 
affectionate nickname. When Fifi and Chouchou are in the bathroom, Goucem enters 
Fifi’s room and takes his gun and hides it. When Chouchou eventually realises, days 
later, that his gun is gone, he angrily confronts Fifi. She denies having the gun and 
escapes Chouchou’s guard but is eventually abducted and murdered by his 
chauffeur. A worried Goucem looks for Fifi at the police station but eventually finds 
her body in the morgue, in the sewer-like basement. At the end of the film, Fifi is 
buried, Goucem ends her relationship with Dr Sassi who has re-married, and Papicha 
sings again in a restaurant.  
To play Goucem, Moknèche employed Belgian-Moroccan actress Lubna 
Azabal, known to French audiences as she previously acted in Loin (Dir. André 
Techiné, 2001). Papicha is played by Biyouna, a well-known outspoken Algerian 
actress. Biyouna made her debut as a singer in cabarets (in the Copacabana when she 
was 19) and was known for her role in a renowned 1974 television series – Al Hariq, 
an adaptation of the novel La Grande maison (1952) by Algerian writer Mohammed 
Dib. Like many Algerian artists, Biyouna had to live in hiding during the Black 
Decade and her role in Le Harem de Madame Osmane (Moknèche’s first feature) 




after over two decades of absence. Between 2002 and 2005, Biyouna achieved great 
success with the Ramadhan trilogy Nass Mlah City, and the Algerian public 
appreciated her sense of humour, and her eccentric and exuberant character. Nadia 
Kaci (Fifi) is an Algerian actress who has acted in numerous Algerian and French 
films. Kaci also left Algeria for France during the Black Decade.  
Unlike his first feature Le Harem de Madame Osmane (discussed in Chapter 
Four), where women are mainly constrained to a house and the film shot in 
Morocco, Moknèche mainly shot Viva Laldjérie on location in Algiers and the city 
and its suburbs are very much present in the narrative. Algiers is filmed in long shots 
with its labyrinthine alleys and stairs following Goucem and Papicha’s wanderings 
in the city. The events take place during winter and Algiers is depicted as a bustling 
yet somewhat grim city under a gloomy light and rain. The city is filmed day and 
night, insisting on social class differences as Moknèche contrasts spacious 
apartments with the small pension room where Papicha and Gouceme live, the 
neglected streets of Algiers and the immaculate facades of buildings. Many scenes 
take place in public transport (bus, taxi) registering the film in a hyper realistic 
aesthetic, which plunges the viewer into the daily life of the characters. These street 
scenes are often without dialogue, only punctuated by the music of Pierre Bastaroli 
in which dominates a piano which accentuate the film’s melancholic atmosphere. 
 In the opening credits Moknèche introduces the city and characters, to 
familiarise the viewer with the settings. A static camera depicts a crowded street in 
the manner of a documentary; the population is diverse. The next shot focuses on a 
woman at work, who we learn to be Goucem, one of many individuals in this busy 




Algiers’s specific identity; it becomes any modern, busy urban centre.243 However, 
the sound of the adhan – call to prayer – indicates that we are in a Muslim country. 
The adhan recurs through the film and is used to indicate the time of the day and 
punctuate the daily lives of the protagonists. The adhan also recalls Merzak 
Allouache’s film Bab El Oued City, in which the adhan and megaphone feature 
prominently to mark the presence of religion in the national space.244 
 Upon its release Viva Laldjérie stirred different reactions in France and in 
Algeria. French journalists celebrated the film while Algerian journalists criticised 
its depiction of sexual freedoms in Algeria and the use of French. The film was 
relatively well received in France attracting 200,000 viewers.245 It benefitted from 
French distribution, promoted as a foreign, independent, auteur, art house film. In 
Algeria, Viva Laldjérie was premiered to journalists then distributed in the six 
cinemas of Algiers.246 DVDs of the film were not available in Algeria, even 
bootlegged ones, nor was it broadcast on national television; it was only shown on 
the French-German television channel Arte. Viva Laldjérie was screened at various 
international film festivals, attracting interest largely because of its depiction of Arab 
women, and its representation of a new vision for North African film directors. 
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In Algiers, the first screening of the film for an assembly of journalists and 
state officials on the 4th April 2004 benefited from much coverage in the French 
press because journalists were already present in Algeria to report on the presidential 
election. French newspapers – the intellectual Le Monde and the left-wing daily 
Libération – focused on the reactions of Algerians to the film. The main issues 
raised by Algerian commentators were the film’s use of French, its French funding, 
and its depiction of women’s nudity, prostitution and same-sex relationships, 
subjects deemed taboo within Algerian society. Florence Aubenas, a French 
journalist, reported the words of an Algerian journalist from El Watan (a French-
language newspaper): ‘C’est du pur Orientalisme […] Ce n’est pas un film fait par 
un réalisateur algérien mais par des producteurs français’.247 The journalist Salim 
Beydu from the Quotidien d'Oran, told Moknèche: ‘Vous montrez les bas-fonds 
d'Alger comme si c'était le quotidien de tous les Algérois. Vous montrez des 
prostituées, des homosexuels, vous vouliez choquer, c’est tout’. Another critic from 
El Watan stated: ‘Est-ce que vous connaissez vraiment l'Algérie, monsieur 
Moknèche ? L'Algérie des cabarets, c’est celle des fantasmes de Paris’, to which 
Moknèche replied ‘Je suis un artiste. Si j’ai envie de parler de 5% du pays, j’en ai le 
droit’.248 Moknèche further stated that Algerians are always afraid that their enemies 
would laugh at them, instead he hopes that his films would serve as ‘collective 
therapy’. 249 While Algerian journalists questioned the authenticity of the images, 
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and accused Moknèche of distorting the image of Algerians, Moknèche’s response 
stresses his authorial choice, and the subjective part inherent to film production.  
Moknèche’s use of the French language was also perceived as evidence of his 
denial of his Algerian identity. Moknèche was blamed, by Algerian journalists, for 
not using darija to suggest the authenticity of his characters.250 The director argued 
that he could not find enough Algerian actors who spoke darija competently, because 
most were trained in Classical Arabic.251 He added that Loubna Azabal speaks 
Arabic with a Moroccan accent and it would have taken time to get her to speak 
darija with an Algerian accent.252 The French press described how Moknèche 
struggled to justify his decision, and that his most acceptable response was about the 
distance that the French language had created, which gave him space to confront 
taboos in Algerian society, such as homosexuality, prostitution and nudity.253  
In another interview, Moknèche stated that ‘le français n’est pas une langue 
étrangère en Algérie, c’est une des langues algériennes’.254 His intention, hence, was 
to reconnect his Algerian audience with the French language and to remind them of 
its place in Algeria’s multivalent national identity and history. Moknèche observed 
that French is already employed in Algerian literature; hence its use in a film is not 
illegitimate or unprecedented.255 Moknèche later stated, ‘Ce n’est pas parce que vous 
mangez un croissant que vous êtes Français’: language, he implies, does not 
determine identity.256   
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The Algerian public also reacted badly upon viewing the film in Algiers, 
some viewers declared that they expected a comedy with the popular Biyouna but 
instead they were met with images of nudity from the first ten minutes (Goucem is 
filmed naked after a sexual intercourse with Dr Sassi).257 Others claimed that images 
of nudity were acceptable for western films but not for Algerian ones.258 Viva 
Laldjérie is indeed the first Algerian film to display women completely naked (Fifi 
getting out of her bath) or engaged in a sexual act as well as openly displaying male 
desire for other men, such scenes are usually only suggested in Algerian films. At 
first the film was not censored in Algeria, but some cinemas judged it too crude and 
the sex and naked scenes were removed from the narrative. Similarly, the public 
wished to hear Algiers’ darija instead of French, one of the viewers said ‘d’entendre 
parler français systématiquement alors que l’histoire se passe à Alger, ça fait bizarre. 
Pendant tout le film, j’ai eu le sentiment désagréable que Biyouna récitait’.259 
 In France, these issues played out differently. Viva Laldjérie was praised by 
French critics as one of the first films to depict Algeria in a vivid and open way. The 
French press did not comment on the use of French, which apparently seemed 
normal even though it was an Algerian film. The actress Biyouna attracted particular 
attention from the French press, because she was the only one of the main actors 
who lived in Algeria. Only the film critic Olivier Barlet, writing in Africultures 
stated that seeing an Algerian film in French was upsetting, since darija is the daily 
language and the Algeria Moknèche reconstructed in French was not  
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recognisable.260 Like Algerian journalists, Barlet links darija to authenticity.  
In terms of academic reception, Marie-Pierre Ulloa argues that the choice of 
French was a political gesture, because to speak French is to refuse the authoritarian 
imposition of a singular national identity (Arab and Muslim); it is also to refuse the 
efforts of religious fundamentalists to erase modern Algeria’s colonial inheritance.261 
Ulloa also observes that the film was often discussed as if it were a documentary 
rather than fiction, the audience who viewed the film at San Francisco’s film festival 
assumed the film to be a realistic or ‘true’ representation of events.262 I agree with 
Ulloa’s argument that Moknèche made use of French to explore the hybridisation of 
Algerian identity. However, I want to argue that the use of French in Viva Laldjérie 
does not contribute to its realism, but instead reveals Moknèche’s authorial presence 
and engagement in an ongoing debate about language and national identity.  
The linguist Fabio Rossi states that film dialogue in general presents a high 
degree of coherence, cohesion, and consciousness because it bears ‘traces of the 
written screenplay’.263 Analysing a set of Italian comedies, Rossi identifies a 
distance between orality and film dialogue; the latter is usually related more to 
literary language.264 Rossi sees that the scripted film language ‘contributes to 
produce cinematic discourse as a compromise between two different poles: not only 
written and spoken, but also private and public, formal and informal, mimetic and 
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fictional, reflecting the author’s intentions and audience’s expectations’.265  Viva 
Laldjérie conveys a similar formalism, by way of Moknèche’s script, the characters’ 
manner of speaking, and its ‘theatrical’ mise-en-scène. Another scene depicts a 
cigarette seller who is fluent in French, unlikely in ‘real life’, which again signifies 
the film’s fictional, rather than a documentary aesthetic.  
The characters’ shared use of French does not unite them but exacerbates their 
differences and French serves to demonstrate ideological diversity and assert 
exclusive group identities and hierarchies.266 In one scene Papicha is in a taxi, the 
group of passengers discusses a Chinese woman speaking French; one of them 
imitates her. The impersonation is redolent of the racism that followed Algeria’s 
decision in 2003 to open to Chinese investors and immigration.267 An unseen man 
next to the driver reads aloud a story from the newspaper about how former singers 
from the Copacabana had gathered in Paris to remember the cabaret. One of the 
other passengers complains that the singers would be better opening a mosque: ‘Ça 
ne leur effleurerait même pas l’esprit’. The passenger’s formal use of French is 
associated with her conservatism, even though French is elsewhere used to articulate 
a range of ideological positions. Papicha, filmed in close-up is hurt by the 
passenger’s comments about the singers’ need for redemption. She asks the car to 
stop and walks off angrily. French in this scene does not serve as lingua franca, as a 
language that brings together different people.  
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Class, language and exclusion are also experienced when Chouchou later 
realizes his gun is gone. In Viva Laldjérie, Fifi, Papicha and Chouchou’s nicknames 
create familiarity but also maintain a distance as the spectator gets only partial 
information about their real names. Fifi’s real name is disclosed only when she 
disappears, Papicha’s name is Madame Sandjak, and Chouchou remains known only 
by his nickname. Fifi is blamed, and Chouchou pursues her through the streets of 
Algiers. To escape, Fifi joins a wedding procession of bourgeois women dressed in 
western clothes; she enters a car, in which a little boy sits on the front seat. A 
medium-shot enhances the anxiety of Fifi and the state of hysteria of the three 
women who are sitting in the back. One of them shouts, ‘Mais vous allez descendre, 
descendez, descendez’. They stop the car and phone an older woman, whom they ask 
for advice. This older woman is shown wearing a fur coat, which emphasises her 
petit-bourgeois status. She arrives at Fifi’s car and ejects her from it.  
The scene clearly presents the women’s different social classes, their lack of 
solidarity, and the perpetuation of patriarchal values: the young boy sits in the front 
and is the focus of the bourgeois women’s concerns. These women do not care about 
Fifi; even worse, they make her situation more difficult. These women are 
representative of a new bourgeoisie that emerged in Algeria in the last decade. As 
Yahia H. Zoubir argues, the gap between the rich and the poor widened in Algeria 
because of the austerity programs, coupled with the corruption and arbitrary laws of 
the period.268 In 2003, a period of recovery and pacification, a nouveau riche class 
emerged which exhibited its wealth and newfound social status.  
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Mustapha Hamil argues that Fifi’s death emphasises how Algerian society 
values the maintenance of social cohesion over the individual, and I argue over a 
shared language.269 Hamil’s argument implies that the women in the car preferred 
the appearance of order to Fifi’s safety. He suggests that Fifi’s death can be read as a 
punishment. I would argue that Fifi’s death, rather than a punishment, represents the 
resurgence of male state power, with which the women in the car are complicit. 
Fifi’s ejection from the car reflects her ejection from this society of women, this 
social class of which she is not a part. Even if she speaks French, her language 
cannot transcend her class. In addition, the scene illustrates how these upper-class, 
French-speaking women are ‘conscious of the advantages attached to the ability to 
use it, and would not be willing to give it up, even if they are otherwise outraged by 
its presence as a reminder of colonialism’.270   
Therefore, a neo-patriarchy is maintained, and its contours demonstrated by 
way of the characters’ access to the French language. Malika Mehdid describes neo-
patriarchy as the encounter between modernity and tradition, as a ‘modernised 
patriarchy’ that maintains the dominance of the father within the household and 
state’.271 These women, who reject the lower-class Fifi, are also modern women, 
fashionable, independent, and self-assured. Hence, speaking French does not erase 
class boundaries or encompass one in the national space; French only draws 
attention to Fifi’s class and helplessness. 
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French is also not used to revive nostalgic moments of France’s presence in 
Algeria. Although Papicha masters the French language, she does not identify with 
France. For example, when Papicha returns to the pension from checking where the 
cabaret would allegedly be rebuilt, the concierge asks Papicha about the 
Copacabana, and if she will visit the singers in Paris. Though Papicha might satisfy 
her nostalgia in Paris, instead she imagines her future only in Algeria. She explains 
she is unwilling to go through the lengthy and demeaning process of applying for a 
visa, and decides instead to bring the singers back, as a ‘return home’. Papicha is 
attached to Algeria and does not feel the need to leave her country; although she 
speaks French, she does not relate to France.272 However, a long shot shows a 
western painting and bottles of wine on the table, so even as Papicha distances 
herself from France geographically, it remains present.  
The objects in the pension – an old piano and a clock – testify to France’s 
lingering presence. The pension is located in a quarter referred to by its French 
name, Debussy, despite the imposition of Arabic place names more recently. This 
contributes to the film’s ambiguous nostalgia for an era when the streets and places 
were still named in French, and the urban population (mainly French) had a good 
command of French.273 The French language, in the context of the film, carries 
deeply ideological connotations, mostly in relation to Algeria’s colonised past.274 
Nostalgia is defined as a longing for home, and also a desire to return to a 
particular time. Linda Hutcheon defines nostalgia as the escape from the present that 
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brings an ‘imagined, safe, and coherent ideal past’.275 However Papicha is not 
nostalgic for France nor its colonial presence, only for her cabaret past and her dead 
husband. On a broader scale, Moknèche’s project does not so much conjure nostalgia 
for French colonialism as represent an effort towards a new ‘hybrid’ identity.  
Moknèche’s film – like Papicha’s desire within it – aims at reconstructing a 
present that simultaneously acknowledges and draws on the past, in the film’s case 
through language and mise-en-scène. Moknèche evokes a ‘past-present’, which 
Homi Bhabha describes as ‘a contingent “in-between” space’ that ‘innovates and 
interrupts the performance of the present’ and ‘becomes part of the necessity, not the 
nostalgia, of living’.276 Moknèche is not nostalgic for colonialism, but he is 
connected with both western liberal culture and Algerian realities. The use of French 
in the film’s Algerian setting is ideological; it is not a neutral medium, nor a lingua 
franca but through the various ways that he uses French in the film, then, Moknèche 
produces an image of Algeria as ‘Laldjérie’, a French-Arabic hybrid. 
 
 ‘On est tous marocains’? Marock: Investigating Religion and 
Identity  
One of the box office hits in Morocco in 2006 was not a foreign venture such as a 
popular Indian or Hollywood blockbuster, but a Moroccan feature, Marock, directed 
by Leila Marrakchi. The film sold more than 130,000 tickets in the two months after 
its release; in 2006 cinema attendance in Morocco averaged only two and a half 
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million annually, mostly for Hollywood and Indian films.277 Marock, the first 
feature-length film by Marrakchi (who had previously directed two short films 
which were nominated in several international film festivals) was selected in the 
2005 Cannes Festival in the section Un Certain Regard. This selection aims at 
promoting films which offer fresh and provocative perspectives on various topics: 
Marock focuses on Morocco, and an aspect of Moroccan culture which, as the 
French press recognised, is rarely depicted on screen.278  
Funded by France and filmed in Casablanca with a mixed crew of French and 
Moroccans, Marock takes the upper class as its primary subject and narrates, mainly 
in French, a love story between a young upper-class Muslim teenage girl, Rita, and a 
Jewish boy called Yuri. The story is set in the late 1990s, during Ramadhan, under 
former King Hassan II’s reign. Both Rita and Yuri live in bourgeois surroundings in 
Casablanca; and the film depicts intimate scenes between the protagonists as well as 
the lifestyles of the upper class: partying, drinking, smoking, and car racing. Rita is 
portrayed as a free-spirited, spoiled young girl who disregards both social and 
religious conventions; she does not fast and goes out with a Jewish boy. When Rita 
passes her baccalaureate, she goes to celebrate with her friends. Yuri is supposed to 
join them, but he is killed in a car accident en route. At the end of the film, Rita 
leaves for France.  
Marock clearly highlights the religious differences between its protagonists, 
but despite these, Rita and Yuri feel Moroccan over and above all else, and French 
allows them both to transcend religious identity. In fact, both Muslims and Jews 
have French as their primary language in the film and I aim at investigating how 
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French is the language of shared identity. I also argue that while Yuri, as a Jewish 
boy, was perceived as a threat to Rita, the Muslim girl, and as such a threat to 
Moroccan identity, the use of French, did not constitute any threat to national 
identity.  
Marrakchi’s film is very personal, although not autobiographical. Like her 
protagonist, Marrakchi is from a privileged background, and left for France after her 
baccalaureate. She wrote the script and used her friends’ houses as filming locations. 
The non-professional actor who plays Rita is Marrakchi’s cousin, Morjana Alaoui, 
who at the time was studying at the American University of Paris. Marrakchi sets the 
film in 1997 to coincide with her own memories of a time when the bourgeoisie was 
more privileged, under the previous King, than it is today.279 These details create the 
impression that Marrakchi filmed a real world to which she had access because of 
her social background.  
Upon it release, Marock drew the attention of the critics as well as the 
various political parties and stirred heated debates in Morocco. The polemic began 
when Marock was screened at the Festival du Film National in Tangier in December 
2005. The one scene that has attracted particularly heated discussion is a love scene 
between Rita and Yuri. Rita stares at the Star of David hanging from Yuri’s neck, 
which he removes and places around Rita’s neck. By removing the symbol from her 
sight and placing it alongside her own religious artefact, the hand of Fatima, he 
implies that she (and the viewer) should put aside their religious differences. One 
director, Mohammed Asli, openly criticised this scene and the film as ‘Zionist’.280 
Asli considered Marock an insult to Moroccans and Muslims; and contended that 
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Marrakchi and her film were not properly Moroccan, and as such they did not 
deserve to be presented in a national film festival. Asli’s claim that the film 
promotes a Zionist ideology clearly reproduced a common understanding – 
promoted by the Egyptian Brotherhood movements and fuelled by anti-Israeli 
politics – which equates Jews with Zionists.281 As well as taking issue with the 
film’s French funding, Asli pointed out that Marrakchi is married to a Jewish 
director and lives in France. 
The PJD, through the Arabic newspaper Attajdid, condemned the film.282 The 
PJD took religion, specifically Islam, to be inherent to Moroccan national identity 
(as exposed in the introduction). Before the release of the film in cinemas in 
Morocco in May 2005, the PJD asked the government to ban the film by contending 
that the director had attacked the symbols of Islam, particularly prayer and 
Ramadhan.283 Journalist Salma Dekki explained that the PJD intended to use laws 
against artworks that attack national values to ban the film.284 One well-known 
representative of the PJD, Lahcen Daoudi, confirmed that the party wanted to 
challenge the government over the film in order to question the government’s 
commitment to religious discipline more broadly.285 It was reported that in mosques 
there were calls for a boycott of the film, and cinema owners were anxious about 
screening the film.286  
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Because the PJD saw Marock as essentially realist, it was particularly 
emphatic in its calls for censorship. Francis Couvares examined Hollywood’s 
censorship in the 1930s and argued that ‘censorship battles help mark out the terrain 
of conflict over discursive practices in a culture’.287 Debates over censorship serve to 
‘reveal what is at stake whenever people at a given time in a given social setting 
negotiate the boundaries of what may be said and heard, or shown and seen’.288 The 
PJD’s calls for censorship were based on arguments over religious morality. The 
National Union of Theatre likewise attacked the film and called for its boycott even 
before its release.289 The attacks were led by the union’s president, Mohammed 
Hassan Al Joundi.290 Al Joundi stated in the Arabic-language newspaper Attajdid 
that Marock praises cultural colonialism and Francophone culture, that it gives a 
negative image of Moroccans and Morocco and serves only the material interests of 
Marrakchi.291  
Newspapers and the film’s advocates, such as the French-language 
magazines TelQuel, La Vie Eco, Le Journal, Aujourd’hui Le Maroc, pleaded for 
Marock’s right to freedom of expression. TelQuel argued that Marock tackles taboo 
subjects (female sexuality and inter-faith relationships) that need to be addressed in 
public.292 The newspaper Aujourd’hui Le Maroc supported the film, despite what it 
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saw as its naïve message.293 Journalist Driss Ajbali argued that Marock offers social 
criticism of a section of Moroccan society which is rarely criticised, but only ‘light’ 
criticism.294 Furthermore, journalists Fedoua Tounassi and Hicham Houdaifa 
observed how the other political parties abstained from the debate and only attacked 
the PJD’s monopoly on questions of religion.295 The dividing line was not clear-cut, 
however. Many of those who denounced the film claimed that one did not need to be 
part of the PJD to dislike it.  
The political researcher Anna Triandafyllidou explores what constitutes a 
nation, and explains how the ‘other’ is produced, and her work is important in 
understanding the reactions that Marock has stirred. Triandafyllidou argues that the 
identity of a nation is defined and/or re-defined through the influence of ‘significant 
others’, namely other nations or ethnic groups that are perceived to threaten the 
nation in its ‘distinctiveness, authenticity, and/or independence’.296 Triandafyllidou 
writes: ‘identity and belonging to a nation introduces a dichotomy between who we 
“are” and who are the “others”’. 297 Amongst the elements that distinguish the ‘we’ 
from the ‘others’ are religion and language. Triandafyllidou explains that religion, 
culture, and language are important ‘not only to the degree that they reinforce the 
nation’s identity but because they differentiate the in-group from the out-group’. The 
‘other’ can be within the nation (e.g. immigrants from different ethnic backgrounds) 
or outside the nation.298  
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Figure 4. TelQuel’s cover page, 2006, Mao praying and Rita standing 
In the case of Marock, the PJD’s focus on religious matters and the attacks 
on the film’s depiction of Moroccan identity reflect how the party linked religion to 
national identity and considered Moroccan Jews as ‘others’. The PJD emphasised a 
religiously-determined Moroccan identity and established itself as a party that 
directed criticisms towards cultural issues, rather than political matters or social class 
inequalities. Furthermore, one issue that demands attention is why Moroccan 
viewers, especially Islamists, assumed that Marock was a documentary – understood 
as a reflection of a reality which one can trust. 
Todd McGowan’s account of cinema’s encounter with reality describes 
cinema as ‘the site of a traumatic encounter with the Real, with the utter failure of 
the spectator’s seemingly safe distance and assumed mastery’.299 McGowan explains 
that spectators subjectively interpret the ‘field of the visible’, which affects the 
extent to which the spectator feels involved or excluded from the scene.300 Because 
Marock depicts a type of Moroccan lifestyle not led by Islamists – a lifestyle of a 
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different class, with a different language – those Islamists understood the film as a 
depiction of real life; because the demographics which the film depicts as sidelined 
and oppressed are the same demographics with which the Islamists can empathise, 
so the film was understood as a ‘real’ documentary articulation of their oppression.  
The film’s style, however, is far from realistic. The film’s depiction of a 
particularly westernised group of teenagers, with all the attendant commodities and 
anxieties, has led Brian T. Edwards to describe Marock as a ‘teen pic’, and to argue 
that Marrakchi uses a Hollywood aesthetic in her filming, particularly in terms of 
music, mise-en-scène, and narrative structure.301 Edwards is correct to observe that 
Marock adopts many of the tropes of Hollywood teen pics. The film uses a 
recognisable light-dark narrative structure: the days are bright, shiny and carefree; 
the nights are devoted to parties and romantic encounters. During the day, Rita goes 
to the Lycée or meets her friends Asma, Sofia and Driss, while at night she goes to 
parties, in houses or nightclubs, or meets Yuri. The dark nights allow for an intimate 
space for the protagonists, but they also establish the spectator as the only witness of 
Rita and Yuri’s rendezvous. The viewer’s privileged access to moments of intimacy, 
and the way those intimate scenes are shot with many extreme close-ups and dark 
lighting, may explain why the film’s opponents have treated it as a documentary. 
While it is true that like a teen pic, Marock has no explicit sex scenes, though sex is 
strongly implied, Marrakchi makes use other elements – such as framing, lighting 
and soundtrack– which make Marock more than a ‘teen pic’. 
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Figure 5. Sofia, Rita, and Asma on Rita’s terrace studying for the baccalaureate 
 
Figure 6. Rita in her room   
 
Figure 7. Rita and Yuri at the beach house 
Perhaps Marock might be described as a hybrid Moroccan and Hollywood 
film, from an aesthetic point of view. The use of Moroccan and western music in its 
soundtrack would suggest as much. However, I do not favour this reading, and 




itself influenced by western culture. Music, in my reading, signifies class difference 
as much as national identity. Marrakchi explains that she wanted the film’s title, 
Marock, to illustrate the contradictions of the young generation in Morocco: Marock 
contracts ‘Maroc’, the French name for Morocco, and ‘rock’, as in music; one 
represents tradition, the other modernity. The film’s poster declares, ‘La 
Jeunesse...Sa quête de liberté, sa soif d’interdits’. Most of the film’s soundtrack is 
rock music, which signifies the freedom of youth – but only for upper-class youths 
who were never anything other than free, which renders the film’s slogan farcical. 
Most of the time only the working-class maids listen to traditional Moroccan music, 
but Yuri does too in his car, when Marrakchi wants to affirm his Moroccan identity.  
The film constantly stresses the separation between its two worlds, between 
its Francophone upper classes and Arabic-speaking lower classes. Rita’s 
mathematics teacher, for example, has a small car, Yuri has a big car; the teacher 
also has an inelegant outfit and an unrefined accent when he speaks French. While 
Rita watches the type of Hollywood film that Edwards associates with Marock itself, 
Yuri’s servant and chauffeur watches Mexican television soap dubbed into Standard 
Arabic, while the maids in Rita’s kitchen dance to Moroccan music. The two worlds 
rarely communicate. As Rita’s father reads his newspaper, the maid arranges the 
table: dressed – almost concealed –in white, she is invisible to him; he ignores her 
but speaks to his wife, who only addresses the maid in Arabic. In many scenes Rita – 
whom various other characters address as lalla, a reverent name given to all women 
of higher social status – is filmed in her opulent house, free of her movements as she 
circulates without restrictions while the maids are consigned to the kitchen or the 
house. The camera emphasises this sidelining of the maids and servants, particularly 




subordinate Moroccans. When Rita is onscreen, she is the camera’s focus, but 
oftentimes in the background a maid can be seen kneeling and cleaning the floor, or 
a gardener’s lawnmower can be heard, and his silhouette can be perceived. 
The mise-en-scène, framing, and diegetic sounds of the film also emphasise 
symbols of Islam, reminding the viewer that Morocco is a predominantly Muslim 
country. The story takes place during Ramadhan, so the call for prayer is heard at 
different times of the day and marks the time for Rita to return home (or to go out). 
Hassan II’s mosque is filmed in a long shot on several occasions. At the same time, 
and as a contrast, the language used in the film insists on the Jewishness of Yuri. His 
full name is repeated several times: Yuri Benchetrit. Rita’s brother Mao strongly 
opposes her relationship with a Jew, which he considers to be shameful for a Muslim 
woman. Mao has recently returned from living in England, and although he was 
known for gambling and partying, he has become religious, fasting and praying. His 
conversion to Islam is associated with his anti-Semitism, even though his conversion 
is also a response to his own guilt at having killed a boy when driving his car. Rita 
calls Mao’s conversion an ‘Islam de fils à papa’ – that is, a bourgeois Islam only 
followed to clear his conscience. Mao calls Yuri ‘yihudi’, the Arabic word for Jew, 
but which has become known as an insult. This is one of the few times Arabic is 
used, and it is used to alienate and marginalise the Jewish character.  
Referring to religion is what separates the protagonists. Mao, who has started 
fasting, considers the whole family to be ‘non-believers’. He says so in French. In 
this instance, French has a double function to assert Mao’s religious beliefs and to 
distance him from Yuri although they share the same language. The double role of 
French is highlighted when Rita’s father states in French ‘un jour de plus et j’aurais 




the end of Ramadhan and is led by the King, the father expresses his happiness that 
Ramadhan has ended, as it was unbearable. French in this case dissociates the father 
from religion.  
Rita is not religious; she refuses to fast during Ramadhan, which she signals 
by speaking in darija when she dismisses the maid who comes to wake her up at 
dawn so she can eat before fasting. Rita asks if the maid ‘understands Arabic’. 
Although Rita shares the same language as the maid, she does not feel obliged to 
observe the same rituals. Instead she chooses to speak mostly in French, which 
allows her to embrace a different identity, for example eating at McDonald’s during 
Ramadhan. Her use of French is part of her rejection of religious obligations.  
Language both divides and unifies the characters; its use is born out of the 
social practices of Muslims and Jews. Yuri’s friends gathered at Yuri’s house by the 
pool, framed as a group of young men drinking alcohol and joking, emphasise Yuri’s 
Jewishness as belonging to their group and framed next to them. The young men 
point to Yuri and Rita’s difference and call her an ‘Arab’. One of Yuri’s friends even 
claims that he cannot fall in love with an Arab, to which Yuri responds, ‘on est tous 
Marocains’. Yuri thus equates ‘Arab’ with Muslim and allows ‘Moroccan’ to 
encompass Jews and Muslims. He hardly speaks darija in the film, only with his 
chauffeur, and though he listens to Moroccan music, Yuri remains identified with the 
other upper-class characters. He considers himself, however, to be predominantly 
Moroccan. 
The relationship between Yuri and Rita is hence doubted by most people 
around them. Though Yuri does not doubt his own Moroccan-ness, the fact that he is 
Jewish is observed by everyone: Rita’s chauffeur, Mao, his friends. Yuri puts the 




the national. When they meet in Yuri’s car, Rita escaping her father’s surveillance, 
Rita and Yuri are framed on the edge of a cliff facing the sea, and the Hassan II 
mosque is in the background, reminding the viewer of the predominance of Islam in 
Morocco. The camera then zooms inside the car, isolating the protagonists from the 
surroundings enhancing the intimacy between Rita and Yuri, and focusing on their 
faces. Rita suggests to Yuri that he converts to Islam, to which Yuri suggests that 
Rita converts to Judaism which she refuses. Rita’s reaction is pragmatic, and an 
unspoken attitude deeply ingrained in Morocco’s collective consciousness: when a 
woman wants to marry a non-Muslim, the man needs to convert. However, by 
affirming that it would be too shameful for her to convert to Judaism, Rita 
acknowledges the social position of Moroccan Jews, who are seen as lesser 
individuals than Muslim Moroccans, and as others who pose a threat to Moroccan 
identity. She ultimately believes that conversion would allow Jews to live easily in 
Morocco. 
Although they remain conscious of their religious identities, the French 
language frees Yuri and Rita from religious constraints, in a way that Standard 
Arabic and darija do not. The transnational version of Moroccan identity represented 
by Yuri and Rita – an identity detached from religion – allows them to contemplate a 
life in France, because their identities are not bound to Morocco. Thus, Marock does 
not seek to convince the audience of Jews’ embedded place in Morocco (in the 
manner of Où vas-tu Moshé? which I discuss in the next section); rather, the film 
suggests that Moroccan Jews (and secular Moroccans such as Rita) can maintain 
their identity within the national space as a parallel and hierarchized culture and 





Où vas-tu Moshé? Re-Imagining Morocco’s Jews  
Où vas-tu Moshé? explores Jewish-Muslim co-existence in 1963, a time when many 
Moroccan Jews were leaving for Israel helped by Zionist associations after the onset 
of the Egyptian-Israeli conflict in 1956. The plot pivots around a small bar in Bejaad, 
a mountainous village where Jews and Muslims live together. An elected council, 
made of Muslim men, is seeking to close the bar, known as ‘Chez Pierre’ and owned 
by a dying French man. Mustapha, the bar’s manager, intends to buy it, but his only 
chance of keeping the bar open is to invoke a Moroccan law that stipulates the bar 
can stay open if a non-Muslim resides in the village.302  
While all the Jews are leaving for Israel with their families, Shlomo, a watch-
maker and oud player, is the only Jew who stays behind, even after his wife and 
daughter have left. Mustapha endeavours to prevent Shlomo from leaving the 
village, mistranslating the letters that Shlomo’s daughter Rachel sends him, written 
in French, in which she asks her father to join her in France. Towards the end of the 
film, Mustapha’s son reveals to Shlomo the deception, and so Shlomo reluctantly 
leaves Bejaad to join Rachel in France. On his way, Shlomo encounters in 
Casablanca a Jew from the village, Brahem, known as the General, who was not 
taken to Israel due to his mental illness and is roaming in Casablanca’s streets. 
Shlomo phones Mustapha to get Brahem back to the village, which allows the bar to 
remain open.  
Où vas-tu Moshé? acknowledges Morocco’s multicultural past and projects 
an idealised image of Morocco as a safe space for Jewish people, even if they 
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eventually left the country. Prior to their exile from Morocco, Jews predominantly 
lived in the mellahs – an area near the Sultan’s palace, which symbolised protection 
by and submission to the local power.303 In the film, they live together with 
Muslims, and the Morocco of Où vas-tu Moshé? is a cross-cultural and multifaceted 
nation. Through Shlomo, the film suggests that Morocco still has the potential to be 
more tolerant, which would involve accommodating Jews into the (currently Arab-
Islamic) national narrative and acknowledging the cultural and social vacuum which 
their departure left. The film suggests that music and darija, rather than religion, will 
be the grounds on which national identity is constructed. However, Où vas-tu 
Moshé? fails in its attempt to place either at the core of Moroccan national identity. 
Ultimately, Shlomo is not accepted into post-independence Morocco. The darija he 
speaks – with a strong accent – marks him as an ‘other’ who cannot be included in 
the national narrative. 
Où vas-tu Moshé? is Hassan Benjelloun’s third feature. Known for his 
political films that denounce ‘les années de plomb’, Benjelloun’s script draws on his 
own memories of witnessing his Jewish neighbours and friends leaving their village 
overnight.304 Où vas-tu Moshé? was made on a low budget, with mostly state 
funding from state television 2M, the CCM, and supported by the Quebec national 
film production fund.305 By the end of 2007, the film was ranked 10th in Morocco, 
having attracted 15,000 viewers.306 It was also distributed in France, Canada and 
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Israel, as well as international film festivals. Shlomo is played by the real-life 
musician Simon Elbaz, who lived in Bejaad. Well-known Moroccan actors are also 
present in the film: Hassan Skalli (one of the musicians and Shlomo’s friend) is a 
veteran actor of theatre and cinema and Abdelkader Lotfi (Mustapha) is known for 
his television roles.  
Shot on location in Bejaad, the film centres on a few locations: the bar, 
Shlomo’s house, the council office, the mosque. The film uses comedy and tragedy 
to convey its message, interwoven with documentary images and Rachel’s voice-
over in French commenting on the mass emigration of Jews to Israel. Making use of 
natural light, Benjelloun uses many long shots of the village and its traditional white 
houses, as well as its surroundings, mountains and trees, presenting it as a safe 
haven, or a lost paradise.  
Shlomo is frequently shot in close-up with his oud, in an orchestra, signalling 
his attachment to Moroccan traditional music and the local community. In contrast, 
Mustapha is ostracised by his community, and his social exclusion is emphasised by 
the mise-en-scène and costume. Mustapha is visually isolated whenever he is outside 
the bar, either in the mosque or at the council. Even his costume distinguishes him 
from other men: he is shown in a traditional jellaba outfit, while the councillors are 
dressed in suits.  
 




Despite its music, dance scenes and the animated discussions at the council, 
the film has a slow rhythm, and the editing fails to present a coherent story, jumping 
from scenes in Morocco to ones in Israel, where Bejaad’s Jews have arrived. 
Nonetheless, the film was well received by the Moroccan press, where it was taken 
as a sign of Morocco’s tolerance.307 In France, the film gathered mixed reviews. 
French journalist Jacques Mandlebaum wrote, ‘Le film est un peu laborieux et peine 
à se porter à la hauteur de l'événement’.308  
  It took until the mid-1990s for Arab cinema to recognise the emigration of 
the Sephardic Jewish communities, who had left for Israel, France, and Canada forty 
years previously. Arab cinema of the 1990s began to acknowledge Jewish heritage 
as part of the tapestry of identities in the ‘Arab’ world, and to present Jewish 
protagonists as nationals.309 Film scholar Malek Khouri argues that the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict of the 1950s onwards influenced Arab filmmakers in the way they 
censored themselves: Jewishness was often equated with Zionism, and to introduce 
Jews as Arabs was likely to be condemned by the public and by state funding bodies 
– the films of the Egyptian director Youssef Chahine were a notable exception.310 In 
the 1990s, Arab filmmakers were questioning the official history that equated Arabs 
with Muslims and ignored Jewish heritage in so-called Arab countries such as Iraq, 
Egypt, and Morocco.  
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In Morocco, home to a Sephardic Jewish population of approximately 
250,000 until the 1960s (only 2200 in 2018), Moroccan films only introduced 
Jewish-Moroccan characters from 2005, in films such as Marock, Adieu Mères (Dir. 
Mohammad Ismael, 2007) and Où vas-tu Moshé?.311 The appearance of these 
Jewish-Moroccan characters was one consequence of the changing political climate 
in Morocco after the 1999 accession of King Mohammed VI. The historian Daniel J. 
Schroeter argues that, by acknowledging the presence of Jews, the Moroccan nation 
presents proof of a ‘more open, progressive, civil society’.312 These films promote a 
secular rather than an Islamic society, in which Morocco is tolerant, cosmopolitan, 
and inclusive.313 However, the film’s title reflects the ambivalence of the Moroccan 
funding authorities towards the subject. The original title was Mon frère le Juif, later 
changed to Mon ami le Juif, which was not approved of; the final title takes Moshé 
as an everyman for all the Jews who have left Morocco. 
Prior to exploring the importance of darija in a would-be secular (or 
religiously and ethnically inclusive) Moroccan national identity, I will summarise 
the historical events on which the film is based, to better comprehend the film’s 
context. Jews lived in Morocco before the arrival of Islam, having arrived in North 
Africa around the time of the founding of Carthage in 813 BC.314 After the Arab 
conquests of Morocco, and the establishment of the Sherifian monarchy in the 
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Eighth Century, Jews were granted the status of dhimmis, whereby they paid tax to 
be granted protection.315 In Algeria, Jews were granted French citizenship by the 
Crémieux decree in 1870, which marked the shift of Algerian Jews from the side of 
the ‘indigène’ (Muslim) to the European. However, the French protectorate that 
began in 1912 did not grant a special status to Jews, who remained subject to 
Rabbinic and Muslim Moroccan courts.316  
Moroccan Jews spoke darija, Berber languages, French, or Haketia – a 
variety of Spanish that borrows from Judeo-Moroccan Arabic – but were not fluent 
in Standard Arabic or Arabic writing, unlike Jews in the Middle East.317 By the time 
of Morocco’s independence in 1956, the new Constitution formally made Jews and 
Muslims equal citizens. One of the political aims of Arabisation was to assimilate 
Jews into the postcolonial Moroccan nation. With the creation of Israel in 1948, 
however, and the onset of the Egyptian-Israeli conflict in 1956, few Jews held much 
hope for their future in Morocco and began preparing to depart for Israel. Helped by 
Zionist associations, the departure occurred in three waves: 1948, after the creation 
of Israel; 1957 to 1961, when Jewish emigration from newly-independent Morocco 
was illegal, until a ship smuggling forty-three Moroccan Jews sank in 1961 and 
sharpened national and international focus on their plight; and 1961 to 1964, when 
the film’s events take place.318 In the latter period, Moroccan authorities facilitated 
their travel by granting collective passports and de facto agreed to their departure 
from Morocco.319  
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Although Shlomo is deeply involved in Moroccan culture – playing 
traditional Muslim and Jewish music in the local group and mixing with Muslims – 
he speaks darija with a discernible accent. His pronunciation of certain letters (s, q, 
h) diverges from the pronunciation of Muslim characters in the film. To some extent, 
then, language, and the way that it differentiates Jews and Muslims, serves to cast 
Moroccan Jews in the film as ‘others’. Shlomo is also subject to the self-interest of 
Moroccan Muslims, who want him to remain so that the bar can remain open. 
Shlomo’s status vaguely alludes to dhimmi: protected, but with restricted freedom. 
Shlomo only speaks darija and is not involved in the political discussions at 
the bar between Muslim Moroccans who mix French with darija. Shlomo’s distance 
from political affairs is visually emphasised: he is an active member of the musical 
group, but he never engages in these discussions with the educated Moroccan 
Muslims in the bar. When Shlomo plays with his group at a private celebration, 
another group of men are assembled around a table to eat. The distance between 
Shlomo and these men is emphasised by the camera’s movement, panning from left 
to right. The seated men are distinguished by their costumes: dark suits, as opposed 
to the traditional jellaba that Shlomo wears.  
 
   




As the educated middle-class men of the village debate the political and 
economic implications of the Jews’ departure from Morocco, they talk in French: the 
language, in this film, of post-independence political consciousness – not the 
language of a colonial legacy as found elsewhere. A doctor in the group argues in 
favour of the role that Jews play in Moroccan society. He is trying to influence the 
councillors who are present, but because the councillors do not speak French, he 
must turn to darija to lend any authority to his argument that Jews are Moroccans.  
The councillors, in turn, conceal their happiness that the Jews are leaving the 
area. They maintain that their only concern is the closure of the bar, even though that 
event is associated with the departure of all non-Muslims. The deeper aim of the 
council, beyond closing the bar, is to eradicate the colonial legacy that it represents. 
One of the councillors calls for Arabic to replace French entirely, because colonial 
times have passed. The sequence cuts to a medium close-up of the man’s face as he 
says ‘Bismillah’ (‘in the name of Allah’). This religious invocation combines with 
the feast that is taking place to clearly indicate are the rightful guardians of a post-
independence Moroccan identity: they are Muslim men.  
French, in the pan-Arab consciousness of the councillors, is not neutral. It is 
the language of the law that allows the bar to stay open and remains the language of 
the coloniser. In the village, this colonial hangover is represented by Pierre, the bar 
owner. Pierre is dying, a symbol of the end of the colonial era. Discussions between 
Pierre and Zina, his maid and caretaker, reveal the impossibility of communication 
between the master (the coloniser), and the servant (the colonised). Pierre has not 
learnt darija and Zina does not speak French. Still, Zina, filmed in close-up, 
reminisces in darija about her years of service with Pierre. He replies, in French, that 




in a post-colonial context, language alienates Zina, on two levels. When Pierre’s will 
is revealed, Zina has been excluded in favour of his family: another colonial lie. Zina 
visits the lawyer, who is Muslim. In French, however, he refuses to see her. The 
colonial legacy is thus still felt in post-colonial Morocco.  
If French is the language of colonialism, then Standard Arabic is here the 
language of Islam. Standard Arabic is not encountered in everyday life in the film 
and is only represented in a scene in the mosque during Friday’s service. The camera 
work emphasises the power of this language in this religious context. The camera 
pans across the assembly from behind, in a medium shot, framing the preacher, the 
Imam. The camera then focuses on the tiles of the mosque. In not showing the Imam, 
the film draws attention to the content of his sermon. Mustapha (the bar owner) 
enters the mosque and becomes the camera’s focus just as the Imam discusses 
alcohol prohibition. The camera shows how the congregation turns to look at 
Mustapha, judging him. A medium shot isolates him as the Imam continues, his 
words loud and clearly enunciated. This religious speech clearly strengthens the 
collective will of the councillors to act against religious ‘deviance’, and the bar 
becomes an issue that is moral, religious, and political. 
When the council addresses Mustapha after Friday’s sermon, they are shot 
from the opposite sides of a round table. Thus, Mustapha is isolated and separated 
from the group. He wears traditional clothes, as he wore in the mosque, while they 
wear suits. Here, both parties speak darija, but in this instance darija does not unite 
them. To defend himself, Mustapha produces a printed copy of the law, originally 
created in colonial time, in French. As such, the French language of the document 
intervenes into the debate, even though neither side sees French as the main vehicle 




moderating but not unifying presence. It is the dispassionate language of law, but a 
verdict beyond religious law: the bar must remain open so long as a non-Muslim 
lives in the village.  
Meanwhile, most Jews have left the village anyway. They have even left 
Morocco and made it to Israel. Paradoxically, the most positive association of 
Jewishness with Moroccan national identity comes about once the Jewish 
community has arrived in Israel. They live on a kibbutz and are welcomed by the 
Israeli Jews. Because the Moroccan Jews have needed to learn Hebrew, their 
language would appear to be one of the first elements of their Moroccan identity to 
be lost. However, the migrant community is shown dancing to Moroccan music and 
clinging onto darija. In this way, the Moroccan Jews resist Israel’s ‘de-Arabisation’ 
policies, promoted by the Israeli government to integrate Sephardic Jews. Shohat 
describes how these Israeli policies aimed to ‘save’ the Jews from their Arab 
backgrounds and free them from the ‘harsh rule of their Arab captors’.320 Israeli 
films of the 1960s that portrayed the Sephardi community were known as ‘borekas 
movies’ – alluding to a Moroccan pastry.321 These were poor quality productions 
that ridiculed the Sephardic community, and Shohat describes the boreka films as the 
cultural equivalent of the de-Arabisation project.322 Unlike the boreka films, Où vas-
tu Moshé? insists on a positive ‘Moroccan-ness’ of the Jews. The film suggests that 
their Moroccan identity and language will not be forgotten.  
A later scene shows a group of young Moroccan Jewish men waiting in a 
queue at an unemployment centre in Israel. Realising their dismal prospects, they 
begin to protest, chanting in darija. The men wave the Moroccan flag, and hold a 
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picture of Mohammed V, Morocco’s king until his death in 1961, described in the 
voiceover by Shlomo’s daughter Rachel, in French, as the Jews’ protector because 
he prevented Moroccan Jews from being deported when the country was under 
Vichy rule. On the Israeli street, there is a clear display of the symbols of Moroccan 
nationhood: the nation, by way of the flag; the king’s power, represented by his 
image; and the use of darija as their language.  
The likelihood of the scene outside the employment centre – Moroccan Jews 
fleeing Morocco, travelling with flags and carrying the picture of Mohammed V – is 
doubtful. The symbolic value, however, is clear. It identifies the difficulty faced by 
Moroccan Jews who left Morocco but did not feel at home in Israel. Language 
remains an essential tool of protest, but their protest is in vain because the Israeli 
authorities cannot understand them when they use darija. However, using darija, 
and not the Hebrew that they have had to learn, is a clear enough protest, even if 
individual words are not understood. The scene confirms the broader message of the 
film that the Moroccan Jews were more at home in Morocco.  
Although Shlomo has left the village, the film ends on a celebratory note: the 
bar remains open, and is named in French, ‘Chez Mustapha’, signalling the end of 
Pierre’s colonial legacy yet retaining the French language in a gesture of 
multiculturalism. This is a triumph for Mustapha. The bar, where traditional music is 
played and where men and women mix and dance, is a symbol of Morocco’s diverse 
culture. It is a place where political discussions occur openly, where languages mix, 
and where religion is relatively unimportant. However, this image of a tolerant and 
multicultural Morocco – and the bar as a symbol of a protected, secular space – is 




shines a light on the failure of Moroccan politics to secure a place for Jews in the 
nation, despite their shared cultural and linguistic heritage. 
 
Goodbye Morocco: The Myth of Globalised Identities 
After his trilogy of films set in Algiers, Moknèche turned to Tangier for his next 
feature, Goodbye Morocco (2013). Referencing the film noir genre, gradually 
revealing a murder through describing the events in the week that precede it, the plot 
follows a young Moroccan divorcee, Dounia, who wants to leave Morocco at any 
cost. Lubna Azabal plays this ‘femme fatale’ who lives with her Serbo-Croatian 
lover Dimitri (French-Serbian actor Radivoje Bukvic). Dounia and Dimitri work on 
a construction site, where Dounia manages the illegal migrants who are building a 
luxurious villa. When digging a tunnel, the workers discover a Christian catacomb 
from the fourth century, which includes a fresco of a praying woman. Dounia sees in 
the fresco her chance to escape from Morocco: she plans to smuggle it to Europe and 
sell it there, with the help of Mourad, the Tangier museum’s director, and then settle 
in Europe with her eight-year-old son who lives with his father, and Dimitri.  
Events do not go as planned. A Nigerian worker named Gabriel, who also 
wants to leave for Europe, is found dead on the construction site. Dounia orders her 
chauffeur, Ali, to dump the body into the sea. She wants to hide the incident and 
avoid any complications with the police. Gabriel’s disappearance triggers a series of 
events. Most immediately, the search for Gabriel’s body by his French lover Fersen 
reveals how poorly the death of illegal migrants is handled by the local police. Later, 
a second death occurs: in an act of frustration, a distraught Ali murders Dimitri 




husband, Ali the chauffeur is imprisoned for the murders of Gabriel – now buried in 
a Christian cemetery – and of Dimitri, and Dimitri’s coffin is sent back to Europe. 
Goodbye Morocco has many transnational elements. It was funded by two 
national sources, state and private: it received the avance sur recettes of the French 
CNC and benefitted from a Belgian state tax deduction, amassing a budget of 2.9 
million Euros.323 The film uses Moroccan, French, and Belgian cast members and 
shooting locations, and multiple languages: French, darija, Wolof, and English. 
Goodbye Morocco was celebrated at international festivals, but this did not translate 
into success at the French box office. The film attracted only 26,503 viewers in 
France after running for 21 weeks, a fraction of the 250,000 viewers for Moknèche’s 
earlier film Délice Paloma (2007).324 Goodbye Morocco was not distributed in 
Morocco or Algeria, perhaps reflecting a lack of commercial interest from 
distributors. Moknèche explained that he chose Morocco this time because Délice 
Paloma had not been distributed in Algeria, which he understood as an act of 
censorship from the Algerian authorities, after which he has not returned to Algeria 
for filming. 325 
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Figure 10. Goodbye Morocco’s poster (title French and Arabic) portraying Lubna Azabal 
Goodbye Morocco explores the effects of globalisation on national identity 
through its use of different languages. The sociologist Pierre Bourdieu argues that, in 
the era of globalisation, language is one means of ideological contestation and 
resistance, and at the same time is a bearer of national identity and ideology.326 
Following Bourdieu, I argue that while the multiplicity of languages in the film 
could have been proof of globalisation and transnational identities, it actually marks 
the limits of transnational identity and demonstrates how national identities are fixed 
in place or limited. A fixed or limited identity, in my argument, is one that cannot be 
re-invented: the individual finds it impossible to shape a new identity for his or her 
self through contact with other cultures.  
Goodbye Morocco also illustrates the disparities of social status that become 
accentuated through globalisation and suggests that the multiplicity of languages 
does not – contrary to what one might expect – facilitate border-crossing or cultural 
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exchange between different groups (namely, the migrants, the Moroccans, and the 
expatriates). Because of the many different languages spoken by different groups, 
the characters remain unable to communicate with groups that speak a different 
language from their own. They remain limited to their own group, their own 
language, and their own identity. Language, as I will demonstrate through close 
analysis of specific scenes, comes to highlight the tensions between the different 
identities and groups. 
Alongside its transnational interests, Goodbye Morocco is deeply concerned 
with Moroccan national identity and its place in a globalised world. Higbee and Lim 
have called for a critical approach to transnational cinema that would not oppose 
‘national’ to ‘transnational’: the former, they argue, can incorporate aspects of the 
latter.327 Higbee and Lim also argue for an approach to film criticism that does not 
reproduce Western ethnocentric views, but instead considers cultural and linguistic 
differences around the world. Using Higbee and Lim’s ideas, I suggest that Goodbye 
Morocco uses an identifiably Moroccan narrative to challenge and question 
Moroccan identity. 
The ‘Moroccan-ness’ of the film is mostly manifest in its location, Tangier, 
its selection of Moroccan actors (Ali is played by director and actor Faouzi 
Bensaïdi), and its use of darija – this is Moknèche’s first film in darija, rather than 
French. The plot focuses on issues pertinent to Morocco: the plight of Dounia as she 
tries to affirm her independence and identity in a patriarchal society; the same-sex 
relationship between Gabriel and Fersen, a taboo subject rarely explored on screen in 
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the Maghreb; and the image of Europe as a place of individual freedoms, but also a 
place to which the characters fail to escape. 
The location, Tangier, is reminiscent of film noir. In various American and 
French noirs, Tangier has long been a city of danger and intrigue. Film noir emerged 
in Hollywood after the Second World War and differed from mainstream Hollywood 
films of the period by articulating the anxieties of men who returned from war and 
were met with unemployment, disillusion, and alienation.328 In Goodbye Morocco, 
film noir provides an aesthetic and a mood, to connote the hopelessness of the film’s 
subjects. Noirs tend to explore the tensions, moral conflicts, and ethical dilemmas 
that fracture identity; Moknèche uses elements of film noir in Goodbye Morocco to 
achieve the same effect. 
Although realistic elements are present in the film, Goodbye Morocco uses 
various codes of film noir: the non-chronological narrative construction, the 
presentation of Dounia as a femme fatale, the dim lighting and disquieting music. 
The film plays with narrative shifts, gradually revealing a murder mystery by way of 
flashbacks. The music is composed by Pierre Bastaroli, who also collaborated with 
Moknèche on Viva Laldjérie. Bastaroli’s music helps to create the film’s dark and 
unsettling mood and adds dramatic effects such as suspense and gloom. Moknèche 
explains that French cinematographer Hélène Louvart – well known for her 
collaboration with international directors such as Wim Wenders, Agnès Varda, and 
Claire Denis – recreated the atmosphere of film noir with the fog and dim lighting.329 
The city of Tangier, with its whitewashed streets, is hardly visible. Instead, we 
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mostly encounter Dounia’s flat – seen under a gloomy, rainy night sky – and the 
construction site where she and the workers spend most of their time. The site is 
located far from the city, facing the sea, and is filmed in long shots, stressing the 
remoteness of the place. 
Dounia’s attributes as femme fatale are partial but important: she is visually 
dominant, filmed in close-ups, medium shots, physically, socially and sexually free. 
Yet, according to the definition of film scholar Virginia Allen, who describes the 
femme fatale as a ‘woman who lures men into danger, destruction, and even death 
by means of her overwhelmingly seductive charms’, Dounia does not totally 
conform to this stereotype.330 She is filmed at work, she is independent, she makes 
her own decisions and she directs men on the construction site, giving them orders. 
Dounia’s shifting between the non-seductive working woman and the femme fatale 
is visually represented by her different outfits. She dresses, variously, like a 1950s 
actress from a Hitchcock film, an independent woman in trousers, and in traditional 
Moroccan costume.  
 
 
Figure 11. Dounia dressed in a Hitchcockian style visiting Ali’s flat 
                                               





Figure 12. Dounia dressed in a traditional Moroccan outfit outside her flat 
In this film, languages construct and differentiate identities. The construction 
site is the starting point of my analysis because it serves as a microcosm of 
contemporary Moroccan society. It also illustrates the illegal immigrants’ 
marginalisation. The construction site is at the margins of Tangier – unsafe and 
illegal. The workers do not have the basic right to speak or exist in the dominant 
culture. The immigrants have no escape from the site, which is guarded by people 
and dogs, and surrounded by barriers. The actors who play the workers are 
Senegalese, living in Tangier, who had previously tried – and failed – to reach 
Europe.331 The digging of the tunnel, and the discovery of the ancient catacomb, 
mark the impossibility of escaping this territory: the tunnel is closed and leads 
nowhere. While inside the tunnel, Gabriel jokingly declares in French that it is a 
tunnel to Spain, a remark that reflects their shared dream of escape, and sense that 
the dream may be a mirage. The sea-route to Europe, is seen from the construction 
site and seems accessible, yet it is inaccessible for the illegal migrants and Dounia, 
and is shown mainly in long shot, distanced from the film’s events. Tangier and the 
construction site remain spaces that are simultaneously open towards the sea, but 
also closed and guarded.  
                                               




French, darija, and Wolof, the Senegalese workers’ language, are all used on 
the site. This diversity suggests transnational possibility, but these languages only 
isolate each character, defining and fixing their identities. For example, when the 
workers refuse to continue digging in the catacomb, arguing that they cannot dig into 
the tombs of the dead, their belief is met with incredulity by Dimitri, Dounia and Ali, 
each of whom responds in his or her own language. When they refuse to continue 
digging, the workers are prompted to discuss their pay as well as their beliefs. But 
when they speak, they are not given subtitles, which renders them incomprehensible 
to most audience members, just as they are to most of the film’s main characters. 
Moknèche places the workers’ chief alongside Dounia, emphasising her distance 
from the workers physically as well as linguistically. She threatens to replace them 
with Moroccan workers.  
The illegal migrants are given no independence or autonomy. Moknèche 
emphasises the loss of individuality of the workers by showing them grouped 
together, almost indistinguishable from one another. Thus, the illegal immigrants 
remain illegal immigrants, unable to shake that identity, subordinated to the 
dominant cultural group. Ali accentuates the workers’ linguistic marginalisation by 
commenting on Gabriel’s disappearance in darija, a language they do not 
understand. Ali declares that Gabriel was a homosexual (‘morricone’), and in 
revealing Gabriel’s sexuality, Ali culturally distances himself from the workers: he 
implies that they share Gabriel’s morals and approve of his sexuality. By using 
darija, Ali denies any possibility for the workers to respond to this intimation. 
Cultural exchange appears impossible. 
Moknèche associates Ali with small spaces from which he cannot escape: his 




end up. Ali, too, is confined to his social status: he is the son of a maid; Dounia’s 
chauffeur. There is no social escape for Ali, and language does not help him to assert 
himself. In one scene, Ali gazes at the poster of Parle avec elle (Dir. Pedro 
Almodóvar, 2002). On the poster, the woman’s closed lips appear to almost touch 
Ali’s closed lips as he is filmed in profile, which emphasises his inability to talk and 
provides an ironic juxtaposition with the title of Almodóvar’s film.  
 
Figure 13. Ali at the construction site  
Ali finds expression in listening to music – specifically, rai music by Chebba 
Djennet, romantic songs that reflect his love for Dounia. Despite sharing the same 
language as Dounia, Ali goes unheard by her. In fact, Dounia dismisses him, 
labelling him as being ‘less than a black guy.’ The racism of the comment 
demonstrates how Dounia perceives identity as something to be fixed and classified. 
Ali’s identity is denied by Dounia. His eventual killing of Dimitri only serves as a 
futile gesture towards re-establishing his sense of self.  
Dounia herself is at the crossroads of different identities. At the construction 
site, she dictates her orders; outside, she is subjected to Moroccan law. Divorced, she 
cannot obtain the custody of her son and lives unmarried with a non-Muslim. 
Dounia’s social transgressions are expressed visually as she is filmed naked, despite 




of language allows her to cross multiple social identities: she uses darija with her 
son and her mother; she uses French and darija at home; yet with her lover she only 
speaks French. However, language cannot help her to escape Moroccan laws against 
inter-faith relationships, nor gain custody of her son.  
While the illegal immigrants are denied any identity, Dimitri, a legal 
immigrant, has actively chosen Morocco as his new home. He is from Yugoslavia 
and has experienced the trauma of the Yugoslav Wars that started in 1991. With the 
violent breakup of Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav federation was divided along different 
boundaries: political, ethnic, religious, and linguistic. With the proclamation of 
independent states on the territory of former Yugoslavia, each state claimed its own 
official language. Dimitri mentions that his identity is complicated because he has a 
Croatian mother and a Serbian father. Life in Tangier, and being able to speak 
French, help him to build a new identity in Morocco, and he does not want to leave. 
Dimitri’s family name, Barberoussa (the name of a Turkish pirate in the 16th century 
who seized Algiers in 1529 and made it the centre of Mediterranean piracy), links 
him to the Mediterranean, and demonstrates how Morocco is home to many exiles. 
Language in this instance offers a means to distance oneself from an identity that has 
been traumatised.  
Dimitri as well as Fersen, Gabriel’s lover, could be described as 
cosmopolitans, the ‘set of privileged subsets of citizens […] who have the resources 
necessary to travel, learn other languages, and absorb other cultures’.332 However, 
cosmopolitanism remains an illusion: neither Fersen nor Dimitri have learnt the 
language of their chosen country, and they live detached from Morocco’s realities. 
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Although Tangier encompasses different nationalities, it is no longer the 
cosmopolitan city it was in the past. A singer at a bar performs ‘Blue Gardenia’, the 
song performed by Nat King Cole in the film noir, The Blue Gardenia (Dir. Fritz 
Lang, 1953). The singer sings in French, a signifier of cosmopolitan identity, used in 
this instance only to present a romantic image for the tourists gathered in the bar, 
drinking champagne. The scene presents Tangier as faded, a city of the past. It is 
cosmopolitan only for the privileged classes: Ali, the Moroccan chauffeur who 
hardly speaks French, is kept outside, at a distance. 
French, when not spoken by foreigners, is the language used to reconnect 
Morocco to its pre-Islamic past. After the fresco is discovered, the museum director 
Mourad traces the ancient Christian route into Morocco on a map. We see his finger 
move in extreme close-up. The map is in French, and the names of the cities that 
Mourad inspects emphasise Morocco’s Roman history: Volubilis, Laxus (Larache), 
Tinguis (Tangier). The map also shows the physical proximity of Tangier to Europe. 
To highlight the Christian and pre-Arabic history of the Maghreb is a common 
feature of Moknèche’s films, Délice Paloma for example draws on Algeria’s Roman 
heritage and historical sites. In so doing, Moknèche contests the definition of 
Moroccan identity as solely Arab and Muslim and insists on the cosmopolitanism of 
Algerians and Moroccans. Moknèche takes the opportunity to recall Tangier’s pre-
Islamic past and its proximity to Europe to blur any singular national identity. 
 English, on the other hand, is presented as the ‘other’ language, spoken by 
very few characters. It is present in the film’s title, where it brings a sense of 
movement and travel. The English title inscribes the film into the era of 
transnationalism and globalisation by stating what many of the characters want to 




Gabriel is singled out from the other workers through language and sexuality. 
Although Gabriel speaks his own language, thus affirming his Nigerian identity, he 
also understands French, and clings to English as part of his identity.  
On account of his desire to migrate to Europe, Gabriel steals a skull from the 
construction site, to sell to a smuggler. The smuggler, contrary to media images of 
smugglers as bandits, is a distinguished Moroccan man in a car, who can speak 
fluent English. Played by Moknèche, the smuggler displays signifiers of 
globalisation: he eats Chinese food, drinks wine, and drives a high-end car. The car 
represents the smuggler’s mobility. He rejects the skull, which indicates his 
connection to modernity rather than history. 
In scenes such as Gabriel’s exchange with the smuggler, English is used as 
the language of commerce. Paul Narukans explains how in the era of globalisation 
English flows like transnational capital, seeming to belong to everyone and no 
one.333 English is separated from the national setting.334 The same scene could be 
filmed anywhere in Africa, emphasising the transnational aspect of the English 
language, and marking the importance of English in Francophone countries, as well 
as the shifting power between French and English in Morocco. 
Although darija, French, and English are used throughout the film, Standard 
Arabic remains the language of news and authority – used, for example, at the 
museum. After the Moroccan authorities recover the museum pieces, the museum 
director resumes his official function, disguising his role in the smuggling plot. He 
asserts in a television interview that he will ensure that Moroccan historical objects 
will stay in Morocco. A medium close-up of his serious expression conveys his 
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resolve as he uses Standard Arabic for his nationalistic speech. Standard Arabic is 
thus associated with both nationalism and corruption. It is the language of arrogance 
and authority; and the language of lies, through which the Moroccan authorities can 
readjust reality. 
 Goodbye Morocco offers a bleak image of the future for the illegal 
immigrants, Dounia and Ali. Gabriel is left dead, buried by his lover Fersen. 
Language (or its absence) delineates their different identities and draws attention to 
each of the characters’ plights: the migrants’ sense of exclusion; Dounia’s sense of 
internal exile; Ali’s inability to express himself. The film contests the notion of a 
borderless world where identities are easily mixed. None of the languages in the film 
offers a new identity to the characters. Instead, each language marks difference and 
fixes identity.  
 
Conclusion 
The four films examined are transnational in terms of funding, production, cast, and 
directors. Yet all these films enter into a dialogue about national identity and 
national cinema and do so by using different languages. The films examine the 
process through which cultural, religious, linguistic practices are defined, contested, 
or remembered. These films ask how the national is to be understood within 
transnational cinema, often by interrogating the notion of the nation itself.  
Viva Laldjérie presents an Algerian identity comfortable with French, but the 
film’s reception demonstrated the expectations of the public and the press about 
which language is appropriate for Algerian films. The polemic about the use of 
French reveals the still vivid debates in Algeria about the place of colonial language 




further challenges the ‘image’ of that nation. In contrast, Marock was not criticised 
for its use of French; the critical focus was on the disrespect of religion.  
Marock’s characters are upper class, so it may have been more acceptable 
than in Viva Laldjérie that they spoke French. This contrast also reveals that the 
post-colonial relations between France and Morocco are not perceived to be as 
difficult as between France and Algeria. Marock attempts to construct a new identity 
for Jews and Muslims in Morocco. Paradoxically, Marock became inscribed in 
Moroccan cinema history due to its use of the French language as a unifier. The film 
implies that the co-existence of Jews and Muslims in Morocco is possible, and this 
will be facilitated by the French language – that is, the language of a secular country. 
Où vas-tu Moshé? too focuses on the presence of Jews and their contribution to 
Moroccan cultural identity. However, the film also highlights how Jews were 
considered as ‘others’ after Morocco’s independence. Sharing the same language 
and culture as Muslim Moroccans did not prevent Moroccan Jews from emigrating 
from Morocco. Religious differences were more powerful than cultural identity in 
defining Moroccan-ness.  
In reproducing the multiplicity of languages that are spoken in Morocco, 
Goodbye Morocco serves as a Moroccan film. However, what is important is not to 
classify it, but to point to the impact of any such classification. In Goodbye 
Morocco, Moknèche transposes issues tackled in his Algerian films to Moroccan life 
and offers a subjective experience of Moroccan identity. The film was not 
distributed in Morocco, perhaps a result of its exploration of taboo subjects. The 
reception of Viva Laldjérie, too, shows that open sexuality and female nudity were 
taken as an ‘attack’ on the nation’s image. The fact that the film was not distributed 




‘Moroccan’ films by the public and by film critics. The multiplicity of languages 
seems at first to offer an opportunity to represent a multiplicity of identities. 
However, the languages do not change the identity of the characters – ultimately, 






Chapter Three: At the Intersection of Religion and Politics in 
Everyday Life 
 
This chapter explores the relation between violence, language, politics and religion 
in a selection of Algerian and Moroccan films which span over ten years – from 
2002 to 2012. I will first discuss three Algerian features that bear witness to the 
Black Decade: Rachida, Barakat!, and Morituri. Rachida and Barakat! illustrate 
how language empowered women to overcome and resist violence, while Morituri 
constructs a more subjective narrative and suggests that the Black Decade was, in 
fact, the work of a political and financial mafia. The second focus of the chapter is 
on themes common to Algerian and Moroccan films: the despair of a youthful 
population, in Casanegra and Roma ouella n’touma, the rise of religious extremism, 
in Nabil Ayouch’s 2012 Les Chevaux de Dieu, and the return of the terrorists into 
civil society after the Black Decade in Le Repenti. The chapter’s final focus will be 
religious discourse in everyday life, as encountered in two contrasting Moroccan 
films: Islamour and Amours voilées. 
 
Algeria’s Black Decade: Resisting Everyday Violence 
 
‘Today’s Lesson’…Rachida: The Teacher Speaks  
Rachida is Yamina Bachir Chouikh’s first feature – which she wrote, directed, and 
edited. The story is inspired by a real-life event: the death in the Algiers Casbah of a 




school.335 The protagonist of the film, the eponymous Rachida, based on Guessab, 
lives in a working-class area of Algiers with her divorced mother Aïcha. When 
Rachida refuses to place the bomb, she is shot by one of her former students, and left 
for dead on the street. To recover from her trauma, and hide from terrorists, she 
moves to a remote village, where she ends up teaching. At the village, the plot 
intertwines the narratives of several characters: Khaled a young man is in love with a 
young woman called Hadjar and who he desperately calls everyday form the public 
booth, Karima, a little girl who dreams of going to the moon, Zhora who was 
abducted by terrorists, raped and who returns to the village pregnant and 
traumatised. At Hadjar’s wedding, Rachida experiences another terrorist attack, 
when the party is raided, villagers murdered, women kidnapped, and houses 
destroyed. Defiant, she returns to her school in the village the day after the attack, 
amidst the damages around her with her pupils walking behind her.  
By the end of the film, Rachida has gained political consciousness and is 
empowered. She does not fear violence. Darija is the language which allows her to 
negotiate her way out of violence and trauma and assert herself. The linguist 
Abdulkafi Albirini, discussing the daily use of Standard Arabic, argues that it is the 
language that brings ‘seriousness and importance to a topic’, whereas darija he 
argues, is the language that is ‘used for narration and giving concrete examples’.336 
However, Rachida reverses Albirini’s statement and uses darija to state her opinions 
and discuss political matters.  
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Figure 14. Rachida’s poster  
 Standard Arabic and French are exceptions in the film, used only 
occasionally. Standard Arabic as the official school language, is hardly spoken by 
Rachida, even though she masters it. French too is rarely spoken, yet when spoken it 
seems to belong to a ‘normal’ way of speech to distinguish the urban educated 
women and it benefits from a more positive representation than Standard Arabic. 
Music and silence are also important in the film in representing Rachida’s inner 
journey and transformation. Diegetic and non-diegetic music accompanies her in 
overcoming her fear, while silence heightens the tragedy of the events in moments 
when language is hopeless.  
  Before directing, Bachir Chouikh (born in 1954) edited all her husband’s 
films, Mohammed Chouikh, and was also a script writer for known Algerian 
directors (Mohammed Lakhdar-Hamina for Vent de Sable (1982), and on 
Allouache’s Omar Gatlato). Bachir Chouikh studied in the short-lived Algerian 
institution Le Centre National du Film Algérien in 1973. Rachida is a medium-




which she spent five years gathering.337 Eventually, the film was funded largely by 
the French-German television company Arte, the Gan Insurance foundation, and the 
Algerian Ministry of Culture and Communication. Bachir Chouikh ensured that the 
same script was presented to the Algerian committee for funding and to foreign 
funding bodies – which is to say that the script was neither censored nor modified to 
conform to particular funders’ expectations.338  
Rachida received national and international attention and circulated in film 
festivals such as Un Certain regard at Cannes and won the Satyajit Ray award at the 
London Film Festival in 2002. The film was released in 2002, in France and Algeria, 
where it attracted audiences of 125,000 and 60,000 respectively.339 The latter is quite 
high, given that only six cinemas were open in Algeria in 2002.340 Bachir Chouikh 
said that Algerian audiences were moved, some to tears, by Rachida because it 
described events they had lived through, something that had not happened since La 
Bataille d’Alger.341 
The film stresses the plight of the population living in fear during the Black 
Decade, the economic hardship of unemployed youth, and the harsh conditions of 
living with scenes describing the shortage of water in Algiers. With the exception of 
the attack on Rachida by the young men, however, violence is only implied in the 
film. Bachir Chouikh uses different filmic strategies to convey it without fully 
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displaying the horror: faux-barrages – checkpoints organised by terrorists where 
people are killed– are filmed from afar; automatic weapons are heard in the night by 
children, who are so familiar with the sound that they can identify the model; and 
dead bodies are lined up, covered, after the attacks. When the terrorists visit the 
village, to ransom the villagers, they are dressed in Western clothes, and close-ups of 
their eyes and of the weapons enhance the danger they represent to the community.  
Rachida was shot on location in Algiers and its suburbs. The film uses 
mainly natural light, often handheld camera, and abrupt jump cuts intended to allow 
the development of other narratives. Non-diegetic music heightens the fear and 
emotions of the characters. Many of the village actors are non-professionals, 
Rachida is played by Ibtissam Djouadi who was studying at the Institut des Arts 
Dramatiques in Algeria and Rachida is her first cinematic role. Only Rachida’s 
mother, Aïcha, is a well-known television actress (Bahia Rachedi).  
Rachida is first introduced to the viewer in the opening scene with a close-up 
of a woman’s hands opening a red lipstick. The camera moves up to lips on to which 
the lipstick is applied. The following close-up reveals a woman’s hand untying 
brown curly hair. The camera then placed behind the woman reveals a young 
woman. Rachida is getting ready to take a picture with her classroom, while some of 
her other colleagues, who are veiled, refuse to be photographed, as their husbands do 
not allow it. A later scene shows Rachida walking to the school wearing headphones 
and listening to Rai music. These scenes establish her independence and free spirit as 




teachers in Algiers and its suburbs were threatened with death by Islamic groups and 
asked to wear the veil. 342 
While Standard Arabic is the school’s official language, Rachida resists 
employing it when addressing her new class in the village and she favours darija to 
convey her ideas. Standard Arabic, on the other hand, is the language used between 
Rachida and the school’s headmaster when they first meet. In the headmaster’s 
office, a blackboard with Arabic writing and a religious inscription: نمحرلا هللا مسب 
میحرلا  ‘Bismillah Arrahman Arrahim’ (‘In the name of God, the most Gracious, the 
most Merciful’) confirms the presence of religion at school and that Standard Arabic 
is used for education and religious purposes. The headmaster is filmed in a medium 
shot approaching Rachida as he tries to touch her shoulder and gets physically close 
to her; and his lascivious behaviour undermines the religious associations.  
When the headmaster introduces Rachida, he uses Standard Arabic to warn 
the children that they will be punished if Rachida is given cause to complain about 
them. Nonetheless, when Rachida meets her pupils, she writes her name on her 
blackboard in both French and Arabic, signalling to the pupils and to the viewer her 
willingness to recognise French and resist monolingualism. Rachida then proceeds in 
darija. When asked by her pupils whether Algiers really is the ‘white city’ (as it is 
known in Arabic, ءاضیبلا رئازجلا  ; and in French, Alger la Blanche [the name given to 
Algiers for the white colour of the buildings of the Casbah]), she replies – 
presumably thinking of the association of whiteness with purity – that a country or a 
city will be white the day the people can live freely, fearlessly, and with dignity. 
Rachida addresses her pupils dynamically in darija; the camera follows her as she 
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moves and talks. A long shot embraces the classroom, and she is filmed from 
behind, focusing the audience’s attention on the rapt expression of the pupils as they 
listen to her. The camera movement combined with darija enhances the feeling of 
intimate dialogue: she is sharing her thoughts and physically moves as she imparts 
her ideas. When the camera stops, Rachida resumes her activity as a teacher and 
begins to call the pupils by their names.  
Rachida’s use of darija is gendered: the association of Standard Arabic with 
punishment and masculine authority contrasts with the way in which Rachida 
addresses her pupils and invites them to ask questions; and when Rachida speaks 
darija at school she becomes associated with a gentler, more sympathetic approach 
to education. Darija also brings to the schoolroom scenes a sense of everydayness 
because it is the language used outside school and is the children’s mother tongue. 
Rachida’s use of darija therefore creates proximity not only with the pupils but also 
with the Algerian audience. A later scene emphasises the bond Rachida has created 
with her pupils. In a dream-like scene, filmed in silence with only non-diegetic 
music, smiling children blow soap bubbles as Rachida watches and smiles. This 
suspended moment marks her regained innocence and hopefulness in her village 
retreat.  
Although Rachida prefers darija for the classroom, she is nonetheless 
proficient in Standard Arabic and Quranic verses. A scene with a female colleague 
demonstrates both Rachida’s mastery of religious discourse and her rejection of 
Islamist ideology. Rachida is sitting and the other teacher is filmed approaching 
Rachida and kneeling to face Rachida. A medium reverse-shot adds intensity to their 
discussion. The teacher asks Rachida in darija whether she is married. A close-up 




hijab [the veil]?’ Rachida replies humorously that the doctor did not recommend it. 
The teacher is outraged that Rachida gives a doctor more authority than God and 
replies, ‘Why is the doctor better than God who asked us to veil?’. Rachida replies 
with a Quranic verse: ٌمیِحَّر ٌروُفَغَ ّهللا َّنَأَو  (‘God is Merciful’). The teacher comes back 
with,  باقعلا دیدش  (‘Severe are  His punishments’), to which Rachida responds, دیدش 
 Severe only to those who substitute themselves for Him’). This‘)  ھب كرشأ نمل باقعلا
exchange draws on the Quranic Surat Al Maeda verse 98, and signals the double 
interpretations made possible when verses are taken out of context. When Rachida 
invokes mercy, the teacher only sees punishment. The use of darija in their 
conversation gives a ‘natural’ turn to the discussion, though one that is nonetheless 
ideologically charged. However, when her colleague’s use of darija fails to achieve 
the desired effect on Rachida, and when the former attempts to assert superiority by 
quoting religious verses in Classical Arabic, Rachida is conscious of the 
implications. 
The veiling of women was a political and religious position taken by Islamic 
parties and, later, the armed Islamist parties: un-veiled women were associated with 
a lack of moral values; ‘real Muslim’ women had to veil themselves in order to abide 
by Islamic laws and protect themselves from men’s gazes.343 Rachida’s female 
colleague associates marriage and veiling with good morals and the preservation of 
female honour. She confirms that veiling corresponds to ‘modesty, obedience, sexual 
probity, conformity’, and that all these ‘qualities’ are ‘expressed publicly and overtly 
when [the veil is] worn’.344  
The female colleague has interiorised and reproduced an Islamist discourse, 
                                               
343 Slyomovics, ‘“Hassiba Ben Bouali, If You Could See Our Algeria”: Women and Public 
Space in Algeria’, p. 10. 
344 Rod Skilbeck, ‘The Shroud Over Algeria: Femicide, Islamism and the Hijab’, Journal of 




mixing darija with Standard Arabic, to pressure Rachida. The scene illustrates the 
ideological antagonisms between women, who may nonetheless be fellow darija-
speakers and confirms that during the Black Decade there was no clear linguistic 
division between representatives of opposing political ideologies. The scene was 
criticised by the Arabic-speaking Algerian newspaper Al Hiwar for illustrating 
Bachir Chouikh’s attachment to Western values and disrespect for Algerian 
values.345 The scene however was not commented upon by any of the French 
speaking newspapers. 
Not all Rachida’s colleagues have internalized Islamic precepts. Yasmina, 
who helps Rachida hide and arranges for her to be transferred to the village school, 
even brings Rachida’s fiancé to meet her in Algiers. Yasmina, unveiled and older, is 
depicted as an independent woman who drives her own car and is not scared of 
terrorist attacks. In intimate conversations, Rachida and Yasmina switch from darija 
to French, and Rachida discusses her intimate thoughts and feelings in French. The 
two women are filmed sitting closely in medium shots, in Rachida’s room, and 
French is associated with feminine chatter and happiness. 
Rachida not only opposes veiling, she also disputes the state’s directives of 
pardoning and reconciliation with terrorists. Indeed, Rachida awakens into political 
consciousness as the film progresses and questions the terrorists’ violence as well as 
that of the state. She rejects the project of national reconciliation, asking in darija 
‘how [is one] to forgive if those who tried to kill you did not ask for your 
forgiveness?’. Rachida also states in darija ‘I am in exile in my own country’, 
feeling alienated and imprisoned in her own country. Instead of reconciliation with 
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terrorists, Rachida begins to recover through her relation with her caring mother, 
Aïcha. 
Bahia Rachedi, who plays Aïcha, had appeared in many popular television 
series and films, presented a famous cookery programme, and was also part of the 
National Television Orchestra, as a singer, for thirty years. 346 The journalist 
Yasmine Ben named her ‘la gentille maman’ because she was often cast in the role 
of loving, devoted mother.347 Rachedi is primarily a television star, and she 
conforms to James Bennett’s description of the television ‘personality’ as someone 
who cultivates a ‘televisual’ image.348 Bennett points to the ‘authenticity and 
ordinariness’ of the television star, which produces ‘the confusion between the 
television personality-as-person and the televisual image’.349 The character of Aïcha 
is a classic Rachedi role, which exemplifies many features of the actress’s own 
public persona.  
 
Figure 15. Aïcha comforting Rachida 
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Aïcha is pious to the point that she never misses prayer, and she questions 
whether Islamist terrorists are Muslims. She uses humour, proverbs in darija, and 
traditional Algerian popular wisdom to reassure and comfort her daughter. Darija 
and music become the mediums through which the mother’s love is communicated. 
Aïcha often sings popular music that would be immediately recognizable to an 
Algerian audience. Her songs are derived from chaabi, Algerian traditional popular 
music, and hawzi, soft music often characterized by lyrics that express suffering. 
Hawzi originates in northwest Algeria (Tlemcen) and is sung in its native dialect. 
Non-diegetically, the film also uses Algerian singers, such as Reinette l’Oranaise 
(1918-1998), a Jewish Algerian singer who moved to France and M’hamed Al Anka 
(1907-1978), the father of chaabi music. Aïcha also sings poems by Mustapha 
Toumi, (1937-2013), an activist during the Algerian war and poet and composer for 
Al Anka.  
Rachida often listens to Cheb Hasni, framed sitting, and dressed in an interior 
dress, rocking her head, in a state of awe. Hasni was a popular rai singer 
assassinated during the Black Decade. Rai makes use of code switching between 
darija and French, and the songs often mix erotic content with stories of life’s 
dissatisfactions. Rai was first banned by the Algerian state media in the 1980s, then 
condemned as amoral by the Islamists, however it circulated through pirate radio and 
cassettes. Although Rai songs had familial and chaste love songs, they also discussed 
the difficulties of family and marriage in strained economic circumstances.350   
Music, therefore, allows Rachida and Aïcha to escape their present situation; 
it opens moments of breathing space for them, as well as emotional resonance. 
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Moreover, it aims at building on the cultural practices of Algerians who use darija, 
and who resist the political and religious discourse of fundamentalism. The choices 
of diegetic and non-diegetic music that refer to, or evoke darija, root the film in the 
everyday landscape and customs of Algeria. Language and music allow Rachida to 
overcome her fear, whereas silence is more meditative in her journey. She is often 
framed sitting in her room, rocking her head in silence, escaping from the rest of the 
world. These moments of silence are accompanied by close-ups of her face, 
conveying the suffering and trauma she has experienced.  
Silence also brings attention to the villagers’ fears. In a long shot, the village 
men are grouped around the body of an old man who was killed by terrorists. The 
men stand silent and powerless. Only the old man’s wife speaks, accusing these men 
of inaction and helplessness. In another scene, a man kneels over a corpse, holding a 
baby bottle. The corpse, presumably his child, is positioned in a row of other 
corpses. The silent scene shows the numbers of people killed by the terrorists and 
reduces the village men to silent witnesses of this barbarism. Other shots of a little 
girl and her mother preparing bread to be extorted by terrorists are accompanied by 
silence. The silence emphasises their fear and helplessness.  
The terrorists, too, are silent. Although the male terrorists dress in military 
fatigues, the one woman who accompanies them wears the veil, though she also 
carries a gun. Her presence suggests a link between these terrorists and Islamist 
armed groups. However, her veil may serve as a disguise, in which case the 
terrorists’ unknown ideology becomes even more obscure. While the terrorists do 
not speak, the state officials are mostly absent, appearing only after attacks to carry 
bodies, the film here showing how the state fails to protect the population. This 




representation of women as victims of patriarchy and of young people as 
marginalised and unemployed.351 The press also contested the events depicted in the 
film. The journalist Yacine Idjer considered the film to bear an over-simplified, 
stereotyped view of the Algerian situation at the time of the events.352 Such reviews, 
however, take the film too literally; its significance resides more in Rachida’s 
journey.  
Indeed, by the end of the film, Rachida is more than a symbol or an ‘idea’ – 
she is a fully formed human being. For most of the film, she is filmed through 
medium and long shots, with few scenes assuming her point of view. There is a 
distance between Rachida and the audience. Indeed, the scenes in which she appears 
most angry or traumatised are shot from another character’s point of view. In the 
final scene, however, Rachida’s face appears in close-up. After the terrorists have 
massacred the village, Rachida returns to the school, now abandoned. She writes 
مویلا سرد  ‘today’s lesson’ in Standard Arabic on the blackboard and turns defiantly to 
the camera with tears in her eyes. With this gesture, she completes her symbolic 
journey, finding a new home – and sense of purpose – in the school. The film does 
not challenge linguistic policies in Algeria, but it implies that the Algerian situation 
will be changed by empowered women and education. 
 
Barakat! La mujahida, la fille et le terroriste 
Barakat! also shows women resisting the violence of the Black Decade. The 
protagonists Amel and Khadija, embark on a journey to find Amel’s husband who 
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has disappeared, presumably kidnapped by an Islamic armed group. On their 
journey, Amel and Khadija get to know each other, and voice fears and anger in a 
mixture of darija and French. The film’s use of these two unofficial Algerian 
languages is a clear declaration of intent. Darija remains the norm in Algeria and in 
film, and frequent use of French is an exception, particularly in the types of village 
in which the film takes place. The combined use of French and darija or code 
switching as defined by the socio-linguist Monica Heller, allows antagonistic 
ideologies to be expressed, and empowers the two women. 
 According to Heller, code switching is not just the use of two ‘non-standard’ 
languages but the mixing of two languages; code switching, as it becomes adopted 
and practised by speakers, becomes a ‘normal way to talk’.353 Furthermore, Heller 
highlights that code switching has social implications; it resists power by ‘virtue of 
its place in the repertoires of individual speakers, on the one hand, and of its position 
with respect to other forms of language practices in circulation, on the other’.354 In 
the context of monolingual nation-states (whereby one language is the official 
language), a case that can be applied to Algeria, Heller argues that the ‘overt 
juxtaposition of codes is threatening, since overt practices such as code switching are 
doubly challenging: first, they introduce into official discourse illicit language 
forms; and second, they challenge the very notion of monolingualism’.355 Code 
switching, performed by the women and the Islamic terrorists in the film, points to 
the characters’ estrangement from official language, Standard Arabic.  
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Barakat! recounts the journey of Amel as she searches for her kidnapped 
husband Mourad. She is a doctor who lives on the outskirts of Algiers, by the coast. 
Discussions at the hospital indicate that her husband has written a controversial 
article on Islamic terrorists. Mourad has not returned home since, so Amel embarks 
on her journey with the nurse Khadija after her neighbour, a mechanic, has indicated 
that Mourad is to be found in the nearby maquis. A former mujahida, that is, one of 
the women who took part in the Algerian liberation movement against French 
colonial power (1954-1962) , Khadija takes with her a gun and a haïk – a traditional 
white outfit that covers a woman’s head and body. Both Amel and Khadija set out 
walking into the maquis but are soon kidnapped by terrorists. At the terrorists’ camp, 
Khadija recognizes Hadj Slimane a mujahid whose life she saved by nursing him 
after an attack by the French in which he was severely wounded. Hadj Slimane 
became pious: hadj is the name given to those who have accomplished a pilgrimage 
to Mecca, the fifth pillar of Islam. After the terrorists release Amel and Khadija, but 
have taken the car keys and their shoes, the women continue walking barefoot until 
they encounter an old man living alone in an isolated house; he gives them a lift 
home on his horse-drawn carriage. On their way back to Amel’s house, the two 
women learn of Hadj Slimane’s death and find Mourad in the neighbour’s garage. 
The neighbour, who turns out to be a terrorist, kidnapped Mourad and may have 





Figure 16. Barakat!’s poster (title in French and Arabic) 
Barakat! is Djamila Sahraoui’s first feature, although she has directed six 
documentaries. Born in 1950 in Algeria, Sahraoui studied at the French Institut des 
Hautes Études Cinématographiques and has lived in France since 1970. Barakat! is 
a French- Algerian co-production, funded by the Algerian television, the Franco-
German Arte, and Tunisian production company Nomadis.356 The film was shot on 
location in Tipaza, by the coast, seventy kilometres from Algiers. The film alternates 
between long shots, low angle shots, panning the scenery and still shots with the 
camera focussing on the face of the characters through medium shots, conveying 
emotional tones. Amel and Khadija’s journey is punctuated with silence and music 
composed by the Algerian musician Alla. Amel is played by the well-known actress 
Rachida Brakni, and Khadija by Fettouma Bouamari.  
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Barakat! was an award-winning film, circulated in international film 
festivals, in Berlin, at the Festival Panafricain du Cinéma et de la Télévision de 
Ouagadougou (FESPACO) where it won the best first picture. It was however less 
successful in France; when it was released in 2006 it sold only 12,460 tickets.357 In 
Algeria it premiered to the press and in the few cinemas of Algiers; there are 
however no figures of the film attendance in Algeria. While Algerian television co-
produced Barakat!, it nonetheless did not broadcast it, instead Algerians were able to 
watch it on Arte channel television. 
The title Barakat! – meaning ‘enough!’ in darija – is a call to end violence. 
This title is closely associated with two different protest movements. One of these, 
Sebaa Snine Barakat! (Seven years are enough!), emerged soon after independence 
in 1962 as a response to a period of murderous political conflict.358 The other, known 
simply as Barakat, was the protest movement led by a female doctor against the re-
election of President Abdelaaziz Bouteflika in 2014. In addition, 20 Ans Barakat is a 
women’s association in France and Algeria that calls for the Algerian Family Code 
(1984) to be repealed.359  
 Upon its Algerian premiere, journalists criticised Barakat!’s extensive use of 
French (although, ironically, many published these criticisms in French journals). 
Idjer, for example, argued that having eighty per cent of the dialogue in French 
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damaged the authenticity of the film.360 The journalist Hind O, writing in the 
Francophone newspaper L’Expression, argued that French funders must have 
imposed the use of the French language, hence a young thug in the film speaks 
French, which would be unlikely in reality.361 O’s comments are indicative of a bias 
against Algerian films produced with French funds, whereby those films are said to 
tarnish national cinema (as discussed in Chapter One). However, the film also 
includes darija and French subtitles where necessary, which would appear to 
contradict the suggestion that French funders imposed the language, while French 
subtitles suggest that the film was aimed at French speaking audiences. O’s 
comments reflect the ideology of the journalists, who seemingly appeal to the 
criteria of ‘realism’ to undermine the films’ use of French. Realism becomes the way 
in which they can comment on the film and criticise it, while what they are really 
expressing is an ideology of national language. 
In this instance, I want to suggest that the use of French was for practical as 
well as for ideological reasons. Practical reasons include the fact that Rachida Brakni 
(Amel) does not speak enough darija. Brakni is a well-known French actress of 
Algerian descent, and a celebrity, married to former football player Eric Cantona and 
trained at the prestigious Comédie Française. Her casting may have endeared the 
film to funders and spectators, and she was presented with a French script, co-
written by Sahraoui and Cécile Vargaftig, a French screenwriter and author.  
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Sahraoui’s personal and filmic trajectory also indicates why she may have 
chosen French for ideological reasons. The generation that experienced colonialism 
and independence – that is, Sahraoui’s generation – learned French, and use it as an 
everyday language, primarily because Arabic in schools was rarely taught under 
French occupation, although, as Alf Andrew Heggoy and Paul J. Zingg point out, the 
policy was inconsistent: ‘An 1898 edict made the teaching of Arabic obligatory in 
the native primary schools throughout Algeria, but Arabic was considered a foreign 
language until 1947 and was dispensed to interested students begrudgingly’. 362 The 
film thus reproduces Sahraoui’s own use of French and may also signal her nostalgia 
for her time living in Algeria. She has described the use of French as a ‘realistic 
reflection of Algerian life’.363 
Sahraoui’s previous works also demonstrate her concern with Algeria’s 
political and social situation, including the place of French and Berber languages in 
Algeria’s multi-lingual identity. Some of the documentaries she directed dealt with 
life in Algeria during and after the Black Decade: La Moitié du ciel d'Allah (1995), a 
feminist documentary about mujahidates, and other women resisting terrorism; 
Algérie, la vie quand même (1998), concerned with youth unemployment in a 
Kabyle village and containing interviews with young people in Amazigh; and 
Algérie, la vie toujours (2001), which explores life in a Kabyle village after the 
Black Decade.364 Berber languages are included in Barakat! in the song at its 
opening and closing. The song’s theme is treason: its story is about a woman who 
warms a cold snake against her chest, but the snake, once warm, bites her.365 The 
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snake, in Sahraoui’s interpretation, is a symbol of domestic terrorists, and the 
woman a symbol of Algeria, the mother nation: an interpretation that confirms the 
Algerian-ness of the terrorists.  
Khadija is played by the well-known Algerian actress Fettouma Bouamari 
(born in 1940), known as the ‘muse of Algerian cinema’.366 Her background in the 
Casbah has instilled in her a witty and endearing manner of speaking – just like 
Parisians or Cockneys are known for their distinctive uses of language. For this 
reason, Bouamari has often been cast as strong and self-assured characters in 
Algerian films. Politically committed, a former mujahida, Bouamari fled for France 
in 1994, after a death threat.367 Barakat!’s cast includes Fettouma’s husband, the 
director and actor Mohammed Bouamari, who plays Hadj Slimane. This casting 
might remind Algerian viewers of Le Charbonnier (discussed briefly in Chapter 
One), in which Bouamari, living in a patriarchal rural environment, resists her 
husband’s authority and seeks emancipation through work.  
In Barakat!, Khadija personifies the figure of the mujahida. She acted boldly 
during the Algerian war, but she also resists violence and Islamic ideology during 
the Black Decade, and fiercely denounces religious hypocrisy. Khadjia carries a gun 
and fearlessly accompanies Amel on her journey. She bears a striking physical 
resemblance to Sahraoui: perhaps the character is the director’s alter ego. The film 
positions her mujahida figure as the opposite of Hadj Slimane’s mujahid-turned-
terrorist. The latter leads the terrorist group that hides in the maquis, the 
mountainous wilderness, just as the mujahidin hid in the maquis during the Algerian 
war.  
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Often framed in medium shots, with the camera focusing on her makeup and 
her dark eyes, before she and Amel leave on their journey, Khadija enters Hadj 
Slimane’s shop dressed in Western clothes. She is enquiring about Amel’s husband. 
Hadj Slimane wears a white jellaba and holds a misbah (a Rosary made of wooden 
beads used to glorify the names of God), two symbols of his piety. Their 
conversation reproduces their ideological differences. They speak in French, until 
Khadija remarks in darija, ‘Zaama hajite’ (‘so apparently you went to the hadj’). A 
shot-reverse-shot isolates the newly pious Hadj against a frame on the wall 
displaying religious inscriptions. Khadija’s turn to darija, instead of using religious 
expressions, can be seen as a disrespectful gesture in this context, and it challenges 
the Hadj’s piety, contrasting with the Quranic inscriptions in his shop. 
 In a later scene, Khadija similarly refuses to be addressed as hadja, the female 
version of hadj, when there are other names in darija which do not carry such 
religious overtones. The shop owner who has addressed her as hadja substantiates 
his claim, in French, by claiming that ‘hadja’ is ‘à la mode’. Khadija bursts out in 
darija saying ‘kaouad maa hadja’ (bugger off with your ‘hadja’), as she storms 
away from the old man, which can be taken as an example of darija’s power to 
challenge dominant religious discourse. French, meanwhile, does not carry the same 
oppositional weight. The point is not that Khadija rejects Islam – rather, she rejects a 
religious name imposed upon her. She does accept the name mujahida, itself infused 
with religious meaning: it is an Arabic name derived from jihad, associated with a 
war in the name of God; but in the Algerian context its primary associations are (or 
were) with the anti-colonial war.  
Khadija’s gun and haïk revive the mujahida figure. Khadija, aware of the use 




getting dressed in the haïk: ‘on va leur en donner de la femme respectable’. She thus 
denounces society’s hypocrisy towards unveiled women. The haïk is also symbolic 
of the anti-colonial struggle. Specifically, as Frantz Fanon argued, it is a means by 
which women resisted colonial power (as well as a disguise used occasionally by 
men during the Algerian war).368 However, with the popularisation of the tchador (a 
black fabric covering women’s bodies) during the Iranian revolution, not all 
Algerian women accept the haïk as a ‘proper’ traditional veil. Anne-Emmanuelle 
Berger remarks that girls in the 1990s wearing the hijab (the dress that covers the 
body and the scarf that covers the head) dismissed the haïk as a symbol of pre-
colonial Algeria and of the Turkish presence.369 The name hijab was preferred to 
tchador as it came to ‘represent a transnational “pan-Islamic movement”’ in the 
1980s, after the Iranian revolution, and the hijab was linked to the Quran in ways 
that the haïk was not.370 
As Amel and Khadija travel through the maquis in search of Amel’s 
husband, they are captured by terrorists and brought to the maquis. Khadija 
encounters Hadj Slimane again, as he is in charge at the terrorist camp. Khadja and 
Hadj Slimane begin conversing in darija, yet they soon shift to French. Khadija’s 
words, coupled with the camera’s movement, corner Hadj Slimane, and their 
conversation takes on a more intimate tone. Though Khadija is off screen, her words 
disorient Hadj Slimane, who stumbles around, trying to escape. Khadija accuses 
him, in French – ironically, as they are discussing the colonial war – of betraying the 
Algerian war ideals: ‘tu as oublié le mot Liberté’. Khadija’s use of the French word 
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Liberté is reminiscent of the French revolutionary rallying cry and motto, later 
appropriated as an anti-colonial call during the Algerian war. Khadija and Hadj 
Slimane’s conversation confirms that there is no longer any common ground 
between the former allies, even though they share a language and a history. French 
cannot resolve the ideological issues between them, and nor can darija.  
Arabic newspapers, such as Al Shorouk, the second largest-daily newspaper, 
vehemently attacked the film because it tarnished the image of the mujahidin by 
implying that they became terrorists (like Hadj Slimane).371 Algeria’s national 
narrative privileges the events of the glorious war and the actions of the mujahidin in 
defeating the colonial power. However, the press reviews ignored the role played by 
the mujahidates during the war. Similarly, Algerian journalist Amine Réda, writing 
in the Francophone Liberté, accused the film of undermining the image of the nation 
by asking the question: ‘qui tue qui?’, a question that recurred in the French media 
during the Black Decade because the Algerian army was suspected of taking part in 
terrorist acts.372  
In addition to its depiction of the mujahidin, the film was unanimously 
attacked by sections of the media for depicting unlikely situations: two women 
walking on their own without fear of terrorists; Khadija smoking freely in the street; 
and Amel fearlessly threatening men with a gun in a coffee place.373 Algerian 
journalists persistently criticized Khadija’s smoking on the street. The journalists 
commented that a woman smoking was not an emancipatory act.374 However, 
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although smoking may not be emancipatory, and Barakat! remains a fiction, the 
extent to which journalists reproduced in their writing a set of orthodox moral 
judgments about this simple gesture is still striking.  
One of the ‘improbable’ scenes criticised by the newspapers, Amel’s use of a 
gun to threaten a man, in a male-only restaurant, captures the violence Amel is 
subjected to, including the male gaze of men who obscenely discuss her presence in 
darija. Fearless, Amel defies these men in darija, replying ‘you want to see? I dare 
you to come and see me’. She uses the same language as the men, displaying a 
regained sense of confidence and empowerment. Yet she perpetuates violence 
herself: she took the gun from her father’s house, a gesture that suggests that 
violence is inherited and cyclical.  
Amel also swears, at this moment and throughout the film. In fact, the car in 
which she and Khadija travel offers a private space for Amel to voice her discontent 
– and to swear. Sociolinguists consider swearing a socially constructed linguistic 
practice associated with identity building and discursive power. Lars-Gunar 
Andersson and Peter Trudgill suggest that swearing is culture-specific and can be 
used to ‘express strong emotions and attitudes’, and it ‘refers to something that is 
taboo and/or stigmatised in the culture’.375 Furthermore, there is a gendered 
dimension to the disapproving of swearing perceived as more acceptable coming 
from men than women.376 Hence, when Amel swears ‘pays de merde’, it has a 
double implication: she expresses her anger and frustration towards Algeria’s 
muddled situation and the incapacity of the state to find her husband; she also 
engages with a taboo subject – that is, disrespecting the nation. However, Amel uses 
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French and not darija. This moment, I suggest, distances her, as a French woman, 
from the Algerian viewer. Her swearing becomes more associated with her status of 
French émigrée than as an Algerian doctor. Amel continues to swear in order to 
assert her empowerment. Khadija, on the other hand, never insults or curses the 
country, and thus maintains a link to her mujahida past.  
When Amel and Khadija are eventually released from the terrorist camp, a 
man from the camp takes the car keys and their shoes, asking in French for ‘les clés 
du carrosse’ and ‘les pantoufles de verre’, an ironic reference to Cinderella. The man 
stresses to Amel, in French, that as a doctor, because of the Hippocratic Oath, she 
cannot refuse to treat a wounded terrorist. His sardonic tone demonstrates his 
cruelty, even though he is dressed as an ‘intellectual’ with reading glasses and 
Western clothes. These veiled threats in French are more nuanced than the 
stereotyped image of the barbarous Islamist terrorist who only speaks darija or 
Standard Arabic. In the camp, only a few religious words are heard: for example, 
‘Allah Akbar’ ربكأ هللا   (‘God is Great’) and ‘Astaghfiru Allah’ هللا رفغتسأ   (‘By God’s 
Mercy’) both said as the women pass by to signify the terrorists’ unwillingness to 
see women.  
Amel’s husband, on the other hand, conforms to the idea of the Francophone 
intellectual who resists the Islamists’ influence; he is a Francophone journalist, 
although the content of his article is not disclosed. When Amel finds out that her 
husband has been kidnapped, she cannot understand why – because, as she points 
out, the Islamists do not read French and thus could not have read his article 
(although some Islamists can read French as some of the recruits were amongst the 
highly educated). The significance of the French language was a recurring theme of 




that Ali Benhadj, one of the FIS political leaders, wanted to remove the French 
presence ‘intellectually and ideologically’, and that he viewed that the state itself 
was a ‘Westernized entity’.377  
After their release from the terrorist camp, Khadija and Amel walk barefoot 
along a mountainous road. They are surrounded by green trees and followed by a 
hand-held camera. The camera highlights their suffering while walking. The beauty 
that surrounds them contrasts with the harshness of Amel’s words as she mocks 
Khadija, in darija, for failing to defend them despite her mujahida past. She 
suggests, in French, that the work done by Khadija’s generation during the anti-
colonial war was hastily thrown together and was a ‘bricolage’. Khadija vehemently 
replies, in a medium close-up that emphasises her anger, that without ‘bricolage’ 
Amel’s generation would still be shining the shoes of the French colonisers. Amel is 
now off screen; Khadija, alone on screen, speaks authoritatively, in French, of the 
contribution of the mujahidates during the war.  
The scene exemplifies how the two protagonists use darija and French 
alternatively to mock, assert and contest the actions of one another. Amel’s swearing 
challenges the ‘appropriate’ feminine behaviour attached to her social status as a 
doctor. Khadija also freely expresses her opinions and contrasts with the image of 
the ‘politically correct’ mujahida and an old, respectable woman. Khadija’s 
forthright speech also reminds the viewer that the mujahidates have been set aside 
for too long, and they deserve a place in the national narrative. Khadija’s point is 
evident in how few Algerian films have mujahidates as protagonists, which reflects 
the marginalised place they have in most accounts of Algerian history.378 
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Amel and Khadija’s unhurried journey is visually enhanced by the film’s 
soundtrack and the long shots that depict the beauty of nature: the sea, the maquis, 
and the green mountainous roads. The contrast between the beauty of the landscape 
and the tragic events is heightened by the music. Throughout the film, the oud is 
played by Alla, an Algerian musician who was rediscovered in the 1970s when 
Algerian television broadcast his tunes in television programs. Alla developped a 
form of hybrid music, the ‘foundou’, mixing Arabic and African rhythms.379 In the 
film, his music is used to enhance moments of anxiety and doubt when Khadija and 
Amel are on their journey. 
Silence also has an important role. It manifests Amel’s fear, internal tension, 
and anguish. Silence also allows the viewer to contemplate the beauty of nature. 
Before they set off on their journey Amel and Khadija sit silently peeling vegetables, 
and a long shot reveals the calm sea in the background. The silence brings to the 
forefront the contrast between the beauty of nature and the agony of their waiting for 
news about Amel’s husband. Silence is often used in auteur films; a striking example 
is Abbas Kiarostami’s Taste of Cherry (1997) where silence reveals nature’s beauty 
and contrasts it with the protagonist’s death drive. In Barakat!, a panoramic long 
shot reveals the beauty of the maquis, a sinuous road lined with green trees. The 
viewer is invited to appreciate the composition yet remain aware of the danger that 
Khadija and Amel face. 
Amel ends her journey by returning home, and finding Mourad through her 
own efforts, without help from the police. Her self-assertion and empowerment are 
visually accentuated in these final moments. At the film’s start, she is often filmed 
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from above, from a high angle, her face closed and worried, as if she were carrying 
the burden of the civil war. Her expression becomes lighter, to reveal her emotional 
change. She also gets physically closer to Khadija, filmed sleeping in her arms, 
taking care of her, finding medicine and calling her affectionately ‘mimti’ (little 
mother). After she finds her husband, the lighting accentuates the radiance from her 
face, as if to suggest the end of the dark period.  
The police’s lack of interest in Mourad’s disappearance, and their subsequent 
refusal of Amel’s request to find him (as she brought the wrong photo ID), reveals 
their bureaucratic apathy. The policeman impassively addresses Amel in French and 
darija, which confirms that state agents use French. However, sharing the same 
languages does not bring them together, and the distance is visually translated by the 
scene’s composition: Amel stands over the seated policeman, looking down at him 
morally and physically.  
Even after Mourad is found, he is never seen on screen. Only the photograph 
signals his appearance and existence. Mourad represents the ‘disparus’, those who 
disappeared during the Black Decade – abducted by Islamist armed groups or 
Algerian secret services – and who never returned. The film does not attempt to 
definitely resolve the question of these ‘disparus’, it only suggests that the Algerian 
history of the Black Decade is complex. One old man who helps Amel and Khadija, 
a widower, summarises the muddiness of the Black Decade: he says that his sons 
have been missing for three years, though he does not know if they have been killed 
or are the ones doing the killing.  
The question of the ‘disparus’ is thorny. Families demand the truth from the 




found.380 They were taken by security services from their homes and places of work. 
These ‘disparus’ have not been declared dead, so their families cannot mourn them. 
This situation is similar to the dictatorship of 1976 to 1983 in Argentina, when many 
people went missing, and their mothers and grandmothers protested in public places 
to demand the truth. Many Argentine films re-tell these events and raise the question 
of the disappeared – but this is not the case in Algeria. Barakat! only timidly 
criticises the state’s actions in failing to protect the population or find those who 
have disappeared. Rather, the film just asks for the violence to cease: in the final 
scene, Khadija and the old man dispose of Amel’s gun by throwing it into the sea, 
shouting ‘Barakat!’  
 
L’Inspecteur mène l’enquête… Morituri: Investigating Algeria’s Darkness 
Morituri was released in 2007 in France and Algeria, directed by Okacha Touita, 
who also co-adapted the screenplay from Yasmina Khadra’s 1997 French novel of 
the same name.381 Morituri was Khadra’s first novel published in France where it 
received critical and commercial success, whereas the writer’s seven previous books 
had been published only in Algeria.382 The book’s title, Morituri, also references the 
Latin expresion: ‘Ave, Imperator, morituri te salutant’ (Hail, Emperor, those who are 
about to die salute you’).383 The film’s events unfold during the Black Decade and 
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follow Brahim Llob, a police commissioner and novelist. He is invited by Malek 
Ghoul – a former state official – to a party and is asked to find his missing daughter 
Sabrina. Llob’s investigation, with the help of his lieutenants Dino and Serdj, and the 
former commissioner Dine, uncovers a political-financial mafia involved in ordering 
the assassination of Algerian intellectuals, financing terrorist groups, and embezzling 
money from the Algerian National Bank. Llob learns that he has been manipulated 
by the mafia, which is headed by Ghoul. At the end of the film, he confronts Ghoul 
and kills him.  
Touita is a French-Algerian director and actor, born in Algeria in 1943 but 
living in France since 1963. Toutia’s most prominent film, Les Sacrifiés (1982), 
exposed the fratricidal struggle between the MNA (Mouvement National Algérien) 
and the FLN in 1958 in France – a subject hardly discussed in Algeria or in 
France.384 Like Les Sacrifiés, Morituri explores events otherwise rarely addressed, 
and advances the idea that the tragedies of the Black Decade were the work of a 
mafia, allied with Islamists, that sought to exploit the confusion for its own material 
and political gain. The film’s music by Rachid Taha, and the use of darija and 
French, complement Toutia’s political take on the events. Taha, a French-Algerian 
musician well known for his politics in France against immigration laws, arranged a 
song, Hassbouhoum, played during the film’s credits. In darija, the title means 
‘make them accountable’, and the lyrics – ‘jail them, punish them, they have robbed 
us’ – reinforce the film’s message that people in power have to pay for their 
misdeeds. 
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Touita adapted Morituri with the French screenwriters Michel Alexandre and 
Nadia Char. The plot, location and characters’ names match the novel. Despite the 
involvement of French screenwriters, Touita gives a prominent place to darija.385 He 
explained that Khadra’s novel appealed to him through its use of language: ‘c’était la 
première fois que je voyais quelqu’un traduire l’arabe dialectal en un français aussi 
magnifique’.386 Darija brings to the film a sense of verisimilitude, especially as it 
alternates with French and Standard Arabic; and I argue that the switching between 
languages emphasises the complex political situation presented in the film as neither 
French nor Standard Arabic can be fixed to a specific ideological position: terrorists 
are not exclusively Standard Arabic speakers, and intellectuals are not only 
Francophones, as observed by the Algerian scholar Addi Lahouari.387 
 
Figure 17. Morituri’s poster  
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 Morituri is Touita’s fourth feature, for which he amassed 400,000 euros – a 
medium budget – from the CNC, French producers, and Algerian television. He also 
received support from the Algerian Ministry of Culture.388 The film premiered in 
Algiers at the event ‘Alger: capitale du monde arabe.’ It received positive reviews 
from the Algerian press, who praising it for asking thorny questions of the Black 
Decade, such as who was behind the chaos (or at least, who was behind certain 
incidents).389 Morituri does not seem to have been released widely in Algeria, 
however. In France, Morituri did not attract wide audiences; it received mixed 
reviews, with the French journalist Eric Loret, in Libération, describing it as ‘un film 
bancal à faible budget’.390 
Touita employed well-known Algerian actors: Sid Ahmed Agoumi (Sid 
Lankabout) who has a successful television career in Algeria; Sid Ali Kouiret (Haj 
Garne), who acted in numerous Algerian films in the 1970s; and Miloud Khetib 
(Llob), a theatre actor trained at the Comédie Française who lives in France, and 
also starred in Les Sacrifiés. Despite these stars, the acting resembles a telenovela 
with over-acting, gesturing while at times the lines are delivered in a monotonous 
way. The film’s plot does not unfold easily. Its editing is incoherent; scenes jump 
from one scene to another without apparent logic. For example, at one moment Llob 
and Lino chase down a man, who escapes by jumping into the sea. The relation of 
this man to the investigation remains unclear. The discontinuous editing 
accompanies changes of language; it makes the significance of the language used in 
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the film less easily readable, and contributes to a chaotic feeling, all elements that 
translate the political and ideological confusion during the Black Decade. 
Llob is introduced to the viewer while he is getting ready in the morning. A 
medium- shot pans through his cramped apartment, and Llob’s voice is heard in 
French while he expresses his fear of going out to work. The policeman is 
characterised by his unkempt appearance: an over-sized suit, dusty shoes, and an old 
car. Llob resembles the American television character Colombo. Unlike Colombo, 
however, he does not solve this case. The viewer never finds out what happened to 
Sabrina Ghoul. Instead, Llob uncovers a political plot. Yumna Siddiqi has identified 
a ‘recent spate of postcolonial novels that use the format of the mystery or detective 
story but tweak it or turn it inside out in what becomes a narrative of “social 
detection”’.391 Llob can certainly be seen as a ‘postcolonial detective’: his 
investigation ends up focusing on the political turmoil rather than the individual 
crime.  
A repeated motif in the film is Llob’s monologues in French, variously 
diegetic and in voice-over. In these, he bitterly comments on Algerian politics as 
well as his personal thoughts and beliefs. The film continually switches from point-
of-view shots from Llob’s perspective to shots of him in his immediate environment; 
the film makes clear that it depicts Llob’s subjective take on events. The policeman 
tells himself that the terrorists are Algerians – but Algerians who kill other 
Algerians. In one instance, he directly addresses the viewer: ‘Et regarde maintenant, 
te reconnais-tu en eux? Moi? Pas du tout’. His pessimistic thoughts contrast with the 
beauty of the scene as he walks by the sea in the sunshine. This is one of the few 
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moments where Llob, and the viewer, escape the busy and dangerous streets of 
Algiers. He uses French for these moments, as for the novels that he writes, to 
convey poetically a sense of melancholy, sadness and introspection, and to articulate 
his political views.  
French is used in the film by characters from various backgrounds: the upper-
class state officials, the prostitute who works at Les Limbes rouges where Ghoul’s 
daughter was last seen, and by police officers. The French name of the cabaret, Les 
Limbes rouges, is a metaphor for Algeria’s political messy situation: it is actually a 
brothel, where influential men act immorally, yet where all is kept secret. In this 
way, French is not expressly associated with any particular ideological stance. 
Rather, French is a ‘normal’ mode of speech, which is part of the daily lives of many 
Algerians in post-independence Algeria, and no longer connotes colonialism as 
much as it once did.  
Standard Arabic is spoken rarely, mainly by state officials and it is associated 
with corruption and immorality. The corrupt banker whom Llob and Dine visit to 
extract information from, speaks mainly in Standard Arabic. He speaks softly, while 
sat on a leather couch in a shiny yellow bathrobe as he offers expensive pastries to 
the two policemen. His outfit and setting feminize him (as Ghoul is elsewhere 
feminized in a red bathrobe). The man reveals to Llob that he has been manipulated, 
sent down the wrong path when actually he should be investigating in another 
direction. The banker’s corrupt morals are associated with lavish surroundings and 
his use of Standard Arabic. 
Llob discovers that Ghoul is the head of the organisation which ordered the 
assassination of intellectuals and civilians, so he decides to confront him in his 




of Ghoul’s walls with images of slaughtered children and men, victims of terrorist 
killings. These highly explicit images are disturbing and hard to look at. When 
Ghoul returns and finds Llob, he bursts accusingly into darija: for him the 
policeman’s status is so insignificant that he cannot arrest him. Turning to French, he 
contends: ‘Nous avons pris un mauvais départ dès 54 [1954], notre révolution est un 
fiasco, la preuve: après trente années d’indépendance c’est la régression, le 
totalitarisme, le règne de la mediocrité’. 
For Ghoul, the actual war is an ‘aubaine’. His speech reveals his thirst for 
power, his ‘ghoulishness’, which is at that point compounded by his use of French. 
Although he evokes the Algerian revolution he uses French to assert his worldview. 
French, the colonial language, has become in this scene the ‘Algerian’ language that 
justifies banditry and crime. French and darija in the scene are the languages of the 
political mafia that Ghoul represents. Llob stands at a distance from Ghoul, who is 
sitting on a couch. The physical separation between them enhances their ideological 
difference. The policeman replies in darija that ‘there are three types of judgement: 
conscience, justice and God. And while the first two have failed, the third will not, 
and it is waiting for you’. Llob’s comment on God marks his attachment to religion 
although he then shoots Ghoul, proving his own attachment to justice above morals. 
In the book, Llob’s lines are delivered in French, but the film translates them to 
darija, a decision that associates the language with justice, rather than the Standard 
Arabic of the state officials to whom Llob chooses not to defer. Darija becomes the 
language of the Black Decade’s violence but also of eventual justice. 
The viewer’s emotional identification with Llob is likely to reach its climax 
in this scene. A quick montage of the violent pictures taken at crime scenes gives 




are reminded of the horrors he has witnessed through the film and during the Black 
Decade more generally, which include the murders of his colleague Serdj and his 
friend Joher, the latter’s head found in a toilet bowl. Llob’s killing of Ghoul is thus 
justified, in the film’s logic, and confirms his commitment to justice. 
The theory expounded in the film of a plot hatched by a politico-financial 
mafia offers a simple and reductive explanation for a very complex political, 
economic and social situation. The theory seems to satisfy Llob (and, by extension 
Khadra and Touita) but is unsatisfying for the viewer. There remains an opportunity 
for a more in-depth explanation than this near-conspiracy theory can offer. The 
historians Martin Evans and John Philips summarise the confused and complex 
situation: ‘By 1996 Algeria had become a murky place with no dividing line 
between truth and untruth. With no dates, no battles, no chronology, the dirty war on 
terror was shapeless, inchoate and never-ending […] In this confused atmosphere 
Algeria became trapped in a series of mysteries […] who was killing whom and 
why?’392  
Morituri presents the point of view of a policeman who uses every language 
at his disposal to share his thoughts. He masters Standard Arabic, darija and French, 
though the film – like Barakat! – blurs the ideological associations of each language 
during the Black Decade and the chaos during that period. French goes from being 
neutral to being the language of corruption; darija is the language of everyday 
violence but also eventual justice, while Standard Arabic is the language of a corrupt 
elite. Hence, ideological associations can be blurred, but they can also shift and rest 
for a moment with particular ideological positions. 
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Casanegra and Roma ouella n’touma: Rebels with a Cause? 
In this section I will conjointly examine the Moroccan Casanegra (Dir. Noureddine 
Lakhmari, 2007) and Algerian Roma ouella n’touma (Dir. Tariq Téguia, 2006) as 
these films similarly focus on young, twenty-something protagonists, from modest 
origins, who wish to flee their respective countries, and use urban darija to assert 
themselves socially and politically. I aim at comparing and investigating how both 
films employ darija to give these youths an ‘authentic’ voice, an effect contributed 
to by both films’ use of non-professional actors. In Casanegra, darija allows the 
protagonists to freely criticise Moroccan society and politics, and to challenge 
traditional forms of authority, primarily the father and the state. Darija also gives a 
realistic feel to the film, and it is what makes the film politically significant. The 
language of Roma ouella n’touma is Algiers’s darija, and allows the protagonists, 
Kamel and Zina, to create their own world linguistically. Thus, they can escape their 
reality and dream of a better future, even though they never leave Algeria. French, 
on the other hand, is not particularly present in either film. In Casanegera, it is 
negatively associated with the upper classes, femininity, even effeminacy. In Roma 
ouella n’touma, French is occasionally integrated with darija, and has fewer class 
connotations than in Casanegra. French was also the language of Roma ouella 
n’touma’s script. 
The American scholar Wahneema Lubiano argues that although ‘vernacular 
language and cultural productions allow the possibility of discursive power 
disruptions, of cultural resistance, they do not guarantee it.’393 Téguia’s film proves 
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Lubiano’s stance as darija allows young Algerians to resist both cultural and 
linguistic hegemony, but only as a fantasy. Darija also serves the function described 
by Susan Gal when she observes that ‘resistance to a dominant cultural order occurs 
[…] when devalued linguistic forms and practices (such as local vernacular, slang 
[…], and poetry) are practiced and celebrated.’394  
Violence – the ability to both inflict and take it – combined with crude darija 
are presented in Casanegra as essential elements of the empowerment of the two 
protagonists Adil and Karim. The language spoken in this film corresponds to 
Casablanca’s actual street language and it conveys the characters’ violence. The film 
is punctuated with vulgar insults such as ‘dine omok’ (‘curse your mother’s 
religion!’), ‘dine babak’ (‘curse your father’s religion!’), ‘kaouad’ (‘bugger off!’) – 
language broadly equivalent to that found in social drama films such as La Haine 
(Dir. Mathieu Kassovitz, 1995) or Boyz N the Hood (Dir. John Singleton, 1991). The 
anthropologist Vivian De Klerk examining youth discussions in an American high 
school argues that obscene language and swearing are for men ‘linguistic strategies 
marking either power or solidarity’, and this is attested by Adil and Karim whose 
swearing and crude language carries ‘connotations of strength, masculinity and 
confidence’ and provides them with provide them with an assertion of dominance.395   
Roma ouella n’touma’s director Téguia wrote the script in French and 
translated it into darija. He wanted Algerian Arabic dialect to be heard, and he 
insisted on using Algiers street language because he did not want to use a 
‘“novlangue”, a mixture of Standard Arabic and dialectal Arabic, which the téléfilms 
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produced for Algerian television usually allow us to hear.396 Téguia assimilates 
darija into the Algerian language, and observes: ‘Je me demande d’ailleurs s’il ne 
faudrait pas simplement dire “l’algérien”, comme il existe, à partir d’un socle latin 
commun, le français, l’italien, l’espagnol, etc’.397 As noted earlier in the introduction, 
darija, escaping state regulation, freely includes words from other languages and is 
gaining greater prominence in domains conventionally associated with Standard 
Arabic.  
Darija in both films was perceived by journalists as making the films 
plausible and ‘realistic’. Birger Langkjær defines realism in film as covering 
‘realism of style (visual and acting style, mise-en-scène)’ and the ‘recognition of 
social, psychological, cultural and even emotional elements’.398 The Algerian 
journalist Hind O, also suggests that darija in Roma ouella n’touma ‘nous met de 
plain-pied dans notre réalité socioculturelle’.399 Similarly, Moroccan journalists 
considered Casanegra’s darija to provide a realistic representation of the language 
of a section of Morocco’s population elsewhere neglected by the media.400 Lakhmari 
noted that none of his actors – professional or non-professionals – was from the 
milieu he sought to depict, so he had to prepare his leads by taking them into 
Casablanca’s nightclubs and streets.401  
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The actors and producers subsequently insisted that the places they visited in 
Casablanca, and the language used, were far more violent than how the film depicted 
them.402 Moroccan journalist, Ahmed Benchemsi – who had founded the first darija 
newspaper Nichane, soon repressed by the state – argued that Casanegra pressed 
Moroccans to look at themselves in an honest way and that life in the slums would 
not have been depicted accurately if the character spoke a ‘median civilised Arabic’ 
or the Arabic spoken on television, which the ‘government tries to impose upon 
us’.403 Thus, using the local urban language was understood to convey realistically 
the socioeconomic and political situation represented by the film. That both films are 
fictions again tended to be overlooked in the press, as if their use of language and 
their realistic feel were the only elements to consider.  
The films’ titles set their tone and confirm their linguistic politics. Casanegra 
bears witness to the blackness of the film, opposed to the ‘whiteness’ of the city 
Casa-blanca, and the romance of the film Casablanca (Dir. Michael Curtiz, 
1942).404 Social inequalities permeate the film and highlight Morocco’s social and 
political situation: corruption, everyday violence (either in the private sphere or on 
the street), and youth unemployment. Lakhmari explained that Casanegra is a 
‘voyeuristic’ film as he wanted audiences ‘to feel on the screen the shock of 
violence’.405  
 ‘Roma ouella n’touma’, meanwhile, is a football anthem chanted in Algerian 
stadiums, addressed to politicians: ‘Rome rather than you’. Football supporters 
usually chant this theme as they wave English, Canadian, Italian and even French 
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flags to signify their rejection of nationalist Algerian politicians: any other country 
(particularly a Western country) is better than ‘here’.406 The mention of Rome also 
signals the globalization of football. In the 1990s, Algerian supporters began to 
identify with foreign teams and even ‘Italianised’ their teams: the Algiers Union 
Football Club (USMA) was nicknamed AC Milan. At the beginning of the film, 
when the two protagonists meet in the street, Kamel asks Zina to leave with him for 
Rome, and she immediately replies: ‘Roma ouella n’touma!’  
The association of the film with football is politically significant. In the post-
independence period, football was used by the state for social unity and national 
pride. By the 1980s, however, it had become a ‘weekly ritual for the public to vent 
its political and social frustration’.407 Football chants became ‘one of the few 
available forums for excluded youths to openly declare their resentments, to send 
politicized signals to society at large and to claim their autonomy, normality and 
their rights to mobility and consumption’.408 Football is significant because it allows 
subversive social gestures for its fan: in the stadium, they can speak freely in darija, 
as they can in Téguia’s film. 
Although Roma ouella n’touma takes place in 1997, in the midst of the Black 
Decade, violence is hardly seen, and the film’s focus is the impossibility for the 
young protagonists to freely move out from Algeria, a theme that was still relevant 
when the film came out. Roma ouella n’touma narrates twenty-four hours in a 
journey undertaken by Zina and Kamel, two Algerians in their twenties. They are 
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looking for a sailor, El Bosco, who supposedly can help Kamel to leave Algeria for 
Italy, from where he was expelled when living there as he was an illegal immigrant. 
The film begins in Algiers, focusing on illegal goings-on: terrorist activities in a 
print shop, smuggling activities around the port, and racketeering. The rest of the 
film takes place in La Madrague, a port twenty kilometres west of Algiers, often 
seen as the city’s periphery. Delayed in their quest by zealous and aggressive 
policemen, Zina and Kamel find themselves restricted by the curfew imposed during 
the Black Decade (from 9 pm to 5 am) and have to spend the night at La Madrague 
with Kamel’s friend, Merzak, at a bakery. In the morning, Kamel and Zina find El 
Bosco dead in his bath, probably shot by terrorists, but the plot remains unclear. At 
the end of the film, while Kamel and Zina leave El Bosco’s house, after finding 
passports and an American Green Card, Zina drives the getaway car. Suddenly, two 
young men appear and shoot at the car. Kamel is wounded and hallucinates as he and 
Zina escape in the car.  
Casanegra depicts a three-day flashback in the lives of Karim and Adil, 
unemployed young men in their twenties, living in a poor neighbourhood of 
Casablanca. Adil lives with his mother and his stepfather, who often drunkenly beats 
his partner for money to buy drinks. Karim is the breadwinner of his family after his 
father was left handicapped, having worked over thirty years in a fish factory. Karim 
supervises young children who illegally sell cigarettes on the street. Adil’s aim is to 
leave Morocco for Malmö, Sweden, where his uncle lives. However, all of his 
attempts to obtain illegal papers fail and Adil needs a visa and money to obtain it. To 
this end, Adil and Karim become associated with Zrirek, a violent criminal who 
gives Adil and Karim assignments such as extort money from a rich man,  drug a 




fight and the horse escapes. After they fail to catch the horse, they escape in a car 
closely followed by Zrirek and the police. When the car crashes, Adil and Karim 
escape on foot, at which point the narrative returns to the opening scene.  
The endings of the two films offer different perspectives on the young 
people’s prospects. In Roma ouella n’touma, Zina and Kamel are shot at, as they 
drive away. The scene is highly disorienting, with overexposed white light and the 
engine sounds amplified. As Zina drives, Kamel faints; he asks Zina if she can hear 
Hasni (the rai singer to whom Rachida listens). She responds ‘jaeyh’ (idiot), 
summing up his question and actions. In the final shot, Zina faces the camera with a 
frozen expression of determination: their effort to escape the country is not yet 
exhausted. Casanegra’s ending shows Adil and Karim back in their neighbourhood. 
Adil reveals that he now wants to leave for Norway, a country of oil and wealth. But, 
at the end of their journey, Kamel and Adil have not changed and will carry on with 
their petty thefts. 
Casanegra is Lakhmari’s second film. Born in Morocco in 1964, the director 
began his career in Norway, where he made short features largely concerned with the 
excluded: immigrants and people living on the margins of Norwegian society. 
Lakhmari’s film career in Morocco began when he directed an American inspired 
crime series for Moroccan television Al Kadia, which encountered great success. 
Orlando identifies in Al Kadia various motifs that Lakhmari repeats in Casanegra, 
such as the stylisation of violence, and exposing economic inequalities.409  
Casanegra was Morocco’s 2009 surprise box office hit. It attracted 500,000 viewers 
from across the spectrum of social classes, age, and gender.410 The film was such a 
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hit in Morocco that it was described by the French journalist Florence Beaugé as a 
‘phénomène de société’.411 Mostly distributed in Moroccan cinemas and sold as a 
bootlegged DVD, Casanegra also circulated in international film festivals, and won 
the best Foreign Film at the Toronto Film Festival. It represented Morocco in the 
2010 Oscars, which signalled to journalists that Moroccan cinema’s authorities had 
accepted this film.412  
Roma ouella n’touma was Téguia’s first feature. After producing four short 
films in Algeria, he spent eight years gathering the necessary funds (211,000 euros) 
from French, German and Algerian production companies.413 In comparison, 
Casanegra gathered 1.3 million euros from Moroccan sources.414 Téguia, born in 
1966 in Algeria, left for France after his baccalaureate in Algiers, and trained in 
philosophy and photography. Téguia’s PhD dissertation was on the works of Swiss 
photographer and filmmaker Robert Frank, known for his experimental photography, 
which frequently refuses conventional photographic grammar. In his ground-
breaking book, The Americans (1958), Frank drew on interdisciplinary sources 
across the arts – Beat literature, abstract painting, and Bebop jazz – in such a way to 
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‘confound easy reading of images’.415 Frank’s work influenced Téguia, who also 
drew on literary sources for intertitles with poetic quotations.416  
 Rachid Amrani, who plays Kamel in Roma ouella n’touma, is unemployed 
and was cast on the streets of Algiers. Samira Kaddour, who plays Zina, is a 
projectionist at Algiers’s Cinémathèque. To further the association with Algerian 
cinema, Zina’s mother is played by Khadra Boudehane, who worked at the 
Cinémathèque for over thirty years as a cashier.417 Only one of the policemen, 
Ahmed Benaïssa, is a professional Algerian actor. Téguia directed his actors to be 
‘themselves’ and ‘to hold back from acting’.418 Indeed Zina and Kamel are often 
standing or sitting with their imperturbable postures and their faces almost 
expressionless as if to translate the idleness of their lives and their boredom.  
Unlike Casanegra’s warm reception in Morocco, Roma ouella n’touma did 
not endear itself to Algerian audiences, who were left puzzled by this film (for 
example Nancy Honicker described a screening where two Algerian students 
declared that the film was ‘nul, nul’).419 At festivals and in France, where it was 
distributed, the film however gained critical recognition: it was awarded first prize at 
the experimental Fribourg film festival and was presented at the Venice film festival 
in 2006. Le Monde journalist Jacques Mandelbaum praised it for its audacious style 
and considered it a milestone in Algerian cinema.420 
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The two films differ in terms of style, rhythm and characterisation. 
Casanegra was compared to Martin Scorsese’s Mean Streets (1973), with its fast 
pace and violent themes, as well as its references to film noir and gangster movies as 
well as Trainspotting (Danny Boyle, 1996).421 Roma ouella n’touma, with its long 
takes, long silences and deconstructed narrative, has been compared to Jean Luc 
Godard’s Pierrot le fou (1965). 422 Guy Austin rightly summarises the film’s 
Godardian techniques: ‘loud ambient sound, metatextual placards, interviews to 
camera, repeated tracking shots, literary allusions’.423  
Some of the most immediately noticeable characteristics of Roma ouella 
n’touma are its long moments of silence and idleness, its ‘fuzzy’ low-light images, 
and its deconstructed narrative in which many scenes are just sketches. The film, 
shot with a mini-DV camera, mostly hand-held, frequently uses poor or over 
exposed lighting. The two directors of photography, Nasser Medjkane and Hacène 
Ait Kaci, were professional press photographers; they used ambient lighting, with 
some additional neon, which Téguia associated with a ‘reporter image, with its 
documentary feel’.424 Only the urban sounds of Algiers are heard, and the city is 
hardly filmed. La Madrague, by the coast, is presented with unfinished houses, bare 
walls and concrete. The architecture suggests a threatening space from which can 
emerge a terrorist or a policeman at any moment. The Arabic name of La Madrague 
is El Djamila (‘The Beautiful’). This name, hardly used, contrasts with the 
abandoned and lifeless place depicted in the film. All these elements all parts of a 
political aesthetic: for Téguia, the film’s style and location ‘go hand in hand with the 
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poor conditions of production and even with the political status of Algeria and its 
economy’.425  
Music plays a crucial role in both films, conveying the protagonists’ moods 
and anchoring the films in the national setting with local, diegetic music. 
Casanegra’s music was composed by the American Richard Horowitz, who lived in 
Morocco from the late 1960s to 1979 while he studied traditional Moroccan music 
and the gasba, a traditional flute made of wood. Horowitz fused jazz themes with 
electronic sounds, so that the softness of the jazz contrasted with the harsh realities 
in the film. In Casanegra, the diegetic Moroccan music includes the song performed 
by Zrirek, the criminal for whom Adil and Karim work. Zrireck sings in a dingy 
traditional cabaret called, in French, Tova bien (‘All is good’ – inscribed above the 
front door in French and Arabic). His appearance in the cabaret associates Zrireck 
with the aaroubi, which means peasant, but has pejorative connotations of ignorance 
and crass manners. Zrirek sings joyously and orders the other men in the bar to sing 
with him. The singing creates a feeling of unity between these men, poor and drunk. 
In Roma ouella n’touma, music marks the film’s rhythm and is also 
reminiscent of Algeria’s past. For example, the jazz rhythms that accompany Zina 
while she is followed by the camera getting down to the street and accompanies her 
steps, is Archie Shepp’s jazz melody recorded at the Algiers pan-African festival in 
1969 with a group of Tuaregs. The 1969 pan-African festival was the highlight of 
Algeria’s positioning at the forefront of Third World countries, which celebrated the 
African fight for independence. Hundreds of delegates attended from African 
countries, including delegates from the African liberation movement and the Black 
Panthers. The festival aimed to ‘discuss, explore and display the role of culture in 
                                               




revolutionary movements’.426 Shepp is known for his Afrocentric music and his fight 
for African-American civil rights. The inclusion of his music has a double meaning: 
it reminds the viewer of Algeria’s political and cultural openness, and that Shepp’s 
struggle applies also to Algerians as well.  
 Téguia reinforces the links between literature, politics and music by 
including the poem ‘Peupliers’, sung by l’Hachemi l’Kerfaoui Tchamba music 
group. Peupliers was written by the poet and political activist Bachir Hadj Ali 
(1920–1991), director of the Algerian Communist Party between 1945 and 1962, the 
date of the party’s prohibition. Hadj Ali was tortured by the political police of the 
Algerian regime. He is known for his poetry, mixing darija with French, and his 
book Soleils sonores (from which the poem is taken) was published in 1985 to a 
limited audience as it was censored in Algeria (and remains unpublished). Téguia 
revives Algeria’s political figures and their struggle for independence but he also 
revives a different ideological stance – more liberal than the official post-
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Figure 18. Zina and Kamel overlooking Algiers’s port in Roma ouella n’touma 
Roma ouella n’touma opens with a long backward tracking shot of the sky, 
then the distant sea, before the camera gradually descends to the lampposts – the 
image is grainy and accompanied only by the sound of the wind. This first scene was 
described by Joseph McGonagle as ‘connoting spatial or temporal regression 
according to Western cinematic convention [in which progression would be a left – 
right movement] – but mirroring the direction of Arabic script [i.e. right–left]’.427 
Austin also argues that shooting from right-to-left when Zina walks in the street 
‘evokes progression from past to future, as in other Arabophone films’.428 But these 
interpretations are unconvincing, for more than one reason. It is not only 
Arabophone films that include this movement; and there is a hint of exoticisation 
here – francophone films are not usually said to use left-to-right tracking like French 
writing. Agnès Varda’s Sans toit ni loi (1985) depicts the journey of a vagabonde 
Mona using right-to-left tracking shots that accentuate Mona’s loneliness and 
detachment from society. Right-to-left shots are thus neither the mark of Arabic 
                                               
427 Joseph McGonagle, ‘Going Nowhere Fast: On the Road in Contemporary Algeria in 
Tariq Téguia’s “Rome plutôt que vous” (2006)’, in Open Roads Closed Borders: The 
Contemporary French-Language Road Movie, ed. by Michael Golt and Thibaut Schilt 
(Bristol: Intellect, 2013), pp. 87-102 (p. 90). 




directors nor of male directors. Furthermore, Téguia was self-consciously influenced 
by ‘Western’ filmmakers and, most importantly for the purposes of this thesis, 
sought to make an ‘Algerian’ film in darija which further dissociates him from the 
‘Arabophone’ assumptions of Austin and McGonagle related to Arabic script. The 
slow camera movement of this first scene only introduces the emptiness, boredom 
and slow pace as if to introduce the viewer to the film’s rhythm.  
Casablanca’s art deco buildings form the backdrop to Casanegra; Algiers, on 
the other hand, hardly appears in Roma ouella n’touma. Casanegra opens with shots 
of Casablanca’s historic town centre with its streets and art deco buildings by night, 
and credits in gold and grey projected onto the buildings, with accompanying jazz 
music. These elements establish a noir ambiance. A subsequent scene of a dog 
roaming around dark and empty streets and rooting through garbage anticipates the 
characters’ downtrodden status. Casanegra is shot mainly at night in empty streets. 
The director of photography, Luca Coassin, drained the colours to intensify the 
visual aesthetic and its suggestions of violence. The shots of Casablanca’s streets, 
and the framing of buildings in the foreground, give the latter a menacing 
appearance as abstract forms and shapes. Such elements emphasise the ‘darkness’ of 





Figure 19. Casanegra’s poster with Karim and Adil (left to right)  
The ‘ville moderne’ in Casablanca was founded by French architects, and 
enlarged from 1914, and its art deco architecture was avant-garde and 
transformative; it served as home for French and European settlers until Morocco’s 
independence in 1959. 429 Subsequently, these buildings were occupied by modest 
and poor Moroccan households as a ‘trésor de guerre laissé en héritage, arraché au 
colonisateur’.430 Casablanca is Morocco’s economic capital, the modern city, home 
to modern buildings and the wealthy but also the poor who have migrated from rural 
areas. Under French rule, Casablanca was home to political demonstrations and after 
independence it became the site of demonstrations in the 1970s, such as the bread 
revolt. Hence choosing Casablanca as the plot’s backdrop accentuates the political 
stance of the film. 
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Adil is often framed on his own, standing against a wall; more than once he 
is shot while talking to mannequins in an empty shop window. Karim, meanwhile, is 
typically filmed in medium shots from a low angle. The buildings that rear behind 
him remind us that he is struggling to escape from Casablanca. Adil and Karim are 
continually in motion, which signals their youthful energy and impatience to get 
away, though they rarely leave their neighbourhood, and the framing reveals the 
decaying state of the buildings. The only moment when the two young men are able 
to appreciate Casablanca’s beauty is when they find refuge on a roof, where they 
drink beer and where Adil occasionally sleeps. The roof provides a distance from 
which they can recognise their love for their city: they joyously scream ‘Casanegra’. 
 
Figure 20. Karim and Adil (Casablanca’s buildings in the background) 
Both films’ protagonists discuss their desire to leave their countries. For 
Adil, to leave the country is to escape from a difficult family situation and 
Morocco’s corrupted morals, while Karim wants to return to Italy, where he once 
lived. Kamel tells Zina about his longing to explore other countries, in a long take as 




Algiers. All three means of travel could help them flee from Algeria, yet their 
separation from these places heightens the sense of their immobility. Kamel muses 
on Algeria’s Mediterranean location, including its connection to other ports: 
Marseille, Barcelona, and Naples. Kamel considers it natural to desire to go these 
cities, close to Algiers, ‘our cousins’. But when Kamel mentions leaving for 
Australia, Zina ironically replies in darija, ‘What is there to do there? There are only 
sheep and kangaroos’. She also questions Kamel’s ability to leave his houma (the 
urban neighbourhood).  
This mention, in darija, is significant. The houma has a central place in the 
daily life of Algerian youth, it is connected to the identification and socialisation of 
neighbourhood lives.431 The sociologist Kamel Rarbo argues that the ‘identification 
with the neighbourhood is not contradictory with the desire for exile and to embark 
on the famous “boat for Australia”’.432 The ‘boat for Australia’ is a myth that 
emerged in the 1980s about a boat that would take all Algerians willing to leave 
Algeria to Australia. It symbolises the ‘symbolic cultural and material frustration’ of 
the young people, as well as ‘their fears and uncertainties with regard to 
unemployment’.433 Yet Kamel remains optimistic. He proclaims, ‘tahya el 
alamisation’ (‘Long live globalisation’), a French rendering of the Arabic word 
‘aalam’ (world) and can be read as a subversion of ‘Tahia el Djazair’ (Viva Algeria), 
a patriotic theme. Then an intertitle emerges, white characters on black, in Standard 
Arabic: ‘to extend a border into another territory is to make war’. This originates 
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from the German geographer Friedrich Ratzel (1844–1904), who regarded borders as 
expressions of the power of the state.434 Often used in silent films, intertitles do not 
fit into the general categorization of dialogue (diegetic) or exposition (non-
diegetic).435 They directly address the audience, so the irruption of this meta-text 
adds a political reading to Kamel’s words: the intertitle is ironic because Kamel’s 
intention is not to make war but to travel, and even to take all of Algeria with him. 
The intertitle is a direct intrusion of the director as he invites the viewer to reflect on 
the meaning of leaving one’s country. Téguia suggests that a borderless world would 
allow peaceful circulation. His choice of Standard Arabic for the translation – rather 
than darija – conveys the ability of this language otherwise associated with 
nationalism to engage with other languages and lends gravitas to the quotation. 
Yet Zina questions globalisation. Why can merchandise travel but not 
Algerians? Kamel reminds her that the word ‘Arab’ means being ‘on the move’. 
Kamel recites, in a mixture of darija and Standard Arabic, Emma Lazarus’s poem 
inscribed on the base of the Statue of Liberty: ‘Send these, the homeless, tempest-
tossed to me, I lift my lamp beside the golden door’.436 This scene from Roma ouella 
n’touma is reminiscent of another, in Casanegra, when Karim tries to lift a statue of 
justice that has folded eyes and a scale, outside an antique shop. Wanting to help 
Asma, the shop’s owner with whom he is in love, Karim struggles, and fails, to lift 
the heavy statue, symbolising his lack of mobility and thus the injustice of Moroccan 
society.  
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In Roma ouella n’touma, Zina challenges Kamel’s optimistic view of 
America by citing Kafka’s menacing characterization of the Statue of Liberty. 
Kamel (possibly not knowing who Kafka was) replies jokingly: ‘He must have been 
refused a visa in order to write that’. Although Kamel and Zina are not free to travel, 
the geographical limitations are overcome through words and citations. Kamel and 
Zina can still discuss and dream of the possibility of travel. They use darija, in this 
instance, to combine local and global culture and to discover new modalities of self-
expression.  Zina and Kamel borrow from the different linguistic resources available 
to them – which include darija, Standard Arabic, and foreign literature – to 
manoeuvre within the very limited space that they are afforded in society. They 
resist restrictions on their freedom through their use of language.  
A second intertitle occurs after two unidentified young men are shown in a 
print shop, one standing still against a machine in the foreground, the other in the 
background folding papers. On a black background in white letters appears the 
following in Standard Arabic: ‘Not to be missed! Young country, very little used’. 
Téguia transposed these words from street graffiti: like the repurposing of the 
football chant, Téguia appropriated youthful vernacular into the film.437 Yet the 
placard occurs in a moment of boredom and indicates the youths’ frustration. The 
young men will later write a jihadi speech. The suggestion is that the enforced 
idleness of young people is one element that leads them to Islamist ideology.  
It is not only Standard Arabic that appears on screen. At another moment, a 
cigarette seller breaks the fourth wall and approaches the camera with a homemade 
sign on which is written in darija, ‘I am alive; am I seen?’ He then speaks, also in 
darija, ‘I am alive, alive, and well’. Austin described this scene as the emergence of 
                                               




the ‘subaltern’, analysing it in the framework of Ranjana Khanna’s 
‘conceptualisation of postcolonial melancholia as “subaltern interruptions”’.438 
Austin argues that the cigarette seller’s appearance ‘posits a melancholic resistance 
that goes beyond the Freudian “crushed state” of the Algerian masses to express 
Khanna’s critical melancholia’.439 Austin’s suggestion is that after the young 
people’s protests in 1988, Algerian youth lived in a state of ‘melancholia’ and 
crushed hope. However, this is evidently over-general; ‘Algerian youth’ did not live 
only in melancholy. Zina and Kamel display energy and a vivid spirit. They express 
longings and demands that are more than melancholia and are proof that they want to 
live and exist as individuals. 
Téguia describes Standard Arabic as it has been imposed by Algerian 
authorities as ‘novlangue’, an allusion to George Orwell’s ‘newspeak’ in 1984, 
where the imposed language reduces the vocabulary and the possibility of free 
thought. 440 However, Téguia does not entirely reject Standard Arabic; rather, he 
repurposes it to signal how this official language can be used for ends opposed to its 
official status (for example, how it can translate foreign poetry). He also seeks to 
prove that Standard Arabic can co-exist with darija – that one does not exclude the 
other, as is often the case in the media.  
Standard Arabic, in Roma ouella n’touma, is also associated with Algerian 
society’s Islamisation. It is heard twice in the diegesis: once via religious dogma on 
a radio; and again, when a young man is writing a religious speech in a print shop, to 
call for jihad. In the former instance, as a young man walks into a café, a sound can 
be heard in the background from a television programme, involving a speech by a 
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cheikh (a religious cleric). A conversation between men is dealing with women’s 
issues. The cheikh forbids women to wear nail polish: he spits out its French name, 
‘vernis’, as though it was the name of the devil. He also forbids a woman from 
visiting her sister’s husband in her sister’s absence, because the woman might end up 
marrying him in the event of divorce or death. These conversations occur in the 
background, yet they signal the increasing conservatism of attitudes, as well as the 
intrusion of these talk shows into daily life.  
The young man in the print shop is writing a speech to encourage jihad. He 
corrects his text and is attentive to the power of the words. The scene is theatrical: 
the young man, filmed from a distance, rehearses the text that he convinces himself 
to believe in. Téguia implies that Standard Arabic, in this context, can be twisted to 
express Islamist ideology. It can easily intrude into everyday life and influence 
young people’s thought. Kamel and Zina, however, mock this Islamic discourse. 
They give themselves nicknames such as ‘ghanima’ ةمینغ  (‘spoils of war’) and 
‘zariaat el irhab’ باھرالا ةعیرز  (‘terrorist seed’). Their humour demonstrates how 
young people can also subvert Islamist ideology.  
Casanegra’s protagonists deal differently with Islamism. For them, the 
ideology is a means for clerics to exert control over people. Adil tells Karim that he 
wants to leave Morocco because he is fed up with the moral issues plaguing 
Moroccan society. Adil is unable to speak French or Standard Arabic; darija allows 
him to freely criticise Moroccan society. These opinions are rarely represented in 
any official discourse. Therefore, the film provides an image of Moroccan society 
that contests the official portrayal of the city as moral and a capitalist success. 
Subsequent scenes in the streets of Casablanca will prove Adil’s words true, with 




‘clean’ Adil is escape to Malmö and his fantasy wedding to a blonde Norwegian 
woman, revealed in a dream sequence. The whiteness of his fantasy bride, dressed in 
a white dress, contrasts with the dark night and street. She appears as salvation, with 
his arguing family now apparently pacified, and his mother and stepfather attending 
his wedding.  
The young people’s rejection of religious hypocrisy in Casanegra is 
symbolised when Karim exposes the hypocrisy of an exploitative factory owner who 
has earned the religious title of hadj. In a medium close-up behind a window, 
keeping his distance from the factory and the workers, the man is having a phone 
conversation in darija, in which he is clearly bribing a politician. Karim arrives, 
ready to confront the hadj, angry at receiving only 50 dirhams (less than 4 euros) for 
his day at work. Karim is filmed in a long shot surrounded by boxes, centrally 
framed and alone, which lends to him a momentary symbolic power. The hadj 
responds in vulgar darija, telling Karim to ‘fuck off’. But Karim has the last word 
when, as he is leaving the job behind, he shouts back, ‘go to the hammam and clean 
yourself from all the dirt you are doing’. Karim rejects the hadj’s religious hypocrisy 
and exploitation by verbally demeaning his morality; darija allows Karim to do so 
(rather than using standard Arabic which would evoke religious precepts).  
Conscious as they are of the city’s moral darkness, Adil and Karim’s 
rejection of polite language in Casanegra is connected with their rejection of upper-
class lifestyles and morals. This is made clear when the two young men are sent by 
Zrirek to collect money from a man who turns out to be a transvestite. Adil and 
Karim’s social exclusion is constructed through a subtle staging of binary 
oppositions, such as the difference between the small apartments where their 




African art and Western furniture and is completely disconnected from Adil and 
Karim’s everyday lives, associated with traditional Moroccan furniture. The bright 
light and whiteness of the walls of the villa further contrast with the dim light in Adil 
and Karim’s homes.   
When Adil and Karim enter his house uninvited, the man films them with his 
camera. We as viewers are momentarily made the transvestite’s accomplices as we 
view Adil and Karim through his lens. They are blurred, as if unreal; the man puts 
them at distance, physically and symbolically, as he speaks to them in French. Then 
he switches to darija to repeatedly address the two as khorot, which designates in 
darija someone ‘dumb’, ‘stupid’, from an ‘under-class’. While Karim wants to keep 
the encounter peaceful, it is only when the man addresses them in darija as ‘ouled 
ezenka’ (‘street boys’) that Karim beats him. Karim’s violence replaces language – 
neither Karim nor Adil can speak French.  
The film offers a disturbing justification of the protagonists’ violence against 
the transvestite, involving a disconcerting attitude towards gender. Because the 
transvestite has mocked him in French, Karim beats the man, and when he falls on 
the floor it is revealed that he is wearing women’s underwear. The scene therefore 
associates French with a feminised, or even perverted, social status. The transvestite 
is meant to portray a loss of morals and masculinity in a wealthy context. Karim’s 
gesture is thus constructed as a class-based and masculine revenge, whereby his use 
of darija triumphs over the upper classes.  
After the encounter, Adil describes the transvestite a ‘sheikha’. Sheikhates 




its region, both in family celebrations and popular cabarets.441Although their musical 
repertoire is recognized as an integral part of Moroccan cultural heritage, these 
women have a bad reputation and are often considered, or even treated, as 
prostitutes, as they operate in essentially male, nocturnal spaces. By associating the 
transvestite with a sheikha, Adil regains his power over the man who insulted him in 
French and asserts his masculinity, with a touch of homophobia.  
While at the transvestite’s luxurious villa, Adil finds money and steals it, 
while Karim takes an expensive suit. With his suit, Karim enters an exclusive 
nightclub where he meets Asma, the antique shop owner who mainly speaks French, 
and the two engage in a one-night romance. When Karim visits Asma’s shop the 
next day, street boys working for him shout at him in darija, asking him for more 
cigarettes to sell and commenting on Asma, ‘your girlfriend is hot’. While Karim 
chases the boys, Asma is pushed into a car by her female friend who repeats in 
French ‘mais monte je te dis’. Karim’s inability to speak French coupled with his 
social status separate him from Asma. 
French, on the other hand, in Roma ouella n’touma, is used in the same 
manner as the intertitles: as interruptions of the complex political context. 
Commenting on the politics of the time, Merzak, the baker who has welcomed Zina, 
Malek and Kamel for the night and who is also a journalist, states ‘haddhi harb 
thekila’ (‘this is a heavy war’) which he translates into French as ‘nous vivons une 
guerre lente’. One of the two young men who works at the print shop wears a green 
shirt with a French Sonatrach logo, the state oil company. On Algeria’s flag, green 
symbolises Islam (as well as the land), while Sonatrach has been surrounded by 
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various embezzlement scandals. The young man wearing this shirt is associated with 
racketeering and Islamist ideology. In another scene, when Malek reads the 
newspapers in French, two ads are shown in close-up: one for Halliburton’s 
expansion in Algeria; another for CV-writing services. Halliburton, a US company, 
was involved with Sonatrach in a bribery and corruption scandal. Kamel reads Le 
Matin, a newspaper that has been censored and not distributed in Algeria since 
2004.442 French is thus the language of business; it is also the language used in the 
papers that reveal political scandals and challenge state authority.  
In Casanegra, social class is marked by the division between darija and 
French. English has fewer class connotations. For that reason, Karim gives his sister 
an Oxford English Dictionary to help her learn. For him, the dictionary – which his 
sister treats as a vital commodity – serves as a kind of fetish to protect her not from 
evil but from poverty. English will be important for Adil if he is to leave Morocco 
for Norway in search of a better life. Unfortunately, none of the characters speak 
English, the language that promises social improvement outside of Morocco. 
Although Kamel can cite English poetry translated into darija, he does not speak 
English; only the policeman they met who cites Henry James speaks it: English has 
not yet reached Algeria’s poorest people. 
I suggested that Casanegra and Roma ouella n’touma are unrealistic in terms 
of plot, but realistic in their use of language. In both cases, the characters prefer 
urban, street language to any other language, which signals not only their 
detachment from official language but also their turn to a more vernacular language. 
Casanegra rejects polite language and turns instead to a vulgar, slang-heavy version 
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of darija to accompany the experience of injustice. The film represents a generation 
of frustrated young Moroccans who are neither heroes nor villains, and there is no 
attempt to make them likeable. In Roma ouella n’touma, the use of darija is also a 
political gesture; it allows the young protagonists to articulate their daily frustrations 
and their desire for freedom, their individual consciousness as well as their rejection 
of Islamic ideologies.  
 
‘We are Not Like You’: Youth and Islamic Terrorism 
The 2013 Doha Film Festival awarded the Best Director prize to Nabil Ayouch for 
Les Chevaux de Dieu (2012) and Best Arab film to Le Repenti (Dir. Merzak 
Allouache, 2012). These prizes reflected an increased interest in the figure of the 
Islamic terrorist in North Africa in 2012. Le Repenti tells the story of a young 
Algerian man returning to normal life after living in a terrorist camp. Les Chevaux 
de Dieu examines the motivations of the young male suicide bombers who carried 
out coordinated attacks in Casablanca on 16 May 2003. These attacks, in which 
forty-five people died, targeted a Jewish cemetery, a Jewish community centre, an 
international hotel, and Spanish- and Italian-owned restaurants. 
Les Chevaux de Dieu is a vivid film with upbeat parts whereas Le Repenti is 
more reflective, with little dialogue. Le Repenti positions Islamic terrorists as part of 
society, while Les Chevaux de Dieu points towards their ideological and linguistic 
distinctiveness. In the latter film, the young men appropriate religious language to 
assert themselves and create their own social milieu, but this cuts them off from the 
broader society they inhabit. In Le Repenti, religious language is absent: all the 
characters use darija, and so the terrorist is indistinguishable linguistically from the 





Les Chevaux de Dieu: ‘Paradise is Ours…Not Yours’  
Les Chevaux de Dieu exposes the harsh living conditions for young men in Sidi 
Moumen, a shanty town five kilometres from Casablanca. The narrative begins in 
1994 and follows Tarek – nicknamed Yachine after the Russian footballer Lev 
Yashin – his brother Hamid and his best friend Nabil. They pass their time with 
football, small-time drug trafficking, and verbal and sexual abuse. One night, Hamid 
sexually abuses Nabil to assert his power as the group’s leader. By 1999, Hamid has 
become a drug dealer and his family’s breadwinner. After throwing a stone at a 
police car, he is sentenced to two years in prison. By the time he has come out of 
prison he has become a fundamentalist and starts to associate with an Islamic 
Brotherhood.  
Meanwhile, Yachine works with Nabil at the local garage. One evening, the 
garage owner Ba’ Moussa, a libidinous old man, makes a move on Nabil. Yachine 
hits Ba’ Moussa on the back of the head, which he thinks kills him, although 
Yachine sees Ba’ Moussa’s body moving again so he violently hits him again, 
eventually killing Ba’ Moussa. Nabil seeks Hamid’s help to get rid of the body, and 
he enlists the help of other ‘brothers’. Subsequently, Yachine, Nabil and another 
friend, Fouad, gradually join the Islamic group. Abu Zubeir is the spiritual leader of 
the young men, who are prepared for suicide bombing by one of their ‘brothers’, 
Ziad. 
Les Chevaux de Dieu is Ayouch’s fifth feature film. It aims for a ‘realistic’ 




‘inside’.443Ayouch spent two years in preparation, during which time he interviewed 
political scientists, sociologists and inhabitants of Sidi Moumen who knew the 
terrorists.444 To achieve a realistic effect, Ayouch filmed on location in a shanty 
town similar to the original one. He employed non-professional actors – the two lead 
actors, brothers in the film, are themselves brothers from Sidi Moumen – and he paid 
attention to language and Islamic attitudes.445 While the script is adapted from Mahi 
Binebine’s Moroccan novel, originally written in French, Les Étoiles de Sidi 
Moumen (2010), Ayouch worked with script writer Jamel Belmahi to change the 
language of the novel. 446 Ayouch also enlisted the services of Reda Benotmane, who 
was previously imprisoned for ‘apology for terrorism’, to advise him on religious 
gestures – for example, of men praying – religious costume, and the correct way to 
deliver a religious speech.447 Ayouch gathered 3 million euros to produce the film, a 
significant budget for a Moroccan feature, the effects of which are evident in the 
cinematography and in particular the aerial views.448 
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Figure 21. Les Chevaux de Dieu’s poster (title in French and Arabic) 
Language, lighting, framing and mise-en-scène play crucial roles in 
representing the young men’s ideological changes. Lighting and camera movement 
in the first part of the film reflect the vibrancy of childhood. These scenes are mainly 
filmed with a moving camera: a system was fabricated with four metallic arms, so 
the camera was flexible and allowed more sequences of movement such as the 
young boys playing football.449 The light is bright, and the rhythm is energetic 
between violent football games and play. The language is darija, with swear words 
and sexual allusions from the children and adults. The second part of the film is 
dimly lit, mostly in interiors, and medium shots serve to distance the viewer from the 
events while enhancing the unity of the Islamic Brotherhood who live in an enclosed 
parallel universe. Darija is now mixed with Classical Arabic and religious discourse; 
this shift in language as well as costume signals the Islamisation of the young 
protagonists. 
In the second part of the film, Nabil and Yachine no longer dress in t-shirts 
and jeans, but mainly in long Islamic robes, and they have beards. They no longer 
                                               




smoke joints, they stop listening to the rai song ‘Jouni marre’ (the Arabisation of 
J’en ai marre), and a poster of the Bollywood actress Aishwarya Rai is replaced by a 
piece of fabric, with black and white motifs, similar to what religious men wear on 
their head. Yachine is renamed Tarek by Ziad, to remove the foreign influence of his 
nickname. The young men also learn to repeat religious idioms, and gradually use 
fewer expletives in darija, which makes their language more polished. They still 
belong to the community, but they become more isolated from their neighbours: no 
longer attending football games or hanging out smoking joints, they stay behind 
closed doors and have less contact with their families. These youths build a new 
community under Abu Zubeir’s influence and find new ways to express themselves 
and behave.  
Abu Zubeir’s mastery of Standard Arabic and religious rhetoric gives him 
authority in the community; he is the spiritual leader to be obeyed. His religious 
influence is enhanced by costume, make-up, lighting, and language. He is an austere 
figure, dressed in black Islamic clothes with a long robe, a hat and a beard. His eyes 
are painted with kohl: Salafi men use kohl following the Prophet Mohammed’s 
advice. His room is filled with shelves of religious books, written in Arabic, which 
accentuate his literacy and religious knowledge. The young men pray and attend 
religious speeches in a house that is kept secret from the other inhabitants of the 
slum. They sit on the floor in a dimly lit room, austerely furnished with only some 
framed Islamic calligraphy. This austerity seems like a choice, whereas elsewhere in 
the shanty town, it is an inevitability, and the Brotherhood have created a protected 
space with greater privilege than the boys are used to. 
Abu Zubeir belongs to the Salafi Wahabi movement, evident in his calls for 




Wiktorowicz defines the Salafi movement as a return to an ‘original’ Islam that 
strictly follows the ‘Quran, the Sunna (hadith) [path or traditions of the Prophet 
Mohammed] and the consensus of the companions [companions of the Prophet who 
learned Islam directly from him]. All behaviour must be sanctioned by these 
religious sources’.450 The Salafi movement is characterised by ideas of Islamic purity 
and rejection of Western influence and local customs. Richard Gauvain explains that 
‘Salafi identity is firmly rooted in the language of jihad and its attendant discourses 
(resistance, suffering, and martyrdom)’.451  
Jihad is a word used by the Salafi to define a holy war against Infidels, and 
the ‘Salafi jihadists justify their radical definition of jihad as a military struggle 
between Muslims and infidels by citing the duty to emulate the Prophet 
Mohammed’.452 Therefore, selective citations from the Quran and the hadith serve to 
‘emphasise the merits or need to wage a military struggle’.453 Wiktorowicz observes 
that, in their communication, the Salafi ‘refuse any infiltration of foreign words into 
the language’ and that ‘tone, the fluctuating pitch and tenor of speech patterns, and 
the learned Classical Arabic all combine to create a religious experience that ties the 
religious message to an emotive dimension’.454 
Abu Zubeir’s discourse is inspired by Salafi jihadi rhetoric. He denounces the 
depravation of Moroccan society, the corruption of the ‘makhzen’ (the Moroccan 
state), and the Imperialist, Zionist crusade to destroy the Islamic nation (a recurrent 
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theme in Osama Bin Laden’s speech when he issued a fatwa against ‘Jews and 
Crusaders’ in 1998).455 Abu Zubeir uses the theme of ‘tawhid’ (unity of God) to 
argue that loyalty is due only to God, not to the neighbourhood or to the state. The 
Salafi extend tawhid to a ‘rejection of man-made laws as they are an interference 
with the word and will of God’.456 Abu Zubeir also insists on the trans-nationalism 
of this combat, so the young men are exposed to videos, songs and speeches from 
Osama Bin Laden. The image of a victimised Muslim community is reinforced 
through videos of Muslim men and women chased from their houses by armed 
forces – likely in Chechnya.  
In his argumentative and emotional speeches, Abu Zubeir mixes Classical 
Arabic with darija as well as religious citations from the Quran and hadiths. He is 
aware that the young men do not speak Classical Arabic, because Classical Arabic is 
a written language (and they do not seem to have been to school). He thus uses 
darija to establish a connection but throws in some Classical Arabic to impress and 
affect his listeners. The first speech that Abu Zubeir addresses to the young men 
reassures them that they will find ‘peace of mind’ and become stronger if they join 
the Brotherhood. Abu Zubeir kneels down to their level to create a physical and 
psychological proximity. He also uses darija to encourage Tarek to forget about the 
murder of Ba’ Moussa, implying that it is the corrupt society that pushed him to 
commit the deed.  
Abu Zubeir is often off-camera, so that it is only his words that are heard, 
which Tarek remembers and mulls over. When Abu Zubeir gives his speech in the 
dimly lit room, the camera focuses on the rapt expression, stillness, and attention of 
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Nabil, Hamid, and Yachine. His speech even continues as a voice-over as they leave 
the house, signalling that his words are lingering and resonating with the young men. 
Nabil is conscious of Abu Zubeir’s powerful language, which he describes in darija 
as ‘hadartou ouaara’ (powerful speech). 
  Abu Zubeir’s rhetoric strengthens the culture of death and martyrdom 
amongst the young men. Before their mission, an unidentified emir comes to the 
house and delivers a speech that reinforces the message of martyrdom. He tells 
Hamid, Tarek, Fouad and Nabil, as well as others, in Classical Arabic: ‘Take care, 
children of Islam, never to become like those who cling to life down here and fear to 
become martyrs. Fly, horses of God, and the gates of paradise will open for you’. 
The expression ‘horses of God’ (the film’s title) was used by one of the Prophet 
Mohammed’s companions in the seventh century when calling for jihad and was 
later repeated many times by Bin Laden in his speeches.457  
All these words and rhetoric impress the young men. The ethnologist Ouafae 
Mouhssine observes that ‘Arabic language [in Morocco] remains inseparable from 
the religious dimension that characterizes the Islamist discourse’.458 The young men 
repeat idioms and expressions, and include them in their daily speeches: one phrase 
they pick up is رصن و هللا حتف  (‘God will ease and provide victory’). Nabil, for 
example, refuses to open a bag that his mother leaves for him in the house (she is a 
singer and prostitute who left the neighbourhood because of religious zealots and the 
rise of conservative morality). He even refuses to see her, uttering a religious saying 
that مارح يغبلا رھم   (‘the prostitute’s dowry money is illegal’).  
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The change in linguistic tone is also noticeable in Hamid and Tarek. At their 
home, their father simply sits around all day, repeating ‘naam ya sidi, ouakha sidi’ 
(‘Yes Sir, of course Sir’) as a remembrance of his years of work and subservience. 
Their brother, Said, has learning disabilities; he listens to football games and the 
news on the radio in Arabic, French and English, and is filmed inside the house, 
unable to get out. Hamid asks him to listen to some religious cassettes he brought 
him from Mecca, which enhances their sacredness. Tarek also asks Said not to shave 
because it is a sign of femininity. Religious attire combined with religious language, 
procures Tarek some authority over the family, even if Tarek is only able to utter a 
few religious expressions, indicating that he is unable to fully master religious 
language.  
 
Figure 22. Tarek, Nabil, Hamid and Fouad (from left to right) at Ziad’s house  
After being chosen for the operation, the young men accompany Ziad to a 
training camp in the mountains. This is to alienate them from their normal 
environment, and to give them a taste of ‘Paradise’. The mountains are green and 
wild, and in stark contrast with the shanty town from which the men were unable to 




in the river and play football. When they leave for a training camp, Fouad happily 
declares that it will be his first trip to Casablanca. When they are in the minivan and 
passing by rich neighbourhoods in the city, Ziad observes the possessions of the rich: 
their clean environment with pavements, greenery, clean cars, women walking by; 
all these elements resemble the telenovelas Tarek’s mother watches on television. 
 Ziad uses darija to emotionally engage the young men: he declares that 
these rich people obtained their wealth through exploiting young men like 
themselves. Ziad declares that ‘they will burn in Hell’, while the young men will be 
rewarded after death. The scene illustrates the disconnection between the rich and 
the poor of Casablanca. Ziad is also quick to suppress any doubts in the young men’s 
minds. When two of them, gathered in a kitchen, discuss the mission, they recognise 
that there will be Muslims in the places they will attack. Ziad cuts them short and 
declares that those Muslims who drink are نیدترم  (‘apostates’); thus, it is licit to kill 
them as long as it facilitates the killing of Christians and Jews too. Religious 
discourse is used to remove the men’s empathy with those whom they will bomb. 
Only Khalil, Nabil and Tarek’s friend, resists the religious discourse. He 
mocks the self-defence class that Ziad gives them, stating ‘this is not an action 
movie’, and does not join the others in prayer. Soon, he is no longer present at their 
gatherings in Nabil’s house, apparently by choice. Khalil also mentions that he 
works with his father who will help him to defend himself in times of need. This 
remark makes clear the role the Brotherhood plays: they replace a patriarchal 
authority, and even play the role of the state to educate, employ and aid.   
Nabil, Fouad and Tarek live together communally. Nabil cooks while Fouad 
irons. Women are excluded, and the genders are separated. Tarek has been in love 




only meets her for short intervals. The night before the suicide attacks (and in the 
credits), Tarek wonders how Ghizlane will react when she hears he has become a 
martyr. Hence, Tarek’s motivations for martyrdom are blurred: there is the religious 
influence, but also the quest for social recognition, which he cannot receive. Nabil, 
who was raped by Hamid when he was young, is seen holding his mother’s lipstick 
and wanting to kiss Tarek. When he becomes religious, however, he represses his 
homosexual desires. Ziad tells him, ‘you became a real man’. Through religious 
behaviour, Nabil obliterates his sexual desires.  
In the film, aerial shots of the shanty town reveal corrugated steel roofs and 
narrow, labyrinthine streets: an endless city. These shots enhance the feeling of 
isolation and suggest that there is no way out of the shanty town. These young men 
live on the margins of Moroccan society, both geographically and economically, 
politically powerless and socially isolated. Religious practice and language empower 
the young men, providing them with a sense of purpose and a place in the 
community, previously lacking. However, this newly found language also removes 
them from social life: literally, as they kill themselves, to say nothing of their 
victims. Religious language simultaneously affirms their social existence and 
alienates them from society.  
 
‘I Am Not Your Brother’: Le Repenti or the Impossible Reconciliation  
Le Repenti is one of the few Algerian films to deal with the consequences of the 
Black Decade and the program of ‘national reconciliation’ aimed at pardoning and 




police, and who were not convicted of blood crimes.459 These people were known as 
‘les repentis’. Allouache wrote the script after he was inspired by a story that he read 
in an Algerian newspaper. He shot the film in El Bayadh, a town in the highlands of 
Algeria, located 500 kilometres south west of Algiers.  
 
Figure 23. Le Repenti’s poster (title in French and Arabic) 
Le Repenti has a slow rhythm, including long shots of a dry and rough 
natural landscape in El Bayadh. Dialogue between the characters is scarce, and 
silence permeates the film. All the characters speak darija which combined with 
silence articulate the lack of dialogue between Algerians that was a paradoxical 
consequence of this process of national reconciliation; and represent the failure of 
national reconciliation and the enduring trauma of the Black Decade. The 
protagonists cannot overcome that which separates them, and they represent those 
who continued to find it difficult to express their anger and reconcile with both their 
own pasts and the new nation.  
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Le Repenti opens with a young man, Rachid, running from the terrorist camp 
he left, on a snowy day through the mountains to reach his village. The villagers 
react to him with hostility, because they believe he has taken part in terrorist attacks. 
Rachid leaves the village for a nearby town and surrenders himself to the police. In 
light of the law of national reconciliation, the commissioner provides him with a job 
as a waiter at a local café in exchange for information. Meanwhile, Lakhdar, a 
pharmacist, spends his nights drinking red wine and watching television. Rachid 
contacts him by phone and offers a deal to which Lakhdar agrees.  
Rachid had heard of Lakhdar’s daughter when he was in the terrorist camp 
and knows that she has been abducted and killed. He offers to take him to the place 
where the daughter is buried in exchange for money. One night, visiting his parents 
at his village, Rachid is attacked by a villager. He retaliates and, after a struggle, 
kills him. The next day, Lakhdar, his ex-wife Djamila and Rachid embark by car to 
the daughter’s tomb. Meanwhile, the villager’s body is found and the police 
commissioner seeks Rachid for the murder. When Rachid, Djamila and Lakhdar 
arrive at the tomb, Djamila cries and laments. Men holding guns approach, dressed 
like Rachid when he deserted, and the film ends up with a long shot of the hill where 
the protagonists are, accompanied by gunshots and shouts of ‘Allah Akbar’ (Allah is 
Great). The ending implies the death of the protagonists at the hands of the terrorists.  
Allouache was given 90,000 euros from the Doha film festival award for his 
previous feature Normal!, and obtained further funding from the Fonds Sud Cinéma 
from the French CNC.460 The exterior locations reveal a harsh and barren 
environment, El Bayedh is filmed in the winter, in cold light, with long shots that 
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reveal broken pavements, unfinished buildings, and dirt – on the horizon, steep and 
arid hills. Allouache succeeded in rendering a dry, gloomy ambiance by long shots 
of nature as well as close-ups of the protagonists’ faces to heighten their expression, 
tracking their frustration, pain, silence and outbursts. Furthermore, music (diegetic or 
non-diegetic) is quasi absent from the film, which accentuates the harshness and 
roughness of the situation in which the protagonists live. 
The interiors offer little comfort. Lakhdar’s flat is neglected, with pigeons 
nesting on the balcony and empty bottles of wine piled up next to the sink. The flat is 
empty because Lakhdar has removed anything that might remind him of his previous 
married life before his daughter had been abducted, except for the books and his 
daughter’s music box stashed in cupboards. Djamila observes that his curtains are 
merely net curtains, implying he should have proper curtains and live in a proper 
house.  
To further isolate himself, Lakhdar immerses himself in another language, 
Chinese, when he watches television. On several occasions, the camera assumes his 
perspective as he watches. This is to highlight the fact that Lakhdar is oblivious to 
what is around him: he is in a world of his own. Chinese language television 
programs provide a space, as does drinking, in which Lakhdar can retreat from 
reality and forget the events he has experienced. Lakhdar’s psychological emptiness 
is paralleled by the emptiness of his flat, in which he sits on the floor.  
The Algerian journalist Soltane understands the scene when Lakhdar watches 
Chinese television as Allouache denigrating Algerian television. She writes, 




regarder la télévision algérienne’.461 Soltane adds that French journalists present at 
the premiere in Cannes wondered if there was such a thing as Algerian television.462 
Soltane has missed the point about Lakhdar’s desire to isolate himself: he does not 
reject Algerian television, but he rejects his surroundings. Yet Soltane’s comments 
do correspond with the pattern for Algerian journalists, when discussing Algerian 
films, to require that the films conform to their own, politically-charged views. Her 
remark implies that Algerian films should reflect Algeria uncritically, or even praise 
it, and not include foreign languages.  
Lakhdar’s consumption of television differs from that of Rachid, who is 
framed watching soaps dubbed in Syrian Arabic or comedies from the Arabic 
Persian Gulf. These are the few moments when Rachid smiles and laughs as would 
any other ordinary young man in his early twenties. Television reconnects Rachid to 
feelings of joy and it is in a language he understands, although it is not darija but 
Middle Eastern Arabic (a fact that was not criticized by the Algerian press). Rachid, 
like Lakhdar, uses a different language to reconnect with joy and forget about his 
daily life. Darija becomes the language of trauma, associated with the violence that 
each of the protagonists has endured – as well as the violence that Rachid has 
inflicted.  
Once he has returned from the terrorist camp, of which he does not talk 
much, Rachid gradually changes. He follows the opposite path to Tarek in Les 
Chevaux de Dieu: he shaves his beard, dresses in jeans and even gazes at a passing 
girl. Yet Rachid is isolated in his new life, filmed with close-ups while his still 
expression conveys mystery and does not reveal much about him or his state of 
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mind. In the café where Rachid works, the café owner and a customer reveal the 
resentment they hold towards him. They mock the way Rachid stares at a girl 
passing by the café and the customer adds that he and people like him should be 
shot. Rachid is separated from the two men in the shot, further insisting on his 
isolation and their difficulty in seeing him as a ‘normal’ man.  
The film questions whether meaningful communication is possible between 
these characters. Hence, while darija is the shared language, it is also the dividing 
language as communication becomes impossible between Rachid and the others; but 
not because of the language. The café owner, Si Salah, an old man, indicates to 
Rachid that he does not want to deal with him because he does not like his ‘sort’ – 
that is, the ‘repentant’. After Rachid’s first day at the café and in an exchange when 
Si Salah shows Rachid his small room; the latter thanks him in darija, calling him 
akhi (brother), to which Si Salah replies in darija, ‘I am not your brother and I will 
never be’. Similarly, Djamila bursts out at Rachid when he uses the word ‘akhi’ in 
the car when referring to one of the terrorists; Djamila strongly objects and hits him. 
The word, as in Les Chevaux de Dieu, designates a faith-based community, yet it 
became used primarily by Islamic groups; hence, the religious connotation is refused 
by the other characters. They reject the vocabulary that Rachid acquired while he 
was in the terrorist camp, and by rejecting his words, they reject what he represents.  
Interestingly, the vocabulary is taken from the mujahidin in Algeria: the 
‘brother’, the ‘maquis’, jebal. Luis Martinez correctly observes that the language of 
a war of liberation used by the Islamists – such as words like jihad –has ‘simply 




liberation’.463 Martinez argues that the ideology of the Islamists was unclear and 
void ‘in the absence of political experience’, which in turn reveals ‘the emptiness of 
Islamism as an original ideological movement’.464 The Algerian war is not the only 
historical event remembered by the film. Djamila goes through Lakhdar’s cupboards 
and stares at a book, Cahier noir d’octobre, which recalls the events of October 1988 
in Algeria. It describes the torture of the young people who participated in the 
protests across different Algerian cities. This glimpse into the past reveals other 
unresolved moments of violence in Algerian history.  
Silence plays an important role in the film in rendering the inner violence and 
the anxiety of the protagonists. Helen Ferguson argues that ‘once sound has become 
the norm in film, its absence is unexpected and therefore significant, thus making 
silence a powerful element’.465 Allouache seeks to represent the violence that stems 
from non-communication. Gathered in the flat, Lakhdar and Djamila fail to talk; they 
often halt mid-sentence, overwhelmed by their emotions. Sentences are unfinished 
and the audience’s sense of their emotion at being brought together and 
remembering their daughter is heightened by an unstable camera and close-ups.  
When Djamila, Rachid and Lakhdar are in the car, in a confined space, 
silence and speech combine to translate the failure of communication and 
reconciliation. Outside the car, the open road is deserted, and the light is warm; a 
striking contrast to the confined interor space. Yet the beauty of the landscape, as in 
Barakat!, only heightens the tragic situation. At first, Djamila is silent. As she sits in 
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the back of the car, her silence is full of aggression and resentment towards Rachid 
in the front. When Rachid asks Lakhdar to see the money he will be given, Djamila 
has an outburst. The shot-reverse-shot excludes Lakhdar as he drives, but Djamila 
violently screams at Rachid asking him how he can consider himself a Muslim while 
he is taking them to the tomb of her daughter.  
Djamila wants to hear the whole story of what happened to her daughter, 
since Rachid knew one of the terrorists who abducted her (a neighbour of the 
family). Lakhdar prefers silence, mirroring his attitude when he watches Chinese 
television. When they arrive at the tomb, Djamila cries and laments, Lakhdar stands 
still and cries, while Rachid sits under a tree, also crying a little. This is the only 
occasion when Rachid betrays any emotion, though he sits by silently, as if outside 
of the events. This is also the only moment of communication, albeit via silence, 
which suggests that they are united only in their pain and sadness. 
By the end of the film, violence occurs off-screen: screams and gunshots 
signal the tragic end and the repeating cycle of violence and death as the protagonists 
have seemingly been killed. The three protagonists have failed to communicate: 
Rachid fails to repent, it only distance them; Lakhdar fails to express his emotions, 
and Djamila can only scream to express her anger. Their shared language, darija, 
combined with trauma, has failed to reconcile the protagonists, even though this 
shared language shows that Rachid is part of Algerian society and their failure to 
communicate serves as a microcosm of the failure of national reconciliation 
While the film received international prizes and its actors several awards, its 
French funding was controversial in Algeria. The debate was initiated at the 




Allouache criticized the lack of Algerian support and funding.466 The Algerian 
journalist Réda asked how a non-Algerian funded film can represent Algeria in a 
film festival, and argued that ‘En aidant, le financement d’un film algérien qui 
dénonce les mécanismes de la politique de la réconciliation nationale et annonçant 
ouvertement sa volonté de soutenir ce film refusé par l’Algérie, le CNC expose les 
rapports culturels entre l’Algérie et la France à de sérieux désaccords’.467  Likewise, 
Soltane stated that ‘Les médias français ont saisi une nouvelle fois l'occasion pour 
décrire l'Algérie en des mots sombres et remettre une couche sur une page du passé 
douloureux qui a été pourtant tournée’.468  
The Algerian public were similarly hostile to the film. One viewer asked how 
Allouache could make a film out of a ‘national tragedy with foreign funding’.469 
Clearly, these reactions indicate an on-going debate about funding and national 
cinema in Algeria, and the relation to France. It also indicates again the widespread 
belief that Algerian films should represent a positive image of the Algerian nation. 
These reactions also show that the Black Decade and its aftermath is still an arduous, 
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Amours voilées and Islamour: amour ou religion? 
Of the thirty Moroccan films released in 2008, there are two whose innate 
similarities and differences offer a rich opportunity to investigate the relationship 
between religious discourse, language, gender and class. These two films are Amours 
voilées (Dir. Aziz Salmy, 2008) and Islamour (Dir. Saâd Chraïbi, 2008). Amours 
voilées is Salmy’s first feature length film and was labelled by Moroccan religious 
clerics a ‘shameful film’. Member of Parliament Abdelbari Zemzmi called for 
Amours voilées to be banned on television, with the assertion that the film 
maliciously distorted the image of the veil and of women who wear it: ‘veiled 
women are portrayed as having sexual relations outside marriage (with the sound of 
the call to prayer being heard) and they even smoke the hookah during 
Ramadhan’.470 Islamour , Chraïbi’s ninth film, was on the other hand deemed 
unworthy of attention by some cinema critics and journalists.  
 Amours voilées presents a woman who has drifted from religion, while 
Islamour depicts a pious man who rejects Western values to reconnect with his ‘true’ 
self. The films share the French language, and darija. The use of French reflects the 
elevated social position of Batoul, the protagonist of Amours voilées, and the 
cosmopolitan position of Abbas’s family (Islamour’s protagonist): his children have 
been educated in French schools while abroad in America, and Abbas maintains 
French as the language of the family home. The two films explore everyday 
operations of religious language, and I argue that the speakers’ religious authority is 
derived more from their social standing than their piety and scriptural knowledge: in 
Amours voilées, religious authority is derived from socioeconomic class, while in 
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Islamour religious authority is linked to the patriarchal structure of the family. To 
illustrate the interrelation between language, social status and religious authority, I 
will investigate how the films’ visual aspects, music, and mise-en-scène present 
language in its relationship to religious discourse. My analysis of religious discourse 
will look at the protagonists’ religious opinions, daily references to religion, and use 
of scriptural knowledge. I will also investigate if Standard Arabic is the language of 
religious authority.  
 Amours voilées revolves around Batoul, a paediatrician, aged 28, who lives in 
Casablanca in her family’s house with her mother, her mother’s husband and his 
brother (Anas), who wishes to marry Batoul, and Batoul’s brothers and sister. 
Batoul’s life is divided between her work at the hospital and her time with her four 
female friends and her family. Batoul encounters Hamza – a divorced man who 
returned from France three years earlier – and a series of secret sexual encounters 
ensue. Batoul eventually falls pregnant and Hamza refuses his support or 
involvement. By the end of the film, Batoul reveals her pregnancy to her family and 
friends. The film finishes uncertainly without resolving the relationship between 
Batoul, Hamza and Anas.  
Islamour revolves around Abbas who has been living with his American wife 
Betty and two children in the United States for over twenty-five years. It is implied 
from his remarks that he left the United States because he was suspected, by the state 
authorities and his in-laws, of being a ‘terrorist’ in the aftermath of the events of 
9/11. Upon his return to Morocco, Abbas starts reading religious books and going to 
the mosque. He and his wife constantly argue about the ‘clash of civilisations’ – the 
differences between the West and Muslim countries. By the end of the film, while 




boyfriend Marc, Abbas discovers that he has an illegitimate daughter, Kaltoum, who 
is the same age as his children. Abbas had an affair before leaving Morocco with the 
gardener’s sister who since Abbas’s departure has been kept in a psychiatric 
hospital. The film ends with the gardener exclaiming in darija: ‘And you pretend to 
be a Muslim!’. 
 Amours voilées and Islamour portray religion as central to their protagonists’ 
roles within the family structure and Moroccan society. The films also emphasise the 
central juxtaposition of love and religion at their core, as reflected in their respective 
titles. Amours voilées can be translated into ‘The Veils of Love’ and Islamour is the 
hybrid of Islam and Amour. The Arabic title of Amours voilées, ‘Hijab Al Hob’, 
translates as ‘The Veil of Love’ and clearly interrelates the religious garment, hijab, 
with intimate feelings, forging an immediate and controversial link between 
religious piety and personal relationships while the French title suggests clandestine, 
furtive love. The opening credits, displaying both titles and a silhouette of a veiled 
woman with bare shoulders, stress the meaning of the Arabic title and the association 
between religious and personal matters. The juxtaposition of religion and love (and 
even sexuality) in the Arabic title bears a more provocative meaning than the French 
title.  
 Islamour was the director’s first choice of title. Chraïbi stated that he wrote the 
script in French and subsequently chose a French title. Although there is no 
obligation for Moroccan films to have an Arabic title, the equivalent title in Arabic is 
Islam Ya Salam, which can be understood and translated in two different ways 
depending on the pronunciation of the words. ‘Ya salam’ can be understood as 
‘amazing’, but if the words are delivered ironically, they can be translated as 




protagonist contradicts his moral behaviour, meaning the latter interpretation of the 
Arabic title seems more appropriate. The film’s ending also questions the French 
title: whether the film is about the association of Islam and love or the contradiction 
between Islam and love. Furthermore, the fact that its primary title was in French 
and French is given more status in the film marks the importance of French to the 
director but also that it is becoming an appropriate idiom which can be used in films 
and at large in Moroccan daily life.471    
 Salmy (born in 1955) moved from theatre to filmmaking in the late 1990s, 
while Chraïbi (born in 1952) started his filming career in the 1970s. Salmy began his 
career as a theatre actor and studied with eminent theatre teachers in France.472 Upon 
his return to Morocco, Salmy staged some plays and then turned to cinema where he 
began as an assistant director before directing his own films. Salmy’s short features 
and television films investigate intimate feelings, death, and familial dramas which 
are linked to social issues such as clandestine immigration. Salmy’s theatrical 
background and his work for television were likely key in shaping the film’s 
televisual aesthetics and mise-en-scène. Chraïbi is an outspoken, political director; 
he published numerous journal articles, one of which called on King Mohammed VI 
to improve the state of cinema and funding in Morocco.473 Chraïbi’s work has been 
celebrated in numerous Moroccan film festivals, and deals with contemporary 
Moroccan issues, including female and political oppression, torture under former 
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king Hassan II, and French colonial rule in Morocco. 474  
Both directors, then, are politically and socially engaged; but their treatment 
of specifically religious matters is where they differ, and this can perhaps be 
explained by their differing directorial aspirations. Chraïbi’s film looks at society’s 
issues through the prism of a protagonist, but against a broader international context. 
He has explained that his aspiration was to ‘illustrate the intolerance and 
incomprehension that pervades the relationship between the Orient and the West’.475 
Chraïbi’s ambitions closely resemble French-Moroccan Nabil Ayouch’s in Whatever 
Lola Wants (2008). In Ayouch’s view, Hollywood mainly portrays Muslims as 
terrorists and his film aimed to present an alternative image of Muslims.476 While 
Ayouch’s film was distributed in France, Chraïbi’s film was only viewed in 
Morocco and Moroccan film festivals, which attenuates the global effect of his 
declared ambition to reach out to all audiences and introduce a ‘dialogue’– unless 
the ‘dialogue’ is catalysed within Moroccan society itself; an idea I shall explore 
later.  
 The films experienced radically different public receptions. Amours voilées 
ignited heated multi-channel debate – across online blogs, newspapers, television, 
and radio – particularly focused on one scene in which the unmarried protagonist 
Batoul kisses her lover Hamza, and then has sexual intercourse, while wearing a veil. 
However, the high-profile debate seems only to have contributed to the film’s 
commercial success. Amours voilées attracted 179,000 viewers in 2009.477  
Islamour, in contrast, grossed significantly less than Amours voilées, only gathering 
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4,050 spectators in 2009 (and fewer than 1,000 in 2010).478 Despite the difference in 
commercial success, the films can both be considered ‘low budget’, or medium 
budget in Morocco, since they received little funding (200,000 euros each) mainly 
from the CCM.479  
 
    
Figure 24. Amours voilées and Islamour posters with French and Arabic titles 
 Looking at the critical reception of both films, Amours voilées received 
extensive attention from the press and even foreign media, while Islamour was not 
widely discussed. It is however enlightening to compare the films’ critical reception 
by contrasting the attitudes of those who defended or criticized the films. Islamour 
was well received by the Arabic-speaking press and journalists, who praised the film 
for being a ‘well documented feature about the issues the [Moroccan] population 
faces when they live abroad in Western countries, the struggles they encounter in 
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reconnecting with their roots and the alienation they endure while they are  
abroad’.480 However, the French-speaking press observed that the film was not as 
bold as recent Moroccan films, which dealt with taboo subjects such as sexuality, 
and had little significance when compared with the more recent Moroccan films and 
the changes Moroccan cinema undergone.481 Journalist Karim Boukhari 
 likened the film’s message to the saying: ‘l’enfer est pavé de bonnes intentions’.482 
Boukhari expanded on the failure of the film, criticising the obvious narrative twists 
and the exaggerated Manichaeism of Abbas, which collectively failed to convey a 
tolerant or even a coherent message.483 Journalist Mohammed Bakrim, writing for 
the Francophone website devoted to Francophone African cinema Africiné, 
considered the film’s ending as representative of Abbas’s hypocrisy, stating: ‘Le 
film se laisse lire […] comme un constat accablant du comportement d’une certaine 
élite qui redécouvre les éblouissements de l’appartenance identitaire au prix d'une 
certaine hypocrisie’.484 Bakrim’s remark is enlightening in the way it links social 
class to religion. He contradicts the Arabic-speaking press, who praised the film for 
its depiction of Abbas’s religious behaviour, and reconnection with his cultural 
roots. The Arabic-speaking press did not however discuss the film’s ending. 
When Amours voilées was released, the French-speaking press primarily 
defended the film, while the Arabic-speaking media criticised the film for its 
disrespectful and wrongful representation of veiled women. The debate was ignited 
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upon the concurrent release of Amours voilées and Casanegra in 2009. Both films 
were criticised by religious clerics, politicians with Islamic affiliation, and parts of 
both the French- and Arabic-speaking Moroccan press, because they were seen as 
disrespectful towards religious and social mores. Zemzmi declared that ‘cultural 
freedom of expression has a limit when it comes to distorting the image of pious 
women’– though he admitted he had not seen the film and justified his decision as a 
refusal to contribute to its commercial success.485  
 
Figure 25. Batoul kissing Hamza while veiled 
The vocal opposition of Zemzmi was key, as by 2009 he was a highly 
publicised person, appearing on television, and writing for online religious websites 
and Arabic-speaking newspapers (such as Al Tajdid, a newspaper close to the PJD). 
Zemzmi issued numerous fatwas in the media on different subjects across culture, 
sexuality, sports and politics.486 He won support from Abdellilah Benkirane, the 
Prime Minister (2011-March 2017) who declared to television channel France 24 
that the films (including Casanegra) were ‘spreading depravity and the zionisation 
of society, and are part of a larger conspiracy which aims at countering the Islamist 
                                               
485 Ibid. 
486 Kawtar Tali, ‘Les Fatwas controversées du prédicateur Abdelbari Zemzmi’, Aujourd’hui 
Le Maroc, 3 January 2010 < http://www.aujourdhui.ma/une/focus/les-fatwas-controversees-




wave’– though he also admitted that he had not seen the film.487 As mentioned in the 
introduction, when Benkirane became the PJD’s leader in 2008, his strategy was not 
to criticise the regime and the monarchy but to ‘champion public morality against his 
main adversaries in the secularist liberal and leftist currents’.488 His statement about 
the film is part of his communication strategy to reaffirm his attachment to Islamic 
moral values. 
For both Benkirane and Zemzmi, however, the burden of morality seems to 
fall squarely on the veil-wearing women; and it is striking that attacks against the 
film and its depiction of hijab were formulated mainly by men, as women were 
invisible in these debates. Male behaviour in the films could have been criticized for 
the men’s lack of traditional religious morality. Hamza, for instance, has sexual 
relations outside marriage with different women; and Anas’s gaze is imbued with 
sexual desire towards women, despite being a strict observer of religion and Islamic 
precepts. These unbalanced reactions pose the crucial question: why is the ‘image’ 
of the veiled woman so important to the preachers?  
Women’s wearing of the veil in fact bears only a relatively recent 
significance, dating to the Muslim encounter with colonial powers in the 19th 
century, when there emerged a new genre of Islamic literature in which the veil 
became both a marker of Muslim identity and an element of faith – and proof, 
crucially, of a woman’s virtue according to some religious clerics and individuals.489 
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The hijab represents also woman’s shelter from the male gaze, thus protecting her, 
and more importantly her family’s honour. As the hijab is seen in terms of 
‘collective identity’ rather than ‘individual’ choices of women, Zemzmi’s anger 
towards the film can be explained as a result of an attack on the collective Islamic 
identity conceived specifically as a patriarchal system of power.  
Moroccan writer Tahar Ben Jelloun, who had not seen Amours voilées, wrote 
in its defence: ‘L’ère de la censure politique est dépassée et elle ne doit pas être 
remplacée par une censure religieuse’.490 Ben Jelloun stressed that ‘plus la réalité est 
transposée dans une fiction, un roman, un film ou une pièce de théâtre, plus ils [les 
Marocains] sont mal à l'aise’.491 Ben Jelloun referred to depicting reality and 
sexuality and the way it influences some of the viewers who reject this ‘reality’. The 
fact that those who debated the film had not watched it is significant – symbolising 
the fact that the film became only a means by which different ideologies were 
expressed and fought for, and Ben Jelloun siding for freedom of expression. 
Salmy’s declared aspiration was to expose the intimate life of a young urban 
woman and the choices she has to make: either to follow her desires or her religious 
beliefs. Salmy’s aim was to ‘expose the problems of society and to create a positive 
debate’ using a more authentic protagonist, as ‘the story of a role model would not 
have been interesting to the public’.492 The complexity of the character, according to 
Salmy, lies in Batoul’s inability to reconcile ‘sa vie sentimentale et sa vie religieuse, 
entre modernité et conservatisme, entre le divin et le charnel’.493 Salmy expands on 
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the controversial representation of the veil in the film, emphatically and repeatedly 
answering his critics by stating ‘Autant dire que c’est complètement hypocrite de 
s’offusquer que j’utilise des actrices voilées dans mon film. Ce bout de tissu n’est le 
symbole de rien. Or l’habit ne fait pas le moine et le foulard ne fait pas la bonne 
musulmane’.494   
Batoul’s use of darija, was also fundamental in the response it provoked. 
Batoul, is played by French-Algerian actress Belhalloufi (born 1984) a television 
actress whose most prominent role was in the French television soap Sous le Soleil, 
where she played the French character Rebecca, a young adolescent, for two years 
(2005-2007).495 Batoul’s accent is not Algerian and she stumbles on some Arabic 
words and mis-pronounces them. Batoul’s accent was widely criticised by the 
French and Arabic-speaking press, as well as by viewers who commented on the 
internet who deemed it ‘inauthentic’ and ‘contributes to distort the image of 
Moroccan women’.496 The ‘foreignness’ of Belhalloufi as an actress was hence used 
by the press and the film’s opponents as way to distance her actions from Moroccan 
women and thus confirm her behaviour was not to be taken as ‘real’, yet still 
immoral.  
Furthermore, members of the Moroccan Parliament, representing a range of 
Islamic perspectives, claimed that the French funding Amours voilées benefitted 
from dictated the way the director dealt with religion and represented the hijab.497 In 
response to such critiques, Salmy stressed publicly that French funding was received 
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only during the post-production phase, and had no bearing on the film’s subject or 
way of dealing with the hijab.498 CCM’s director Noureddine Sail openly supported 
Amours voilées after its release and the CCM delivered the distribution visa without 
censoring or cutting the film (which included scenes of nudity).499 
However, Batoul’s use of French was not criticised by the press or the public 
which exposes the links between authenticity and the use of Moroccan darija. Salmy 
also mentioned that although the script was written in Arabic, some actors and 
actresses chose to deliver certain lines in French; he insisted that he was not 
concerned with the language so much as with the fluidity of the discussion. 500 This 
declaration is key to analysing the film, since Salmy was not tied to making a 
political point through the language used in itself; however, Salmy used dialogues, 
either in French or darija to convey his authorial view.  
 By contrast, Abbas’s sister Ouafae, played by French-Moroccan actress Souad 
Amidou, lives in France comes back with her French boyfriend, and speaks little 
darija. Amidou admitted that her lack of proficiency in darija did not allow her to 
perform in Moroccan films until recently, when she overcame her ‘handicap’; as her 
lack of proficiency in darija ceased to matter to audiences.501 Moral authority is, 
therefore, tightly linked to language: Belhalloufi was criticised for her lack of 
mastery of darija because her character wears a veil while the press did not mention 
the fact that Amidou suffered from the same problem. 
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The linguistic, moral debate almost entirely outweighed the artistic criticism 
of Amours voilées, with journalists and film critics barely discussing the film from a 
technical, aesthetic or performative perspective. The few newspapers that did, 
compared Amours voilées to a ‘television documentary with weak dialogues’ and 
argued that the director consciously aimed to create controversy to mask the film’s 
technical and aesthetics deficiencies.502 Middle Eastern newspaper Al Sahrq Al 
Awsat summed up the debate by stating: ‘if it were not for the scarf, the film could 
be mistaken for a Mexican television series [a telenova]’.503 By its unrealistic 
settings, and an over-use of sentimental music, the film seems largely inspired by 
television soaps. Amours voilées is for example unrealistic in depicting women’s 
lives: they jog by the cornice, dressed in pink sportswear; they only meet one man 
(while the cornice by the seaside is a busy area and the chances of meeting women 
jogging are even smaller), but I see it as an attempt to deliberately engage in a non-
realist aesthetic in order to make more controversial statements.  
In the same manner as the American series Sex and the City, women in 
Amours voilées are independent and provide for themselves. They gather in 
restaurants, the beauty salon, the hammam, or Batoul’s house to freely discuss 
personal matters: love, marriage, sexuality, the veil, and religion (in relation to 
marriage as well). Despite this limited setting, Salmy liberates women in other ways 
and gives them a space to establish their identity as independent beings. Hardly any 
shots of ‘daily life’ are available, apart from Anas’s shop or a shot of a children 
playing in a school’s backyard. By having few locations and a disconnection from 
social realities, the film succeeds in illustrating how the middle- and upper-class 
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characters live in a world that is cut off from social realities. Similarly, Islamour has 
few locations, and has been impacted by the limited budget. Shot in four weeks on 
location, in the mountainous region of Azrou, the film suffers from a lack of clear 
lighting as well as sound editing, which obscures dialogue in some scenes, and 
abruptly ends others. Islamour makes an exaggerated use of non-diegetic music in 
order to build up the drama and suspense, and it renders dialogues less audible and 
the film’s overall intention less explicit.  
Religious practice is central to the framing and editing of both films. Batoul 
is filmed praying, re-arranging her hijab, and reading the Quran. Abbas is often seen 
accomplishing religious rituals; praying on the tomb of his father, attending religious 
meetings, and buying religious books. Abbas’s reconnection with religious practice 
is displayed through his choice of both dress and language. Abbas dresses in the 
same manner as Anas (in a white robe) and ostentatiously holds the misbah. The 
scene where Abbas is given the misbah is symbolic of Abbas’s desire to reconnect 
with what he believes is his ‘true’ identity. The scene is shot in a coffee terrace 
where Abbas sits between a French-speaking man dressed in a suit reading a French 
newspaper, and an old man dressed in traditional clothes who speaks in darija. The 
shot then cuts to remove the French-speaker, leaving Abbas in discussion with the 
old man and then Abbas receiving the misbah. The removal of the French-speaking 
man from the frame speaks to Abbas’s efforts to reclaim his Muslim identity (what 
he feels is his true identity) by sacrificing that which links him to France. Abbas 
speaks darija and holds the misbah as proof of his renewed authentic self.  
 The contrast between Abbas’s and Anas’s religious behaviour illustrates how 
their different social positions within the family and broader Moroccan society rest 




discourse in different manners. Both use Quranic verses or injunctions linked to 
religion in their private and public lives. Religion is part of Anas’s daily life; his 
fervour is demonstrated in the film by his invocation of Quranic verses and his strict 
observance of religious practices. Abbas, on the other hand, is a ‘beginner’ and 
acknowledges it by asking the bookseller, while he buys religious books, to go easy 
on him. The film insists on the external aspects of Abbas’s religious behaviour and 
illustrates how Abbas reconnects with his identity by attending male-only religious 
gatherings as if that alone was proof of his piety.  
Abbas’s knowledge of religious verse is limited; this is demonstrated in the 
shot where he is limited to reciting only Al Fatiha when he visits his father’s tomb, 
whilst the fqih (religious person) recites longer verses. Al Fatiha is the first chapter 
of the Quran that every Muslim learns, as it opens the prayer. The sociolinguist 
Niloofar Haeri observes that in Egypt Al Fatiha is what illiterate mothers know; 
Abbas, like an illiterate – although many Muslims do not speak or master Arabic – is 
also seen mumbling in the religious gathering as if he does not understand the words 
but wants to prove his faith.504 However, in the presence of other religious people, 
Abbas’s behaviour differs from his behaviour with the rest of his family. He is 
authoritative and dominant with his wife and daughter (asking them to dress 
properly, fighting with his wife over religious matters and accusing her and the West 
of misunderstanding Islam) and tries to direct his sister’s love life (asking if she 
intends to marry her French boyfriend who is a ‘heretic’). Yet when dealing with 
religious characters, Abbas is respectful and subordinate; he does not consider social 
class.  
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Comparing Anas’s lack of authority and Abbas’s position in his family 
demonstrates that religious authority is not derived from linguistic abilities but from 
the social position of the protagonist. Anas, unlike Abbas, has significant knowledge 
of the Quran, and for different social situations can recite an appropriate passage. 
Religion dictates his social interactions. He tells his friend that he cannot stay alone 
in Batoul’s car, confirming the religious rule that unmarried men and women cannot 
be together in a closed space (otherwise evil will be present) although he lives under 
the same roof as her. Anas is torn between his religious commitment and his desire 
for Batoul.  
Despite the centrality of religion and the authority he feels it grants him, 
Anas’s religious discourse is dismissed throughout the film. One particular scene 
illustrates this through actions, music and gestures, rather than speech. When Anas 
and Batoul are in the car, Anas’s religious authority is diminished through an 
ordinary incident.  Anas remarks that listening to the Quran would be better than 
listening to the radio and recites a Quranic verse اب الأo بولقلا نئمطت  (‘Isn’t it with 
words of God that hearts are at peace?’). Batoul dismisses his words by putting on 
Egyptian music, thus diminishing the impact of his words, and even mocking him 
with her brother and sisters who are framed in the back giggling. Anas’s position is 
clearly powerless; he cannot drive, he cannot impose his choices, and the Quranic 
passages he uses have no effect on Batoul’s behaviour. Furthermore, Anas is 
consistently isolated; he is filmed, from a crane shot, reading the Quran and listening 
to religious cassettes in his spare time. This shot underscores his pious behaviour 
whilst also revealing his social isolation and loneliness in the house – which 




In the subsequent scene, Anas fantasises about his marriage to Batoul. He 
reverses the situation experienced in the car; achieving a sense of power in the realm 
of the imagination. Egyptian music is replaced by religious verses and Batoul – now 
fully veiled and clothed in white – has become religiously observant. Since Anas 
cannot impose his opinion or declare his love, fantasy remains the only way he can 
marry Batoul and impose respectfulness upon her. In his fantasy, he is the only one 
looking at Batoul, while she is framed looking at the ground in a pious and 
submissive way. Religious discourse is also used by Anas to attempt to obscure the 
well-established authority of class and education. Religious language is used to 
justify Anas’s right to marry Batoul, despite the socio-economic realities that set 
them apart. He is conscious that he works in her father’s boutique as a salesman 
whilst she is a doctor. His friend however emphasises that marriage should 
overcome class difference and he should accomplish the ‘halal’ (what God allows), 
emphasising that ‘in halal there is no shame’.  
The complex interaction between religious authority and social position is 
best illustrated by comparing Batoul’s mother with Abbas’s wife. Batoul’s mother, 
dressed in a long Moroccan traditional dress manousriya with her head covered, is 
different from Betty who is connected to the internet and speaks French and English 
(but no darija). Batoul’s mother tolerates her daughter’s nights out and even defends 
her when her brother starts questioning his sister’s behaviour, forcing him to admit 
he has not worked as hard as Batoul. Anas consults Batoul’s mother when he asks 
for permission to marry Batoul. Betty on the other hand cannot even handle the 
plumber, due to both her linguistic inability and her lack of authority. Batoul’s 
mother is pious and pushes for her daughter to get married while Betty cannot 




speak openly with Abbas, although they speak French and English, is more tied to 
the way Abbas sees his wife. Abbas thinks his wife has sided with the ‘West’. Any 
political discussion between Abbas and his wife becomes a political tribune for 
Abbas, where he takes over and imposes his authority and ideology. French or 
English language are of lesser value to Betty, not equating to higher authority; she is 
undermined by Abbas’s authority.  
Batoul, on the other hand, chooses to impose her religious choices upon 
Hamza and confronts him; and the following scene explores the dynamic of 
linguistic-religious authority between Batoul and Hamza. A two-shot scene where 
Batoul drives, dressed in the hijab, shows Hamza gazing at her in disbelief that she 
is veiled, surprised that she would go along with such costume and behaviour. A 
bilingual dialogue about the hijab ensues that mixes French and darija. Hamza 
disrespectfully qualifies the scarf in darija as charouita, which means rag. When 
Batoul pulls over, she succumbs and kisses Hamza, and they are framed in a close-
up enhancing the intimacy of the scene, but a guard spots them and intrudes, 
reminding them it is Ramadhan and such behaviour is unacceptable, which leads 
them to flee. The guard represents the ‘collective eye’ or ‘moral sense’ which 
reminds Batoul of her religious duties; she insists they should respect the ‘halal’. 
Batoul even states: ‘Nous ne sommes pas en France’. This sentence is significant in 
the way it distances Batoul from any Western behaviour, implying Hamza’s 
behaviour is not acceptable in Morocco, and that she is the one who is behaving 
‘correctly’, even if she says so in French. Hence, even if she speaks French, Batoul 
does not embrace what she perceives as French morals.  
Batoul’s use of darija and French vary according to the impact she aims to 




Batoul transitions into darija to confirm her attachment to moral values and 
associates it with religion and marriage. Yet, Batoul’s flawed accent when she 
speaks darija accentuates her contradictory and divisive feelings between her 
religious duties and her sexual desire, like two separate identities. Hamza is 
unimpressed by Batoul’s religious discourse and insists on remaining unmarried. 
Hamza, unlike Abbas, does not consider his life in Morocco different from the life 
he could have lived while abroad. Hamza’s use of French is hence associated with 
secular ideas and his dismissal of Batoul’s veil. 
 Hamza’s attitude could be paralleled with Marc’s point of view on religion.  
Abbas drives Marc back after they attend a religious gathering. Abbas asks Marc if 
he will convert to Islam if he marries his sister (while, as his sister rightly observed, 
Abbas’s wife has not converted to Islam). Abbas’s religious authority is brushed off 
by Marc’s use of French and his feeling of detachment from the situation. Marc is 
only an observer and maintains distance by not getting involved in family affairs or 
religious discussions. Marc’s position parallels Hamza’s behaviour; both feel at ease 
with their chosen path in life, neither wanting to be disturbed. The French language – 
combined with the social status of the protagonists, and their gender – is, in both 
films, the language that authoritatively opposes religious discourse. 
The hijab in Amours voilées has also social implications for women and not 
through its inherent religious meaning. When the five female friends gather in 
Batoul’s room, Nadjwa, a doctor who works with Batoul, informs them that she will 
keep the hijab even after Ramadhan to find a husband. Houyam mocks Nadjwa’s 
decision and denounces the hypocrisy of the habit of veiling during Ramadhan and 
observing moral practices such as listening to Amr Khalid – ranked by the New York 




figure’.505 Khalid had commercial success on satellite television; he was popular 
amongst urban educated classes. His shows were about strengthening the faith of 
Muslims, educating them about the Prophet’s life, and discussing practical issues. He 
was not seen as extreme in relation to his religious opinions, but his shows stopped 
in 2008 as the Egyptian authorities, fearing his growing political influence, 
particularly amongst the wealthy and educated. Khalid then moved to the United 
Kingdom, and only resumed his preaching activities after the ‘Arab Spring’ in 2011. 
By evoking Khalid, the film anchors itself within Moroccan society whilst at the 
same time demonstrating how religious practices have changed in a globalised era 
through satellite television and the influence of non-Moroccan preachers. 
During the discussion Nadjwa uses French to emphasise her determination in 
keeping the hijab. Linguistic turns in French are used to stress her point. She says 
‘Détrompe-toi ma chérie’ and ‘la preuve’. Houyam however is more radical in her 
opinion about the hijab. She states she would rather shave her head than wear the 
hijab. Darija is used as well by Houyam to affirm her opposition to the hijab. 
Houyam introduces herself as a neguafa – a darija word that designates women who 
dress and look after the bride during traditional Moroccan weddings. The word 
reveals the demarcation of Houyam as an outsider in terms of education and social 
position compared to her female friends. Hence, the French language is not the only 
language to counter religious discourse. 
In this scene French is only used to confirm opinions while darija is the main 
medium of asserting one’s opinion – as is the case for Houyam and Nadjwa. 
Houyam’s opposition to the hijab is not linked to her linguistic mastery of French 
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(like Hamza and Marc) but is more linked to her social status as the owner of her 
beauty salon. Her priorities are economic rather than spiritual; to feed her children 
and not to get involved in religious matters. Religion is of little importance to 
Houyam and seems important to Nadjwa primarily to obtain marriage.  
Nadjwa’s situation contrasts as well with Kalthoum, Abbas’s illegitimate 
daughter. Urban and educated, Nadjwa aims only at getting married, while Kalthoum 
is from a rural area and aims to reach higher education and to escape her social 
situation. Abbas’s daughter, Itto, questions Kalthoum’s education and its ties with 
Islamic education, repeating an overheard discourse (in Moroccan media), in French, 
that Moroccan national education is impregnated with Islamic education.506 
However, Kalthoum contradicts this claim, and the film further suggests that social 
mobility is possible in Morocco. This is evidenced by Kalthoum, from a rural 
village, attending university, and Kalthoum’s linguistic abilities illustrate that higher 
education is concurrent with a mastery of the French language. 
Amours voilées and Islamour reveal the tensions within Moroccan society 
around the role that religion plays in shaping people’s behaviour, whether they act in 
complicity or rebellion. Socio-economic status also significantly affects the authority 
of the speaker’s discourse. Amours voilées and Islamour illustrate that religious 
discourse can only be influential if the person who delivers it has both power and 
status, conveyed by the family or by society. In other words, a mastery of Standard 
Arabic is not proof of religiosity or religious authority within these films.  
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In the introduction to this chapter, I grouped the films thematically and historically 
according to the role that language played in each. Although each film has a unique 
combination of languages, they raise similar questions concerning the debates about 
language and its relation to politics, religion and class in Algeria and Morocco. 
Standard Arabic was not widely used in films and was subtly mocked in Roma 
ouella n’touma, associated with mundane, everyday Islamism. Unlike the 
protagonists of Les Chevaux de Dieu, the protagonists of Roma ouella n’touma 
remain suspicious of and distanced from Islamic ideology. In Les Chevaux de Dieu, 
Standard Arabic is the language of the Islamic community and is positively connoted 
as it allows young people to develop new understandings of self, albeit via religious 
indoctrination. The exclusion of Standard Arabic in Rachida and Barakat! is an 
ideological gesture: these films distance themselves from the official language, and 
from the official narrative of the Black Decade. 
The French language, on the other hand, is present in films across gender and 
social classes. French is presented positively in Rachida and Amours voilées yet it is 
associated with higher education. Amours voilées has shown also that when it comes 
to religion, French-speaking characters are not polarised: those who refuse the hijab 
are not necessarily French-speakers. In Barakat!, French is, somewhat paradoxically, 
the language of the mujahida figure, presented as a strong, determined, and 
independent woman, but also the language of terrorists or mafieux (as in Morituri) 
blurring the ideology underpinning French language during the Black Decade. 
Darija, is presented in the films as the de facto an Algerian or Moroccan 
national language. In Rachida, darija lends a sense of ‘authenticity’ to the characters 




and her Algerianness. Darija allows Rachida to weave her own narrative into the 
grand fabric of the nation. In Morituri, meanwhile, darija is the language of both the 
terrorists and the police – that is, the language of violence and justice, among other 
things. Like Casanegra, Roma ouella n’touma asserts the ‘Algerianness’ (or 
Morocanness) of darija, a language capable of conveying political and intellectual 
ideas and offering to young people a means of subversion and contestation. Finally, 
the combination of French and darija becomes a language in itself in Barakat!, one 








Chapter Four: Powerless Women, Powerful Men? Exploring 
Language, Gender, Power and Sexuality 
 
This chapter focuses on the relationship between language, power, gender, and 
sexuality in a selection of four Moroccan and four Algerian films selected across a 
period from 2004 to 2015. The Moroccan films are Much Loved (Dir. Nabil Ayouch, 
2015), Les Jardins de Samira (2007, Dir. Latif Lahlou), Agadir Bombay (Dir. 
Myriam Bakir, 2011) and Sur la planche (Dir. Leila Kilani, 2011). The Algerian 
films are Moknèche’s Algerian trilogy – Le Harem de Madame Osmane (2000), 
Viva Laldjérie (2004), and Délice Paloma (2007) – as well as Allouache’s Les 
Terrasses (2013).  
I have assembled the films by country of origin to discuss them through their 
comparable cultural and social grounds. Particularly important will be how these 
films construct their characters’ gender identity and empower the protagonists in 
relation to language. French, darija and to a lesser extent Standard Arabic are all 
used in these films. The first section will discuss the four Moroccan films. I will 
examine whether these films disavow preconceived ideas of women as submissive 
and men as dominant and fearless and I will examine whether, and to what extent, 
language emerges plausibly as a valuable tool to resist patriarchal dominance. 
Similarly, questions of gender, sexuality and social ambition will be analysed in the 
four Algerian films. I will begin with Moknèche’s filmic trilogy constructed around 
women and using French as the main idiom, I will then explore Allouache’s film that 
takes in Algiers after the so called ‘Arab Spring’ and illustrates the ambitions and 




of the most relevant concepts in the field of language, gender, and power as these 
concepts are at the core of my textual analysis of these films.  
 
Gender, Language, and Power: A Theoretical Overview  
This section is a succinct review of sociolinguistic research in relation to language, 
gender, and power. The aim is to highlight the different trends that have emerged 
over time as research has been influenced by feminist criticism, gender theory, and 
cultural studies. Robin Lakoff’s 1973 seminal article ‘Language and Woman’s 
Place’ marks the debut of sociolinguistic and anthropological research in language, 
gender, and power.507 The American sociolinguist analysed ‘woman’s language’ in 
the context of Western industrialised societies, and argued that in mixed-sex 
conversations women use, amongst other linguistic forms, hedges, interrogative 
intonation, and suggestions rather than direct command, which leads them to be 
taken less seriously than men (a causality that was questioned by other socio 
linguists as I will discuss in this section).508 Lakoff noted that women used fewer 
swear words than men, were more polite, and had ‘hypercorrect’ grammar.509 
Lakoff further argued that women were silenced by being prohibited from 
using the same words as men use, and for her ‘woman’s language’ is founded on the 
‘attitude that women are marginal to the serious concerns of life, which are pre-
empted by men’.510 Lakoff concluded that women found themselves in a 
contradictory position: if they speak the way they are expected, that is as ‘ladies’, 
they are not taken seriously and are powerless, and if they speak more resolutely, 
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that is like men, they are ridiculed and ‘subjected to criticism as unfeminine’.511 
Therefore, for Lakoff, women were assigned an inferior place in society, and 
‘woman’s language’ was to be associated with powerlessness, while conversely 
men’s dominance was preserved through their linguistic behaviour.512 
 Linguists termed Lakoff’s approach to sex differences the ‘dominance’ 
approach, which is concerned with an imbalance of power between the sexes. Those 
who use ‘woman’s language’ will be perceived as weak, unassertive, and lacking in 
authority. Lakoff’s view that women’s language is deficient when compared to 
men’s or reflects men’s dominance was criticised by other sociolinguists. First, her 
work was considered to rely heavily on personal observation and to be lacking in 
empirical research. Indeed, Lakoff derived her conclusions from her own speech and 
from observing only white, relatively privileged, suburban American women.513  
Following Lakoff’s article, sociolinguists expanded on her findings and came 
up with another approach to distinguish between how women and men speak. 
Sociolinguist Deborah Tannen introduced a non-hierarchical concept of ‘difference’ 
to distinguish men and women’s speech.514 Tannen suggested that due to their social 
upbringing, women and men learn different behaviours and ways of speaking; and 
language translates into social roles and how men and women socialise.515 For 
Tannen, the language used by women is primarily ‘rapport-talk’, which means it 
establishes connections and promotes sameness amongst women.516 Men, on the 
other hand, use language described as ‘report-talk’ as a way of preserving 
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independence while exhibiting knowledge and skill.517 Therefore, the difference 
between men and women’s speech was that women collaborate while men seek to 
acquire and maintain social status and hierarchical order status through language.  
While Tannen’s and Lakoff’s approaches differ – Tannen studied peer groups 
(at school and sports teams) and Lakoff was concerned with family talk – they 
nonetheless share the idea that women’s language is distinct. Anthropologist and 
sociolinguist Susan Gal criticised Lakoff’s and Tannen’s approaches and the 
equation of ‘woman’s language’ with ‘woman’. Gal argued that it is the speaker’s 
words that create a speaker’s identity and power: ‘the categories of women’s speech, 
men’s speech, or powerful speech are not just indexically derived from the identities 
of speakers. Indeed, sometimes a speaker’s utterances create identity’.518 Gal 
surveyed the way English middle-class women speak and observed that these 
women ‘use more prestigious English than middle-class men’.519  
For Gal, gender differences in language often transcend social class, 
implying that women use more prestigious language to gain power over men. Gal 
also argued that gender is ‘negotiated’ rather than fixed, and that language and 
changing linguistic practices mediate it. Gal also defined power as ‘symbolic 
domination’ and a ‘product of culture’ that is perpetuated by schools, in the media, 
and by state representatives.520 For Gal, women’s language can be seen as ‘strategic 
responses, often of resistance, to dominant hegemonic cultural forms’ and that when 
women use ‘male’ forms this can indicate ‘nonconformity’.521 To resist dominant 
cultural orders, therefore, other forms of language are used such as ‘slang, minority 
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language, local vernaculars, [and] women’s interactional styles’ even if these forms 
are widely denigrated and stigmatised.522 Gal’s findings demonstrate how the 
definition of power has shifted over the last two decades under the influence of 
feminism and critical theories, from the concept of institutionalised domination – 
exercised by the few who possess it over the majority that is dominated – to a 
changing practice varying over time.  
Deborah Cameron, a pioneer in research on gender and language, also took 
issue with the generic term ‘woman’ used in ‘woman’s language’; Cameron argued 
that ‘women’ do not form a homogenous group, as they differ in terms of age, class, 
and ethnicity.523 Moreover, the way women speak should not be restricted to 
subordination as per Lakoff’s view, but instead – or as well – should be considered 
as a means of resisting power or a tool for women to cope with their condition.524 
Similarly, sociolinguist Jennifer Coates argued that there is no binary opposition 
between masculine and feminine speech as gender and language change and develop 
according to social interaction and daily practice.525  
Cameron also redefined power by drawing on Michel Foucault’s theory as 
‘understanding it [power] as a multiple relation […] recognising the links between 
power and resistance’.526 For Cameron, power is a strategy, an action, and an ever-
shifting process of establishing and enacting role relations rather than a static state 
held by one agent over another. For Cameron, language is also important in 
negotiating power, even for the marginalised and disempowered. Furthermore, 
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Cameron argued that women’s powerlessness in the 1980s resulted from the absence 
of women’s voices in the public domain as they were denied access to speech styles 
that would allow them to enter the public domain, such as politics and media.527  
For Cameron, women self-censored themselves or were prevented from 
speaking either by social taboos and restrictions or by the more ‘genteel tyrannies of 
custom and practice’.528 Silence, Cameron observed, stemmed from self-censorship 
for fear of ridicule, attack, or indifference.529 Cameron also noted that there are 
persisting normative expectations about how men and women should talk, and strong 
persistence of women’s language stereotypes, reinforcing and maintaining gender 
distinctions and hierarchies. Cameron argued that women have been instructed to 
speak properly, as they were instructed to dress properly, and this is what she termed 
‘verbal hygiene’.530 Verbal hygiene imposes language norms upon women.  
Moreover, Cameron pointed out that the ideology that denigrated women was 
maintained by both men and women.531 
While Cameron, Gal and Lakoff focused on constraints on speech, by the 
1970s, the French philosopher Hélène Cixous, the psychonalayst Luce Irigaray, and 
the philosopher Julia Kristeva called for ‘writing the female body’ in an ‘écriture 
feminine’. 532 Cixous argued that the written language articulates a male ideology and 
was used to ‘encode and maintain the dominant patriarchal order’ and called for 
écriture feminine in her 1975 essay Le Rire de la méduse as a political gesture that 
                                               
527 Cameron, Feminism and Linguistic Theory (London: Macmillan 1985), p. 67. 
528 Cameron, ‘Introduction: Why is Language a Feminist Issue?’, in The Feminist Critique of 
Language: A Reader, ed. by Deborah Cameron, 2nd edn (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 1-
21 (pp. 3-4).  
529 Ibid. 
530 Cameron, Verbal Hygiene (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 20. 
531 Ibid. 
532 Fiona Tolan, ‘Feminisms’, in The Literary Theory and Criticism: An Oxford Guide ed. by 




would disrupt the ‘order and law of patriarchal language’.533  Cixous argued that 
women should write (about) their bodies and sexuality as it empowers them to 
overthrow masculine ideologies and to create a new female discourse: ‘il faut que la 
femme s’écrive […] En s’écrivant, la femme fera retour à ce corps qu’on lui a 
confisqué, dont on a fait l’inquiétant étranger dans la place […] À censurer le corps, 
on censure du même coup le souffle, la parole. Écris toi : il faut que ton corps se 
fasse entendre’.534 For Cixous, écriture feminine was a unique way of writing about 
intimacy, making ‘the unconscious heard’, even if the writing turns out to be 
‘eccentric , incomprehensible, and inconsistent, and if such writing is difficult to 
read […] it is because the feminine voice has been suppressed for so long’. 535  
Irigaray, critical of Freud’s theory defining women as imperfect castrated men, 
argued that women’s problematic relationship to masculine language was rooted in 
female sexuality as women’s sexual pleasure, and jouissance, cannot be expressed 
by the dominant male language.536 Kristeva, relying on psychoanalysis and 
semiotics,  argued that female language was suppressed and male language became 
the ‘norm’.537  
Even if some of this research avoided the simplification that depicted women 
and men as two natural split categories with distinct speaking styles, one recurring 
problem was that the research tended to perpetuate a popular conflation of gender 
with fixed categories of ‘men’ and ‘women’. By the 1990s, however, due to the 
gender theory developed by Judith Butler, sociolinguists went further in questioning 
                                               
533 Hélène Cixous, ‘Le Rire de la méduse’, Revue de l’Arc, 61 (1975), 39-54. 
534 Ibid. pp. 39-43. 
535 Tolan, ‘Feminisms’, p. 336. 
536 Ann Rosalind Jones, ‘Writing the Body: Toward an Understanding of “L'Écriture 
Feminine”’, Feminist Studies, 7.2 (1981), 247-263 (p. 250). 





the assumption of homogenous groups of ‘men’ and ‘women’ and the association of 
dominant power structures with masculinity. Butler advanced that ‘gender is the 
repeated stylization of the body, a set of repeated acts within a highly rigid 
regulatory frame that congeal over time to produce the appearance of substance, of a 
“natural” kind of being’.538 Butler rejected any account that treats sex as the 
foundation of gender; and linguistic research has taken Butler’s concepts of 
performativity and performance as useful concepts to investigate the relationship 
between language and gender.  
Gender, therefore, is not fixed and attained once and for all but is an ongoing 
performance produced by repeated actions. For Cameron, ‘each individual subject 
must constantly negotiate the norms, behaviours, and discourses that define 
masculinity and femininity for a community at a particular time in history’.539 
Following Butler’s views on gender, sociolinguists attended to the diversity of 
femininities and masculinities and moved away from the equation of male with 
power and female with powerlessness. Instead, research focused on the ways in 
which gender could be performed using language or linguistic variations 
(pronunciation of certain vowels or choice of words).540 Cameron rightly pointed out 
that sexual identities as well as gender identities are locally and culturally variable 
and they do influence one another.541 Hence, for Cameron, to study language and 
power is also to pay attention to what shapes gender stereotypes, such as the power 
of mass media that attributes ‘appropriate’ gender roles through language.542 
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One of the other issues of research in gender and language is that the main 
scholarship on language and gender concentrates on English-speaking environments, 
mainly monolingual and white. In 1992, Penelope Eckert and Sally McConnell-
Ginet urged researchers to rethink the way ‘men’ and ‘women’ were constructed as 
homogenous groups and to abandon biases of ethnocentricity, to take into account 
class, race, ethnicity, and age, and to reach out to research in other countries across 
other languages.543 In the 1990s, more and more studies were done on ‘minorities’ 
living in the US, for instance the use of Hispanic languages in America, and African-
American vernacular English. This led researchers to move away from a narrow 
focus on a straight, white, middle-class version of femininity and masculinity as well 
as a standardised English language.  
However, there is still limited study of Algeria and Morocco’s use of 
language and gender, with the notable exception of the works of anthropologist and 
sociolinguist Fatima Sadiqi who has analysed mixed-sex conversations. The focus of 
sociolinguistics in Algeria and Morocco during the past decades has been the 
political role played by languages in relation to national identity (particularly Berber 
and darija), and the politics of Arabisation, but gender studies of language and its 
relation to power in the Maghreb have still to be further explored. In Women, 
Language and Gender, Sadiqi draws on English scholarship in sociolinguistics and 
questions how it can be applied to Morocco, where tenacious old political and 
cultural traditions as well as visible patriarchal dominance are still cultivated.544 
Sadiqi argued that Morocco’s Islamic tradition, diverse languages, and monarchical 
regime determine the gaps between women and men’s language. Sadiqi rightly 
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observes that language, gender, and power cannot be isolated from ‘class, economics 
and bigotry’.545  
Sadiqi’s book also highlights the difference between urban and rural 
environments and the private and public spaces that influence how women and men 
speak.546 The languages attributed to women are hence the languages of the private 
sphere, which are also mainly rural darija and Berber. Women became the 
preservers of oral culture as they use darija and Berber in the household and find 
themselves in the paradoxical situation of the conservative speakers who maintain 
tradition and ‘non-conservative’ speakers since they do not use Standard Arabic as 
often as men in the public arena.547 Sadiqi examines how men use Standard Arabic 
in the public space, media, politics, and religion to gain power and authority, and 
how when women use Standard Arabic they penetrate a masculine space. Women’s 
use of Standard Arabic removes them from the public ‘lower position’ and 
destabilises the hierarchy.548 Therefore, men do not encourage women to use 
Standard Arabic in public discourse as it is part of masculine identity and power. 
French, on the other hand, is also perceived by Sadiqi as a prestigious language that, 
like Standard Arabic, is associated with power, urbanity, and the public domain.549 
Men, however, are more favourable towards women who use French as it symbolises 
prestige while it does not threaten their position and dominance in society. French is 
also only mastered by highly educated women in urban areas.  
For Sadiqi, women traditionally exert less influence in the public sphere. 
However, the penetration of women into public space through work and urbanisation 
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has contributed to linguistic changes. Women emerge as active agents of change in 
civil society and the public sphere as they contribute to linguistic versatility and 
actively participate in the social changes that are taking place. Women use languages 
to access the public sphere and even feminise it, which is evidenced in the print 
media, television, and films. In return, the media has transformed the way women 
see themselves and how they are spoken of and allowed women to express 
themselves.550  
While women are more visible on the public scene, Sadiqi notes too that they 
cannot use the same language as men and there is an ongoing hostility towards 
women using taboo words.551 For Sadiqi, taboo words prevent women from fully 
accessing the public domain and exclude them by prohibiting them from 
pronouncing these words that are made ‘invisible’ to women.552 Furthermore, either 
publicly or privately, women’s speech needs to be controlled by men and even by 
other women, as in the example of the mother-in-law in the household who controls 
the bride.553  
Sadiqi’s work as well as previous research reveals the degree to which power 
is contested or asserted through changing linguistic practices. Language becomes a 
site for the analysis of power as ‘finding the attempts at resistance will tell us where 
and how [power] is exerted’.554 In analysing the corpus of films in this chapter, I will 
investigate how the use of slang, taboo, and transgressive language challenges 
societal norms in terms of gender, and whether it gives rise to anxiety amongst the 
public. My aim is also to determine whether one language is more empowering than 
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another in the context of multilingual films. I will also challenge Sadiqi’s claim that 
it is only French and Standard Arabic that empower women and men, while she 
argues that the same cannot be said of darija. 
  
Morocco On the Edge 
 
Much Loved; ‘I am a kahba [prostitute], and this is how I speak’  
It is noticeable that over the last decade, Moroccan films such as Marock and 
Amours voilées were deemed controversial for their representations of social mores 
pertaining to women’s sexuality and religion. Yet none of these films reached the 
level of debate and controversy that Nabil Ayouch’s Much Loved did in 2015. Much 
Loved is set in Marrakech and focuses on four female prostitutes who drink alcohol, 
speak raunchy darija and service wealthy Saudi clients. Moroccan journalists and 
politicians reacted with defensiveness and discomfort towards the film’s display of 
female prostitution, nudity and crude language.  
While discussing Much Loved I aim at disentangling the themes that were 
deemed controversial in it and focus on the most thought-provoking and 
controversial one: the use of vulgar language by women. Indeed, I argue that crude 
language was a major trigger in the controversy because the film’s female 
protagonists appropriate obscene language, often associated with male speech. By 
contrast, when the male characters in Casanegra (discussed in Chapter three) used 
street slang and crude language, none of the critics deemed the language 
inappropriate. Instead, the language was praised for its realism since it allowed the 
young men to contest their harsh living conditions. To further comprehend how 




masculinity, I will contrast it with Les Jardins de Samira, Agadir Bombay and Sur la 
planche.  
Much Loved is Ayouch’s sixth feature film, with which he aimed for a 
‘naturalist, intimate film’ that depicts the ‘real life of these women (prostitutes)’.555 
The Arabic title Zin Eli fik signifies ‘the beauty inside you’ and refers to the 
‘interiority’ of the protagonists that Ayouch aimed at capturing.556 Similarly to Les 
Chevaux de Dieu (discussed in Chapter Three), Ayouch spent two years in 
preparation, during which time he interviewed over a hundred prostitutes.557 To 
achieve a realistic effect, he filmed on location in Marrakech’s nightclubs and villas 
but also in poor areas and he employed nonprofessional actresses who came from 
deprived neighbourhoods close to prostitution circles.558   
Much Loved examines the lives of four Moroccan prostitutes Noha (Loubna 
Abidar), Randa (Asmaa Lazrak), Soukeina (Halima Karaouane), and Hlima (Sara 
Elhamdi Elalaoui) living in the same apartment under the patronage of Noha, who 
organises the encounters with their clients. Randa, in her twenties, is a reluctant 
prostitute who aims to be reunited with her father in Spain. Soukeina dreams of 
romantic love, while Noha, the oldest, is her family’s breadwinner. Hlima joins the 
women’s group when she meets them at the hospital where Soukeina was admitted 
after she was beaten up by a wealthy Saudi client. After Soukeina’s beating, a 
drunken Noha throws bottles of beer at the gate of the Saudi house after which she is 
arrested. Released from the police station, Noha decides to get away from Marrakech 
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and invites the girls and Said, their driver, to an upscale resort in Agadir, for a few 
days.  
 
Figure 26. Much Loved’s poster with Loubna Abidar in the forefront 
While the CCM authorised Ayouch to shoot Much Loved in Marrakech, it 
rejected Ayouch’s request for funding, which signals that the CCM was averse to the 
themes developed in the film. Ayouch eventually gathered 700,000 euros through his 
production company Ali N Productions, winning investment from French producers, 
and receiving some funding from the CNC through L’Aide aux cinémas du 
Monde.559 Ayouch collected four times less than for his previous film Les Chevaux 
de Dieu, the effects of which are evident in Much Loved’s hurried editing and the 
scarcity of outdoor scenes, with the camera immersed in the interior spaces where 
the protagonists live or work.  
                                               




 Upon its premiere at Cannes’s Quinzaine des Réalisateurs, in 2015, over 
three hours of Much Loved’s rushes were leaked and circulated on social media. One 
of the rushes reveals the protagonist Noha (Loubna Abidar) naked and performing a 
sexual act, although this scene was not present in the film. Within a few days, the 
film became the subject of political protest and heated discussions in Morocco. 
Many Moroccans considered that Much Loved had a documentary value and 
reflected reality.560 Some even confused Abidar’s role as a prostitute with her real-
life persona. The actress Abidar who visually dominates the film was thus called a 
‘whore’ on social media and was the target of death threats and attacks. Some 
Moroccan journalists labelled her a ‘porn actress’ who had no shame in exhibiting 
her nudity.561  
Ayouch and Abidar were prosecuted by a civil organisation, on charges of 
‘pornography, public indecency and inciting debauchery’, although the trial was 
dismissed due to a fault in the judicial procedure.562 Calls were also made by a 
religious cleric to ‘jail Ayouch and Abidar because they seriously damage the moral 
integrity of the Moroccans’.563 The controversy reached its peak in November 2015, 
after Abidar was violently beaten up by three drunken men on Casablanca’s streets. 
Abidar made her attack public and broadcast the injuries inflicted on her in social 
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media. She then left Morocco for France, where she lives now.  
Prostitution is prohibited by Moroccan law, and prostitutes are stigmatised 
and socially marginalised. Scholar Nada Addoum further observes that a ‘prostitute 
is a symbol of transgression of both the law of the state and of patriarchy’.564 Hence, 
the heated debate revealed that ‘controlled female sexuality is just fine. It is the 
uncontrolled […] that threatens the social order so distinctly’.565 Moreover, the 
women in the film sexually service non-Moroccan men, mainly Saudis and French, 
further endangering the Moroccan sense of honour and masculinity. Hence the 
different reactions indicate that the female body is a site that must be tamed and 
controlled, even if Much Loved is a fiction.  
The female body and national identity were, thus, at the core of the political 
debate. Abidar’s character was taken by the Moroccan public, and some of the 
critics, to represent all Moroccan women, and by extension Morocco itself. For 
instance, the Moroccan Minister of Communication, Mustapha El Khalifi, who is a 
member the PJD, accused Ayouch’s film of ‘seriously outraging moral values and 
distorting the image of Morocco and the Moroccan woman’. 566 El Khalifi’s 
statement indicates that he upholds the patriarchal idea of the sanctity of the nation 
as depending on the purity of its women. James N. Sater argues that the PJD, indeed, 
views women as the bearers of tradition against the corrupting influences of the 
West.567  
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The film’s funding and its reception in France were also fiercely discussed by 
Moroccan journalists. While it is a recurrent theme in the Algerian press that France 
intervenes and funds films that disfigure Algeria’s image, it was the first time the 
Moroccan press tackled this matter so forcefully. The Moroccan journalist, Bakrim, 
for instance, considered that the French flood of sympathy was motivated by the 
Moroccan ban, adding: ‘Le message est stupide: un film doit être alors interdit dans 
son pays pour bénéficier de la charité sympathique des distributeurs’.568  
For Bakrim, other successful Moroccan films did not circulate in France 
because they attracted less controversy and did not publicise a degraded image of 
Morocco.569 The Moroccan press even considered the film an ‘artistic failure’ that 
benefited from the controversy.570 After the attack, Abidar published an article in Le 
Monde where she explained that she could no longer live in Morocco where she was 
called ‘une pute’.571 She was then vehemently attacked in the Moroccan press for 
bringing up issues that would further distort the image of Morocco.572 In France, 
Much Loved met with instant praise, and received extensive press and television 
coverage, yet was not a big hit with the public: it gathered 270,000 viewers, which is 
a good number for a Moroccan film, but is not remarkable for French audiences.573 
It is noticeable that ten years ago, the Moroccan press defended Marock 
against the PJD who considered it a Zionist film, funded by France, which 
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dishonoured Morocco by including Jewishness and inter-faith sexual intercourse. In 
the case of Much Loved, surprisingly, some journalists aligned their positions with 
those of the PJD and claimed that Ayouch gave in to French funders by displaying 
nudity and female sexuality.574 Furthermore, none of the film’s detractors at this 
point in the polemic had seen the film, yet they fiercely pilloried it. Indeed, Much 
Loved was banned even before obtaining a visa for distribution. The film’s 
detractors, thus, were the self-appointed guardians of public decency. The French 
Moroccan writer Leila Slimani who interviewed Nabil Ayouch points at the 
discrepancy between the ubiquity of prostitution and use of pornography in private 
and the taboo about talking about it in public.575 The polemic reveals the anxiety that 
female sexuality and nudity provoked, as well as the still vivid debate between 
cinema and national identity.   
 Having summarised the issues pertaining to prostitution and female sexuality 
intertwined with national identity, I will now address the linguistic dimensions of the 
film. Crude and frank language is introduced from the opening scenes which set the 
film’s tone. The opening credits are accompanied by Noha’s voice, in darija, bluntly 
categorising men into ‘the luxurious one, the medium range one, and the oueld el 
kahba (son of a bitch)’, adding that ‘one has to acquire the more luxurious one to 
gain money’. Noha’s language objectifies men and contests the view of prostitutes as 
merely passive. Language allows Noha to speak against her own commodification, 
and to bring her female voice to the forefront.  
The camera then cuts to medium close-ups introducing the protagonists one 
by one: Randa sniffing drugs, Noha eating, and Soukeina putting on nail polish. The 
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women share their sexual experiences and do not shy away from salacious details. 
Noha remembers a party in Marrakech when she and Randa managed to gain 
entrance as Randa uttered a few words in English, presumably passing for a tourist. 
Randa recalls that Noha was ‘fucking everywhere and everyone’ at the party, to 
which Noha adds ‘my vagina got destroyed by a black dick and I was unable to work 
for six months’. The three women are simply dressed, in sports outfits, which will 
become their interior costume, contrasted with the fancy and glittery dresses they put 
on for work.  
In the scene that follows, the three protagonists are dressed up and framed in 
Said’s car by night, heading for work. Noha sits at the front, and the camera focuses 
on her face. Noha briefs Randa and Soukeina and warns them in darija: ‘today I 
want you to show your asses, your legs and hips, understood?’ She then asks Randa 
to perform a ‘thamanyatoun’ a figure of eight with her hips and buttocks. Noha also 
instructs them: ‘you sit next to me and if I dance, you dance, if I move, you move 
and if nehoui [I fuck], tehouiou [you fuck]’. Said turns a disapproving eye on Noha 
in response to this speech, and she responds: ‘I am a kahba (prostitute). Do you want 
me to speak in damiati (high language)?’ Noha then adds: ‘O God, please provide 
me with a handsome, rich Saudi, with a little zeb [penis)].’  
The fast-paced rhythm of the exchanges in the car and the mixture of 
religious prayer with uninhibited crude language attracted quasi-hysterical responses 
from Moroccans. Social media viewers labelled the language as ‘tayeh’ (low and 
vulgar), in breach of Islamic morals and social norms.576 Many Moroccans 
considered that this language could not be used by women so bluntly and openly 
                                               
576 ‘Micro trottoir: que pensent les marocains de Much Loved?’, Femmes du Maroc online, 




because it was ‘improper and dishonourable’.577 The CCM’s director even stated that 
Ayouch had scorned the CCM, since the dialogues shifted from the initial script, and 
further condemned the ‘verbal violence’ of the film.578 Some Moroccan 
Francophone journalists claimed that Ayouch had given in to French funders’ 
demands by including vulgar language.579  
Few Moroccan journalists or critics defended Much Loved in relation to its 
use of language. Moroccan journalist Mehdi Ouessat argued that the debate was 
polarized between a traditionalist majority who were mostly Arabic-speaking, and a 
Francophone modernist minority, in favour of individual freedom. 580 Yet YouTube 
videos were made in darija in defence of the film, which indicates that the debate 
was not clearly divided between Arabic-speaking and French-speaking Moroccans. 
In one of the videos, a man explains in darija that women have the right to speak as 
they wish, and it is Moroccan society that should be condemned for not 
acknowledging these women’s plight. 581  
For over a year, Ayouch worked with his actresses on theatrical 
improvisation, so they could ‘loosen up’ and speak with ‘their own words’.582 The 
women’s vocabulary in the film is filled with slang and with the frequent repetition 
of vulgar words such as kahba (prostitute), zeb (penis), tehoui (fuck). Ayouch 
considered that vulgar language increases the naturalistic elements of the film.583 
Furthermore, crude language is shown from the opening scene to be in alignment 
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with the ‘authentic’ self of Noha, as she claims that she is a prostitute, and this is 
how she speaks. Vulgar language is hence positioned as an authentic language that 
expresses the protagonists’ self-defined existence. Sadiqi argues that ‘the notion of 
differentiating Moroccan women’s language from men’s results from the “duality” 
(men-leader/women-subordinate) stereotype that is deeply rooted in Moroccan 
culture’.584 Noha reverses the symbolic male domination and further transgresses 
gender and social norms by mixing religious prayer with slang and sexual allusions. 
Furthermore, by using crude language, Noha is opposed to the idea that women are 
powerless.585  
The only positive figure of masculinity in the film is Said, a middle-aged 
man who is part of the enclosed circle of women. Furthermore, Said’s masculinity 
does not threaten the women, instead, he drives them in his car, cooks, runs errands 
and even distributes condoms to the women before their sexual encounters. Said is a 
quasi-silent witness of the women’s lives, and the external eye that is introduced into 
their intimate circle. In one scene, Noha is framed at the back of Said’s car, after the 
night she spent with the Saudis. She extracts from her vagina a packet of money that 
she stole. The package is rolled in plastic, with blood around it, and she hands it to 
Said who remains stoic. Although in the opening scene Said disapproved of Noha’s 
language he nonetheless remains silent, which emphasises that a Moroccan man is 
capable of accepting the women’s way of life and their speech.  
The protagonists’ friendship constitutes a key theme of the film. Ayouch 
employed two cameras to heighten the sense of closeness and bonding between the 
four women. He also surrounded himself with women technicians, including 
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Virginie Surdej (director of photography) and Camilla Montasier (assistant director), 
so he could achieve a ‘sense of intimacy and immediacy that would not have been 
possible with a male crew’.586 The handheld camera and numerous close-ups also 
highlight the social confinement of the protagonists and their disconnection from 
outside life.  
The dim lighting, the night scenes in dirty empty streets, the filming of 
Marrakech’s poor neighbourhoods, and the melancholic non-diegetic music 
contribute to the gloomy feeling of the protagonists’ lives. The location of the 
women’s apartment in a dusty area of Marrakech also metaphorically represents 
their lives on the fringes of society. In one scene, when Soukeina is in Said’s taxi, 
the camera sweeps over Marrakech in a long shot, and juxtaposes the social 
differences between cars and cart sellers, as well as exposing the poorly dressed 
women and beggars. The dirty pavements, the grey sky and images of a decrepit 
cityscape mark Marrakech as the antithesis of the pleasant touristic destination it is 
usually seen as. It is only towards the end that the landscape widens, and the 
panorama includes long shots of a blue ocean under a bright sky, thus offering a 
visual escape from the city. 
The film’s exploration of the life and language of prostitutes, who live on the 
margins of society, extends to transvestite prostitutes. Dressed in bright dresses, with 
high heels, wigs, and heavy make-up, the transvestites gather at Noha’s place to 
drink alcohol, laugh, and dance. They are framed as frivolous, colourful, free, and 
portrayed as figures of fun and comic relief. Yet the transvestites are only seen by 
night on Marrakech’s streets to further emphasise their estrangement from society. 
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When they meet with Noha, the transvestites share the same crude language, they 
call each other ‘kahba’ (prostitute), and use expletives when addressing each other. 
Vulgar language is thus used amongst them as a solidarity-based linguistic practice 
and a ‘form of opposition to symbolic domination’.587 Hence obscene words assert 
the group’s contempt for social morals and resist ostracism as well as allowing them 
to assert their sexuality. Language is thus used subversively, opening a space for the 
expression of a different sexuality. 
 The girls also shelter Hlima who left her town for Marrakech when she got 
pregnant. In Marrakech, Hlima services Moroccan men on the streets, often for as 
little as a few euros, or for some vegetables. Hlima’s journey to Marrakech is one 
that many young women from the countryside make in real life. She is an aaroubiya, 
a rural girl who speaks darija with a heavy accent and is dressed in a traditional 
jellaba, with a headscarf. Hlim’a accent is grounded in the dialect of rural life and is 
also used for comic relief in the film. Noha, Randa and Soukeina mock her name and 
ask her to pick a more distinguished urban name to demarcate herself from her 
peasant origins. Noha asks her ‘do you want to hear “Hlima, fetch the cow”: or 
“Ahlam, please call the chauffeur”?’.   
Through attention to Hlima’s rural accent, costume and manners, the film’s 
verisimilitude is also realised. Her status as an aaryoubia prostitute further marks a 
significant departure from the glamorised representation of Noha and the girls. 
Indeed, Hlima addresses men and women equally in vulgar darija, while the girls 
change their way of speech when they are in presence of their clients. Undeniably, 
the crude language used by Noha, Randa and Soukeina contrasts with the meek, 
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passive and feminine language and lascivious postures adopted by them when they 
entertain the Saudis.  
At the Saudis’ house where Noha and other women are gathered, the women 
need to ‘present’ themselves during a dance competition. In a richly furnished room, 
the Saudis sit and drink while the women are aligned opposite them. The camera 
assumes the position of the watching Saudis so that the performance is played 
directly to the camera. The viewer is thus encouraged temporarily to adopt the 
viewpoint of the Saudis, whose gaze fixes and commodifies the women while the 
camera explicitly frames their voluptuous bodies, in tightly fitted, glittery dresses.  
  
Figure 27. Noha at the Saudis’ house dancing 
Noha dances and is framed from the back performing a ‘thamanyathoune’ in 
a tight pink outfit, moving her hips, accompanied by loud music. She crawls and 
offers her body as what E. Ann Kaplan describes, talking of women in Hollywood 
films, a ‘spectacle, an object-to-be-looked-at.’588 The camera focuses on her 
movements of her hips and buttocks, as well as her seductive smiles, winks, and 
alluring pouts. The dance sequence both fixes the identity of Noha as a prostitute and 
reaffirms the power relationship between the Saudis and those who perform under 
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their gaze. Noha is the object of the Saudis’ sexual gaze; she is desirable, but she 
also needs to masquerade and flatter them. She consciously manipulates her body as 
well as language to seduce the Saudis. During these gatherings, Noha employs 
Middle Eastern Arabic, to flatter and praise the Saudis’ virility. For instance, she 
states in colloquial Egyptian ‘aadat essaoudiya bitasaoui fiya’ (sitting with the Saudi 
puts me on fire). Egyptian vernacular is widespread in the Middle East and North 
Africa, through television series and music, and has dominated Arabic cultural 
forms.589 Hence it is no surprise that Noha masters this language. Furthermore, she 
turns the language into a valuable commodity, using it to seduce the men. She 
stylises her language by including rhymes and jokes and hyper-feminises her pose. 
She speaks slowly, smoothly, and frequently accompanies her words by a dance, a 
suggestive wink, and the camera focuses on her tight outfit while she speaks.  
In the gatherings with the Saudis, women are reduced to smiling, dancing, 
and hardly speaking while the Saudis use language to perform their gender identity. 
The men are framed gathered, sitting on the floor, eating food with their hands and 
dressed in traditional white robes with agals and keffiyeh (traditional headband and a 
scarf). One of the men eats while speaking, praising the Saudi’s financial generosity 
towards the Palestinians whom he calls ‘beggars’. Soukeina, who is at the other end 
of the group, dressed in a tight black outfit, intervenes: ‘poor Palestinians, haram, 
you should not say that. They are deprived of their land’. She is then cut short by a 
young man who says in his Saudi accent: ‘who is this woman? Shut her up’. Noha is 
framed as she glances back at Soukeina and asks her to stop talking.  
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The framing enhances the power that is allotted to the Saudis. They are in the 
foreground while the women are framed in the background and remain quasi-silent. 
The men’s language, as well, triumphs over the women’s speech and proves the 
power imparted to them. The Saudis do not speak darija, further signalling that the 
men impose their language. Hence, Noha and the other women are compelled to use 
Middle Eastern Arabic. Using a language the Saudis understand is symbolic of 
power relations between Moroccan women and Saudi men: the women need to 
repudiate darija while the men maintain their language. In other scenes, gendered 
power relations are established through money. The men throw money at the women 
when they dance, placing bills between their breasts and thighs, and women are 
framed crawling, in underwear, to gather the money the Saudis distribute.    
The above-mentioned scenes present clichés of Saudi men whose wealth 
allows them to consider women as commodities. Furthermore, the scenes highlight 
the Saudis’ double standards; they are traditionally clothed yet entertain prostitutes 
and drink alcohol, acts that are severely punished in their country. A short-lived 
illusion that the Saudi men can be courteous and polite is exemplified by Soukeina’s 
experience. She entertains a man who every night declaims ghazal – ancient love 
poetry in Arabic. In one scene, the Saudi man is tightly framed, facing Soukeina, 
gazing at her with love. After several encounters where he is unable to achieve an 
erection, the two, framed on a bed, begin watching a pornographic film to get him 
aroused. Fiddling with the laptop, Soukeina discovers images of naked men, 
indicating his sexual preference.  
Feeling dishonoured, Soukeina hurriedly dresses, wanting to leave. The 
Saudi asks her why and she replies in a Middle Eastern accent ‘you are gay’ and that 




repeating in his Saudi accent she is ‘gahba’ (whore) adding ‘you are worth nothing, 
less than half a cent’. Defenceless, Soukeina endures his violence in silence. The 
character of the Saudi man points at the contrast between civilised masculinity 
embodied by the poetry and the violent behaviour he displays. At the same time, the 
Saudi is also a victim of a culture of macho posturing, religious strictures and 
endemic double standards.  
Although Noha speaks French, she only uses it to gain access to more clients.  
She does not gain social prestige or power from it, which implies that her social 
status as a prostitute cannot be overcome. In one scene, Noha, Randa and Soukeina 
entertain three French men in a nightclub. The middle-aged men are framed together, 
indistinguishable one from the other, drinking alcohol. One of them says in French 
‘Ce soir on va baiser’ and says to Noha, ‘vas-y, montre-nous ton cul’. Soon after, 
Noha realises that the men do not have enough money and she and the girls leave the 
nightclub. The three men are angered and throw money at the girls while insulting 
them ‘c’est ça, mets-la dans ta chatte’. The scene emphasises the men’s vulgarity 
and parallels their rudeness with the Saudis’ behaviour. Yet none of the 
abovementioned scenes were deemed controversial or criticised by Moroccan 
journalists. Their lack of reaction to these scenes implies that it is acceptable for men 
to have sex and use violence and crude language as long as women are maintained in 
a subaltern position, linguistically and physically.  
The conflation of sex and violence is a critical feature of Much Loved. When 
Noha is arrested, she is brought to the police station where Amine, the policeman she 
knows, is in charge. Amine rapes her in exchange for her release. She is framed 
against Amine’s desk, clenching her fists, and her expression denotes pain. Amine is 




chatting. Jemaa El Fnaa is amongst the most visited places in Marrakech, busting 
with food carts and sellers, yet in this scene, it is framed empty, dirty, under a grey 
sky, which emphasises Noha’s state of mind. Amine asks Noha for more money to 
dismiss the case and adds ‘as for myself I already got paid’. The scene underscores 
the corruption of the police that profits from the prostitution trade.  
The abovementioned scene may remind the Moroccan viewer of another 
film, Tabit or not Tabit (Dir. Nabyl Lahlou, 2006), which exposed a real-life scandal 
in which the police commissioner Tabet raped over five hundred women while 
secretly filming his deeds. The film revealed police corruption and was received 
with cathartic floods of tears and praised for dealing with such a poignant and taboo 
subject.590 Yet the abovementioned scene did not provoke any sympathy towards 
Noha, nor did it raise any debate when it came to discussing the film. This further 
confirms that the status of the protagonists as sex workers again seemed to justify 
sexual abuse and violence.  
Father figures are markedly absent in the film, while the state does not 
protect the women, hence the only space in which they feel safe is amongst 
themselves. The female group becomes a substitute family that comforts and 
protects, where they find solidarity and where they can freely speak. The female-
group and Said become a non-patriarchal family within a patriarchal context; they 
challenge, resist and defy patriarchy and social marginalisation. Central within Much 
Loved is the relationship between sexuality and individuality, a theme strengthened 
by the use of crude language. The film presents a compromised, non-triumphalist 
image of Moroccan masculinity, as well as a liberated female sexuality. Much 
                                               





Loved’s most significant challenge to Moroccan cinema, hence, stems from the way 
it represents female language in connection with sexuality.  
 
Les Jardins de Samira: Samira is in No Paradise 
Les Jardins de Samira (2007) is Nabyl Lahlou’s third feature film, following a series 
of public information films for the CCM. Lahlou was born in 1939 and trained at the 
French Institut des Hautes Etudes Cinématographiques. His debut feature, Soleil de 
printemps (1969), shot in black and white, was influenced by Italian neorealism and 
the French New Wave.591 Soleil de printemps examined the misfortunes of a civil 
servant of peasant origins who cannot adapt to urban life in Casablanca.592 Armes 
considers it a cornerstone in Moroccan cinema, as it broke new ground in a radical 
way through its use of black and white, nonprofessional actors, and tight framing of 
Casablanca’s landscape, insisting on the rapid urbanisation of the city with its 
housing development, dense crowd,  and flow of cars, although at the time of its 
release it encountered little success with Moroccan audiences.593  
Les Jardins de Samira reverses the plot of Soleil de printemps. It explores the 
sexual frustration of Samira, a young urban woman from Casablanca trapped in her 
marriage to Driss, a landowner, who is old. Confined to Driss’s house in the 
countryside, Samira has to nurse Driss’s father who has Alzheimer’s Disease, 
receiving help only from Farouk, Driss’s young nephew who lives in the house as 
well. Over time, Samira discovers that her husband is sexually impotent, and she is 
drawn to Farouk. Samira and Farouk begin a sexual relationship but growing 
                                               






suspicious of their affair, Driss asks Farouk to leave, and Samira is left alone in the 
house.  
Les Jardins de Samira connects silence with female powerlessness and 
speech with male power. The three protagonists speak the same darija, but language 
delimits gender roles and power relations: Samira often remains silent, while her 
husband speaks and is powerful. Samira rarely leaves the house. Meanwhile, Farouk 
– who is confined to the domestic sphere – is as powerless as Samira and submissive 
to his uncle’s authority. In the household, Driss mainly speaks to prohibit and 
reprimand; outside the house, he uses language to assert his power and masculinity.  
The film begins with Samira’s journey as a married woman in Driss’s car, 
leaving her family home and heading to Driss’s house. Samira is framed wearing a 
traditional wedding dress, with the camera focussing on her smile and expensive 
earrings while non-diegetic joyful music is heard. As the car drives away from 
Casablanca, the camera brushes the city landscape, passing through the wealthy 
areas with their neat white buildings, sweeping over empty fields, and reaching 
Driss’s house. The vast and bare landscape contrasts with the closeness of the house 
and is symbolic of the short-lived illusion Samira will have about her marriage. 
Samira is to remain in the house and the dreams she had for a better life as a married 
woman will soon be dispelled.  More overtly, the Arabic title of the film, يف ةریمس 
ةعیضلا , bears more meaning than Samira’s Gardens. ةعیضلا , El dayaa literally 
translates to the estate it also signifies loss and forfeiture, feelings that Samira will 
endure.  
In stark contrast with Much Loved’s highly stylised costumes and fast pace, 
Les Jardins de Samira is a slow-paced film, infused with moments of silence, similar 




Emmanuel Binet, underscores Samira’s domestic life and boredom. Lahlou raised 
200,000 euros from the CCM – an average budget for a Moroccan film, but a modest 
sum nonetheless – meaning that the lighting is poor at times and the locations 
limited.594 Lahlou employed renowned Moroccan singer Sanna Mouazine (Samira), 
the established film and television actor Mohammed Khouyi (Driss) and the one-
time television show host Youssef Britel (Farouk). Khouyi and Britel were praised 
for their performances and won Best Actor awards at the 2009 Tangier National 
Film Festival.595 In 2009, the film’s cinema audience reached 47,000 in Morocco, a 
high number by Moroccan standards as Moroccan films gather averages of 10,000 
viewers.596 
 
Figure 28. Les Jardins de Samira’s poster (title in French and Arabic) 
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Gender and space boundaries are visually emphasised in the film. Driss is 
often shown outside the house, while Samira is confined to domestic tasks within the 
boundaries of the house. This view of space is in accordance with the Arab-Muslim 
patriarchy, which is based on ‘strict gender-based space dichotomy’.597 Sadiqi and 
Moha Ennaji draw upon Fatima Mernissi’s work to argue that ‘the private space is 
culturally associated with powerless people (women and children) and is 
subordinated to the public space, which is culturally associated with men – who 
dictate the law’.598 Indeed, in this film, public-private space is where gender 
identities are distinguished and linguistic power is negotiated.  
Although Samira has mastered French, this ability does not empower her. For 
instance, when she meets Farouk for the first time, he calls her ‘Madame’, and she 
replies in French ‘enchantée’. Farouk does not understand Samira’s words and 
continues to call her Madame to mark his respect towards his uncle’s wife. Sadiqi 
points out that Moroccan women adopt French ‘more readily than men’ because it 
allows them ‘social prestige’ and social empowerment.599 However, Driss does not 
even acknowledge Samira’s urban, sophisticated language: he is framed looking at 
Samira’s dress as he does not notice her use of the French ‘enchantée’. 
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Figure 29. Samira and Driss in the kitchen upon Samira’s arrival at the house 
The film is shot in a succession of interiors in Driss’s house: the kitchen, the 
bathroom and the bedroom. The compact, claustrophobic space reflects Samira’s 
state of mind as her freedom of speech and her movements are progressively 
reduced. On Samira’s arrival at the house, Driss tells Farouk, ‘From now on Allah 
relieved you from kitchen duty’, with Samira silently watching. By using the 
religious Allah, Driss implies that Samira’s domestic tasks are sanctioned by 
religion. Her silence reveals that she has accepted her domestic role as her husband’s 
servant. We see her serve tea, while the two men are seated. As the camera focuses 
on Driss’s central position at the table, it further marks how the space is gendered, 
confirming Driss’s position of power over the household. 
Women in the film are rarely present outside the domestic space, with the 
notable exception of the workers at Driss’s farm. The women are dressed in trousers, 
with their heads covered by hats, while they pick tomatoes. Their costume and 
framing signal their lower social class and suggest the de-sexualisation and 
invisibility of these women, as they are framed in the background as mere silhouettes 
while Driss is in the foreground. On the other hand, Samira’s awakening sexual 
desire is revealed at different moments in the film. For example, she is framed when 




ritual, drawing also on pagan practice. The women hang their bras on the coastal 
rocks and pray to a Saint. Samira’s sexual desire is revealed as the camera lingers on 
her body and her lips, with close-ups of her legs when she stands in the sea. These 
rituals are the resort of women who are denied power in the real world, so they use 
whatever means are available to them to attain a measure of control over their 
destinies. These gatherings also provide moments of respite for Samira, when she 
gazes back at men who observe the women from afar.  
Laura Mulvey’s seminal essay of 1975 on the male gaze established that 
narrative film has manipulated visual pleasure in such a way that it reproduces a 
pattern of male looking and female ‘to-be-looked-at-ness’.600 In a book of 1988, 
Kaplan challenged Mulvey’s view, arguing that the gaze is ‘not necessarily male 
(literally), but to own and activate the gaze […] is to be in the “masculine” 
position’.601 Gaze theory in feminist film criticism also claims that the gaze is 
entrenched in power relations, divided by those who have the power to look and 
those who are looked at.   
 Positioned at Samira’s point of view, the camera sweeps across Farouk’s 
body through a series of shots revealing his face, his hands and then his bare chest. 
Samira acts upon her gaze, and has sexual intercourse with him, contradicting 
Kaplan’s observation that ‘women receive and return a gaze but cannot act upon 
it’.602 Samira’s sexuality and active gaze provide her with a newfound sense of 
freedom, emphasised by the bright light that surrounds her and Farouk when they are 
in bed. Her gaze is a source of power and is used in the film as her expression of 
self-worth: a tool for Samira to claim her own desires, which are otherwise thwarted 
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by her husband. Through Samira’s gaze, a visual distinction is also established 
between Farouk and Driss. Driss’s body is not looked at. Instead, he is fully clothed 
in traditional outfits, often framed on his own, at a distance from Samira. Unlike 
Farouk, Driss barely gazes at Samira: his gaze is distant, dispersed, and powerless as 
if to reveal the symptoms of his sexual impotence.  
Despite his impotence, Driss aims at asserting the image of his sexual power, 
and he uses language to maintain his public persona as a sexually active man. In one 
scene, Driss describes his wedding night to his male friends. We see his three old 
friends, dressed in traditional outfits, gathered around Driss in a dimly lit room. The 
claustrophobic space adds to the sense of intimacy and invites secret revelations. 
Crudely, Driss reveals in darija that, ‘The virgin [Samira] brought back my virility,’ 
and that he felt like a ‘horse in a Fantasia [horse show]’. He then imitates the 
screams she allegedly made, adding, ‘I violently fucked her, I hurt her, I tore her 
[virginity] and I almost felt sorry for her’. His friends envy him, and one of them 
states, ‘I wish I could take another wife’. The joking tone that the men adopt when 
replying to Driss’s remarks, and their curious gaze, suggest that they use crude 
language to assert their masculinity. Driss, too, wishes to regain sexual power 
through language.  
Driss’s conversation is addressed to a male-only audience and occurs within 
the context of marriage. He derives prestige from Samira’s virginity, which is proof 
of his sexual strength. At the centre of Driss’s masculinity is his sexuality, and his 
words indicate that sexual prowess is equated with masculine power. In another 
scene, he lies to another friend that Samira is pregnant and became difficult to deal 
with, adding that he is too old to raise a child. Driss’s lie allows him to assert his 




While the film portrays domestic violence, Driss beats up Samira on many 
occasions when she questions his sexual impotence, in order to preserve his 
patriarchal power, Moroccan journalist Najat Faïssal praised the film, somewhat 
surprisingly, for its balanced representation of Morocco’s social realities at the same 
time as it respects the country’s traditions.603 Les Jardins de Samira’s positive 
reception amongst the Moroccan public also indicates that Moroccan audiences can 
accept images of female sexual desire, even for a woman outside the boundaries of 
marriage, although these features are made ‘acceptable’ as by the end of the film, 
Samira’s extra-marital affair is ended and Farouk leaves the house. This reception of 
Les Jardins de Samira is in stark contrast to the reception of Much Loved. 
In the film, religious power – never far dissociated from patriarchal power – 
also thrives on language and sanctions Samira’s sexuality. In one scene, Samira’s 
father and Driss seal the wedding by reciting Al Fatiha (the opening verse of the 
Quran). The two men, similar in age and costume, sit in the living room, which 
emphasises their closeness and shared power. The women of the house are kept at a 
distance, visually and physically; they are framed as mere silhouettes at the room’s 
entrance. The scene demonstrates the religious and legal power conferred on 
Samira’s father to sanction her marriage, as well as the limited space given to 
women in religious and legal matters.  
Like her father, Samira’s mother perpetuates patriarchal power through 
language. In the opening scene, when Samira is introduced, her mother’s voice-over 
in darija enumerates what Samira will gain by marrying Driss. The mother 
idiomatically expresses that Driss is from ‘a good lineage’ and ‘your father has 
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checked his background’. She adds that Driss is rich and will provide Samira with 
stability and economic certainty. The voice-over implies that the mother is the 
mouthpiece of tradition and patriarchal order, and that Samira has neither agency nor 
power to resist the command of her parents. By the end of the film, Samira is framed 
walking alone in a public garden where she sees a man and a woman, who are 
followed by a little girl. The scene emblematizes Samira’s loneliness and what 
Samira is deprived of: a loving husband, and a happy life.  
Les Jardins de Samira oscillates between transgression – in its treatment of 
sexual intimacy, female desire and the gaze– and conformity, while dealing with 
Samira’s domestic life and Driss’s power. Driss, has maintained through language 
masculine honour and power inside and outside the household – even though it is a 
mere front. The film also exposes Samira’s fragile position in society, helpless, 
unable to fully live her sexuality. Hence, language cannot liberate Samira from the 
constraints and norms of society, and the film’s ending is sympathetic to Samira, she 
is framed sitting alone outside the house, contemplating her surroundings, left with 
Driss’s father who cannot speak; the house becomes Samira’s jail.  
 
Agadir Bombay: Happy Ending is Only for The Virtuous Woman 
Like Les Jardins de Samira, the Moroccan feature Agadir Bombay (2011) does not 
allow women to free themselves from patriarchy, to openly live their sexuality, and 
to find empowerment through language. As in Les Jardins de Samira, darija is used 
only to perpetuate patriarchal values and leaves women powerless. Darija in this 
film is sanitised and normalised to reinforce gender and moral boundaries, and 
spoken language only reaffirms the standardised view of women as powerless and 




The plot concentrates on Imane, a 14-year-old teenager who lives in 
Taroudant, a small town in southern Morocco. While Imane’s family prepares for 
her cousin’s wedding, she must collect jewels from her grandmother’s house, but she 
loses them on her return home. Her parents shout at her, so she runs and hides, later 
to be found by her neighbour’s daughter Leila. Leila, who is in her thirties, lives in 
Agadir and is visiting her sick mother. She takes Imane to Agadir for the day to 
forget about the events, and later brings her to a house party, where a rich 
industrialist, Mounir Absi, is being entertained in advance of a business deal. It is 
revealed then that Leila is a prostitute, though Imane had thought she was a child-
carer. Leila’s aim, at the beginning of the film, is to get married to Rachid, her pimp, 
and to have a domesticated life. She previously sacrificed herself, by working as a 
prostitute, to help her mother and sister after their father left them. During the house 
party, Mounir sees Imane and covets her; Rachid, takes Mounir Absi to Imane’s 
room. Absi tries to force himself on her but – Imane, not understanding what is 
happening at first – ends up stabbing him with a fork and escaping. By the end of the 
film, Leila is in jail, as she called the police to rescue Imane and was imprisoned for 
prostitution, and Imane has become a baker’s apprentice, which was what she always 
wanted to do.  
While darija is predominant in the film, there are no traces of Tashelhit, the 
Berber language spoken in Taroudant and its region.604 Since the director Myriam 
Bakir was born in Morocco but raised in France, she may not be fluent in the 
language. The dominance of darija on the other hand allowed the film to achieve 
commercial success and to be broadcast on the Moroccan television station 2M. The 
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absence of Berber means that the film is not entirely authentic, while the dominance 
of darija maintains the status quo for women, as I will further elaborate.  
Agadir Bombay is the first feature, as writer and director, of the French 
Moroccan Bakir, who received 500,000 euros from the CCM and 2M for the film.605 
The significant funding indicates that, despite the film’s prostitution subject matter, 
the film was not deemed morally threatening by Moroccan state authorities – unlike 
Much Loved which did not receive any state funding. Agadir Bombay also met with 
critical and commercial success in Morocco upon its release, ranking as the 4th film 
in the first quarter of 2012 with 16,426 tickets sold, a significant number for a 
Moroccan feature.606  
 
Figure 30. Agadir Bombay’s poster (title in French and Arabic) 
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Imane is at the centre of the film and is the explicit narrator through her 
voice-over. She speaks in rural darija, which is distinct from the urban darija used in 
Casablanca, and provides authenticity to her character, who is played by a non-
professional actress from Taroudant. Imane is associated with the ‘voice of the truth’ 
as she addresses the audience and expresses her desire to leave Taroudant, where she 
feels constrained by her surroundings. She is frustrated because adults do not take 
her seriously. Imane’s narration provides a ‘frame for interpretation’ of the events 
we see her experience.607 Kozloff argues that with a first-person narration, the 
viewer assumes the narrator’s point of view and ‘embraces the character as the 
principal story teller’.608 The camera also provides Iman’s visual point of view as 
most of the film is framed from her point of view.  
Agadir Bombay references Bollywood in more than one way: its title, colour 
composition, and characterisation of the protagonists. The film’s title draws a link 
with Bollywood and juxtaposes two cities that represent Imane’s dreams: she wants 
to escape from Taroudant for Agadir; at the same time, she loves Bollywood films. 
Her walls are covered with Bollywood film stars, and she is a fan of the Indian actor 
Shah Rukh Khan. The film’s moral conclusion also parallels Bollywood films, as 
morality is safeguarded and ‘pure’ women maintain their virtue. Through Imane’s 
persona, and in the same manner that Bollywood films are ‘updated and manipulated 
to ultimately reinforce conventional gender constructions’, Agadir Bombay promotes 
a renewed commitment to the family and marriage ideals.609  
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The references to Bollywood extend to the film’s music, aesthetics and 
characters. The film’s non-diegetic music is a mixture of Moroccan rhythm and 
Indian music and the camera emphasises clean lines, clean streets and bright 
costumes which compete for domination. Imane is dressed mainly in pink, and each 
character is similarly assigned a colour: Imane’s mother is green, Imane’s sister is 
purple, and to signal that Leila is a prostitute but still aims at love, her bed has red 
sheets, she has red flowers and even her dress at the party is red. The film also over-
simplifies its characters: they are stereotypes, from the villain Rachid, to Imane the 
pure at heart, to Leila the fooled, who thought Rachid was in love with her and 
would marry while he was exploiting her. The dialogue is delivered in an over-
rehearsed manner, the effect of which is that the film resembles a television soap 
opera.  
The Moroccan journalist Youssef Ait Hammou has argued that Moroccans’ 
infatuation with Bollywood stars and dramatic narratives, and especially Bollywood 
music and choreography, has shaped a Moroccan cinematic imagination that, for a 
generation, has gradually replaced local myths and legends with Bollywood 
tropes.610 Bollywood, for Ait Hammou, has created a real counter-power in response 
to the intensive Westernization and secularisation of the imaginary in the late 
1980s.611 Furthermore, Standard Arabic – not French – is the language used for 
Bollywood films’ subtitles when these films are screened in Morocco. Moreover, 
Bollywood films are more linked, visually and linguistically, to Egyptian film 
production, with its music, dance and safeguard of morals, than to Western film. 
Imane is a fan of Bollywood and the romance and escapism it offers. Bollywood 
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films further reinforce her moral values as she longs for romantic films devoid of 
sexual representation.  
Marriage as a safeguard of morality is a recurrent theme in the film. Leila’s 
mother, Fatima, watches a Moroccan television show, in French, that features ‘les 
meilleurs moments de couples mariés’. On the television, a woman dressed in a 
traditional kaftan is shown with her husband. Fatima watches the television show 
with a misbah in her hand, her head covered as if approaching the show with moral 
caution. French, in this instance, emphasises the social and religious importance of 
marriage and is associated with moral purity.  
An opposition between honour and shame is further highlighted as scenes of 
Imane’s cousin’s wedding in Taroudant and the party in Agadir take place at the 
same time. The wedding is in a modest courtyard. Traditional music by men dressed 
in traditional costumes is played, women are gathered, also dressed in traditional 
outfits, and dance separated from the men. The bride is completely veiled and will 
only be seen by her husband. The scene is one of cultural tradition and community. 
At the house in Agadir, on the other hand, music from Egypt and the Arabic Gulf is 
played; any Moroccan songs are modern ones, in contrast to the folk music at the 
wedding. The members of the orchestra are dressed in Western suits, and scantily 
clad women mingle and dance with men who drink alcohol. In another scene, two 
prostitutes are filmed in a bedroom with a drunken client from whom they steal 
money and whose wife they rudely taunt over the phone.  
As mentioned, Standard Arabic is used to subtitle Bollywood films. As such, 
the language allows Imane and Leila to enjoy those films, and thus provide an 
opening to other cultures. Yet Standard Arabic is also linked to deceit and 




gathered for breakfast and the radio is on. On the radio, in Standard Arabic, can be 
heard news of Mounir Absi’s recovery after Imane assaulted him. The radio 
announces that Absi suffered from a mild disease, thus not revealing that he was 
stabbed at a party. The news describes Absi as a benefactor, a generous donator to 
charities; only the viewer is aware of his real identity, as neither Imane nor her 
parents know his name. Standard Arabic becomes associated with deceit, and the 
scene suggests that the official language and the media cannot be trusted as they are 
used to conceal Morocco’s political corruption. Hence, the rural Moroccan family 
remains the only place where one can feel protected or live in wilful ignorance.  
 
Sur la planche: Women on the Verge of a Social Breakdown 
Like Much Loved, Sur la planche tells the stories of four protagonists – Badia 
(Soufia Issami), Imane (Mouna Bahmad), Nawal (Nouzha Akel) and Asma (Sara 
Betiou) – from a low social class, living in Tangier. The film turns its attention to the 
dark underworld of the Tangier of globalisation, to women who are on the margins; 
Badia the protagonist, uses quick slang which empowers her and frees her from the 
prohibitions and linguistic norms of her social environment. Through language, 
Badia affirms her social existence and rejects the alienation she experiences as a 
factory worker.  
  The plot revolves around Badia and Imane who peel shrimps at a factory and 
steal from men with whom they have sexual relations. At a party, they meet Asma 
and Nawal, two textile factory workers, and the four young women decide to team 
up in robbing men they have sex with. Nawal suggests to Badia that they steal 
iPhones from the house of a local mafia boss. Badia agrees and commits the robbery 




down and to cover their tracks. Badia is splashed by the kerosene and heads to the 
bathroom to wash it off. Imane enters the bathroom to warn Badia that the house is 
on fire, but then decides to leave. Badia is arrested by the police while she is in the 
shower; meanwhile, the three other girls are shown outside the house uncaught by 
the police. The film begins with Badia’s arrest, and her voice-over recalls the events 
of the previous weeks that led to her arrest. 
 
Figure 31. Sur la planche’s poster 
Badia often speaks in monologues and mutters her words in slang darija. She 
speaks in a hastened manner that sounds at times like slam poetry. Kilani detailed 
her work with Soufia Issami (Badia) who had to carefully rehearse her text to obtain 
the effect of the quick rhythm of slam.612 Issami had to listen to rap music and 
Quranic scansion (the recitation of Quranic verses), and to replicate the rhythm of 
Moroccan storytellers. Kilani also made the decision that the protagonists would use 
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a language that is hybrid, malleable and reflective of the street language of today’s 
Morocco – a language that is curtailed, mangled and interspersed with Berber, 
French, Spanish and invented words.613  
At moments Badia’s language is even close to verlan, the French ‘back 
slang’ that involves (sometimes complex) syllable inversion and a language 
associated with ‘tough street culture’, which makes it at times according to 
sociolinguist Meredith Doran ‘socially off-limits for females’.614 Reversing Doran’s 
stance, Badia’s verlan and slang allow her to be fearless, streetwise and empowered. 
For Florence Martin and Patricia Caillé, the film explores ‘how and to whom the 
subaltern speaks in the era of global capitalism’.615 Indeed, Badia, who is the 
‘subaltern’, mainly wants to escape from her situation as a shrimp worker and to take 
advantage of consumer society to improve her social condition. For her, stealing is 
one option, among others, while language justifies her acts to herself and others. 
 
Figure 32. Badia dressed in a leather jacket. 
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Sur la planche is Kilani’s first feature film. Born in 1970 in Casablanca, she 
now lives in France. She began her career as a historian before turning to cinema, 
and she had previously directed three documentaries, each with a political bearing. 
Tanger, le rêve des brûleurs (2002) deals with illegal immigration; Zed Moultaka 
Beyrouth retrouvé (2003) portrays a Lebanese musician who reconciles Arabic 
orality with his Western lifestyle in Lebanon, and Nos lieux interdits (2008) tackles 
the ‘Lead Years’ under Hassan II. Kilani gathered one million euros of film funding, 
the largest contribution coming from the CCM, and the remainder from the French 
Fonds Sud Cinéma.616 While the budget seems sizeable for a Moroccan film, it 
mainly allowed for the construction of the shrimp factory set and on-location 
shooting in Tangier.617 The actresses are non-professionals, and the crew is mixed 
Moroccan and French. The film was widely acclaimed in festivals, selected at the 
Cannes Quinzaine des Réalisteurs in 2011, and the Dubai, Oslo and Taormina film 
festivals, but it did not win a large audience in Morocco, gathering 11,531 tickets in 
2012, a number similar to Agadir Bombay.618   
Sur la planche references film noir and its tropes; it combines a gloomy 
ambiance, flashbacks and a voice-over. Like Moknèche, Kilani chose Tangier as the 
location of the film for its connection to film noir as a city of ‘permanent tension’.619 
Kilani wrote the script with Abd-El Hafed Benotma, a French Algerian writer of noir 
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novels, who was imprisoned for bank robberies when he was younger.620 The film’s 
style is less plot-driven than a film noir, and is disjointed, with long takes, a slow 
rhythm and an emphasis on mood and subjectivity. 
Badia’s use of slang darija, combined with the film’s style and its recourse to 
nonprofessional actors, creates an impression of truthfulness and lends the film a 
‘documentary’ style. To capture the expression of the protagonists and the tension 
that runs through the film, Kilani worked with a reduced team and used a hand-held 
camera that facilitated close-ups, allowing for a visual and physical proximity with 
the protagonists. The close framing, for example, highlights the confinement of 
Badia, the dingy room where she lives and her deprived conditions as a worker. The 
camera also often tracks her in extreme close-ups and concentrates on her tense 
unsmiling face, on parts of her body and her quick gestures. The camera circles 
around Badia, which gives the impression of constant movement, and corresponds to 
the speed of her words. The film’s music composed by Wilfried Blanchard adds to 
the feel of a disjointed narrative as the music combines acoustic and electronic 
sounds and there are no songs but only sounds and beats that accompany the 
movements of the young women in the city. 
The film is also characterised by its contrast of low-light close-ups with 
starkly lit scenes, an opposition of colours that gives an impression of hyperrealism. 
The black night of Tangier is opposed to the white, neon-lit shrimp factory. The 
factory is filmed as a vast space, captured by a long shot that shows the workers all 
dressed in white – white gloves, white hats, white overalls. The long shot displays 
the mass of workers, all women in a clinical space that seems soulless, and the 
                                               





images render a stifling atmosphere with the deafening noise in the factory. The 
white factory is contrasted with the dim city of Tangier, mainly filmed in the rain 
and at night. During these nocturnal scenes, even the protagonists are 
indistinguishable. The cinematography also avoids the predictable scenes of the 
historic town and the sea, instead focusing on the underbelly of the city, on 
unfinished buildings and deprived areas.  
 
Figure 33. The shrimp factory where Badia and Imane work 
Badia wears no makeup; she sometimes dresses in a white shirt and black 
leather jacket, other times in a jellaba (traditional dress) when she goes out or to 
work. Unlike the other characters she is ‘masculinised’, to distinguish her from 
Asma and Nawal, who wear makeup and fancy clothes. Badia’s costume indicates 
that she does not play the game of feminine seduction. While Sur la planche is not a 
documentary, Badia’s language and costume, as well as the close framing, provide 
the viewer with an impression of being confined. Badia’s movements are closely 
tracked, she is filmed when she hurriedly eats, when she showers, at work, all 
elements which render the viewer familiar with Badia’s surroundings.  
Badia repeats that the only truth is her own truth. One of her ways to exist is 




burglarise; I get my due. I do not traffic; I do business. I do not prostitute myself; I 
invite myself’. She also repeats to herself and to the other three girls, ‘gad el foum 
gad edraa’ (‘as much as the mouth speaks the arm has to act’). Badia’s latter words 
indicate the importance she gives to acting upon what she says. Through these 
words, Badia tells herself and the viewer her truth. Through language she constructs 
her social persona and claims that she is entitled to a better life.  
Badia is indeed frustrated with her lot as a shrimp worker: she lies to Asma 
and Nawal when she meets them, claiming that she is a textile worker. She considers 
that textile workers belong to a more prestigious social class as these workers 
operate in the free port zone. The free port zone provides a first glimpse into Europe 
and entrance into a global economy to which Badia is denied access. She manages to 
make her way through the area, where permission and papers are needed to enter, to 
meet Asma and Nawal, to keep up the pretence that she works there. She even tells a 
taxi driver, too, that she works there and that even state officials need a passport to 
enter the free zone. Through these lies, Badia constructs an alternative reality, and 
the language she uses allows her to assert herself and convince others.  
Once Nawal and Asma have found out that she is a shrimp worker, Badia 
feels humiliated and runs away from them, crying. Visually, the textile workers 
Nawal and Asma assert their social superiority through costume, language, and 
make-up. They are feminized even through language, as Asma states in French she 
works as a ‘modéliste’, a word Imane does not understand. Badia understands the 
word but cannot reply in French, so language, along with conventional markers of 
femininity, indicates the social difference between Badia and Imane on one side and 




In one scene, at the factory, Badia repeats that she is on the edge and is ready 
to jump. Her words indicate her desire to get away from her situation and they are 
often accompanied by physical activity, such as running and jumping against a wall. 
Badia aims at remaining untouched by her condition as a shrimp worker. She packs 
her clothes in plastic containers to avoid contamination by the smell, she is closely 
filmed scrubbing her body with mint and soap and washing her face with lemon. 
Badia peels herself as if peeling shrimps, and aims at escaping from herself: she 
states, ‘one must moult’.  
While Badia is surrounded by sounds, in the factory, at the pension, and in 
the street, she remains isolated from the other workers. She even exerts control over 
Imane, her only friend, by forbidding her to mingle with the other workers in the 
factory, who have different ambitions in life. She is also disappointed that Imane 
appreciates Nawal and Asma. Badia does not trust anyone. Her family are never 
mentioned in the film. The only mother figure is the pension’s owner, a lady who 
tries to control Badia’s movements in and out of the pension, by questioning her and 
telling her she cannot go out as frequently as she wishes. Yet Badia rejects her 
intrusion and concern, shouting at her. Similarly, her boss at the factory, a man, asks 
her to become a recruiter. She rejects his authority, stating: ‘I am not a kawada [a 
pimp]’. Badia is conscious of the alienation of working in a shrimp factory; the 
workers are further dehumanised by the numbers they must wear on their white 
blouses, which become their names in the factory. 
Badia also refuses to be subjected to male authority, or to the men she 
encounters in cafes and whom she follows in their cars. These men are mere 
silhouettes, and the interaction with them is limited to sexual encounters. Badia 




make Badia conscious that she cannot sell the iPhones she stole as her clothes reveal 
her social class and indicate that she obtained the phones illegally. This is why she 
teams up with Nawal and Asma for the final stunt, as without them she cannot make 
a profit from the stolen phones. Her language and bravado find a limit since she is 
not able to sell the phones and overcome her social condition as a lower-class 
worker.  
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Butler suggests that gender identity is 
performed, and is constituted by the everyday expressions of speech, utterance, 
gestures, dress codes and representations.621 To what extent do Butler’s views apply 
to Badia when she uses darija as part of her performance? It is true that through a 
‘stylized repetition of acts’ Badia, using lewd language and slang, performs her 
identity.622 She deploys her language in very different ways to Noha (in Much 
Loved), even though they both use darija as a means to resist and overcome their 
disenfranchisement. Badia refuses to conform to stereotyped femininity and 
sexuality, and makes the language her own, composing her speech like slam poetry 
as she performs her chosen identity. Through language, Badia excludes herself from 
the group of shrimp workers and from society at large, and instead builds a fearless 
persona. Yet her performance is constrained by her social class and environment. In 
the end, she has little agency, and is caught up by her condition as a poor worker. 
Hence Butler’s account of gender performativity finds its limit within Badia’s social 
and class condition.  
Upon the release of the film in Morocco, Badia’s character was the subject of 
heated debates. Her language was perceived by the Moroccan public, upon the film’s 
                                               
621 Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity, pp. 191–193. 




premiere, as unusual as it defied gender norms imposed on women’s speech; 
according to those norms, women are to remain polite or even silent.623 Kilani 
observed that the public was divided between those who praised Badia for her use of 
expletives and brave behaviour in defying social norms and those who rejected her 
behaviour and found her unsympathetic.624 Kilani noticed that the questions of 
sexuality were not of importance to the Moroccan public because there were no clear 
scenes of nudity.625 That Badia’s language dominated the discussion around the film 
proves that gender performance through language is still problematic for a part of the 
Moroccan public. 
 
Algeria’s Men and Women: Status Quo of Gender Roles? 
 
Le Harem de Madame Osmane: The mujahida Comes Back 
Le Harem de Madame Osmane (2000) is Nadir Moknèche’s first feature. The film is 
centred on Algiers in 1992 at the beginning of the Black Decade; and Madame 
Osmane is an authoritative figure who rules over her tenants and family, mostly 
women, whom we follow on their journey. The film is conceived as a huis clos of 
women and Moknèche makes distinctive use of space by confining the protagonists 
to only a few locations within a limited area. The title of the film alludes to the space 
in which Madame Osmane controls the women of the house, the harem. The word is 
derived from Arabic hareem which means women and designates the space where 
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women and concubines live, and it is also associated with haram which means the 
space forbidden to men. 
The use of French by women in the film corresponds with greater power for 
them and freedom from both state and patriarchal power. While darija is mainly 
absent from the film, French allows Madame Osmane to assert power in her house 
but also outside the house. Shot in Tangier, the city of Algiers is nevertheless very 
much present in The Harem of Madame Osmane. The film was shot in 2000 in 
Morocco, a substitute for Algeria, for reasons associated with security concerns and 
logistics, as it was difficult to film in Algeria just after the Black Decade while 
terrorist attacks were still occurring. Due to the state of Algerian cinema in 2000, 
there were also limited material means and film professionals in Algeria. Algiers, in 
the film, is rendered via a combination of shots that capture the atmosphere and set 
the landscape of the city space as a background. Making use of natural lighting, 
Moknèche multiplies the use of close-ups to enhance the protagonists’ emotions and 
accentuates the closeness of on-screen visual space. Only one long shot by the sea 
brings a breathing space for the protagonists, who for a moment can dance and move 
freely.  
Everything revolves around Zhor Bouchama who is known and called by her 
nom de guerre: Madame Osmane, the name she chose during the Algerian war. She 
rents out parts of her house and lives with her daughter Sakina, who is twenty-five. 
Madame Osmane is played by Spanish star Carmen Maura, one of the recurrent 
actresses in Pedro Almodovar’s films. Maura stated that her memory of her mother’s 




Madame Osmane.626 Meriem (Biyouna), the maid, is middle-aged and unmarried, 
and portrayed as extravagant and obsessed with men. The tenants include Madame 
Costa, an old French woman and Kheira, a forty-year old woman who lives with her 
younger lover Sid Ali. There is also a married couple, Yasmine and Mohand and 
their young daughter Kahina. Finally, there is M. Estoriaros, a foreigner who works 
in Algiers. Through the diversity of the characters, Moknèche draws our attention to 
the composition of an Algerian society that was soon to disappear as most foreigners 
left Algeria when the era of terrorism began. Madame Osmane claims that her duty 
is to maintain the honourable reputation of the house, in the absence of the men of 
the family; her husband had left for France where he kept a French mistress; her son 
followed to escape military service.  
 While these women live under the curfew and the surveillance of Madame 
Osmane, Sakina escapes with the tenant Yasmine; they go out and vent their 
frustrations after tensions occurred during a wedding attended by all the women of 
the house. At the wedding, Madame Osmane met the mother of Sakina’s fiancé and 
cancelled the engagement because the mother was of a lower social class. Yasmine, 
a French-born Algerian, has discovered at the wedding that her husband has a second 
wife and a son. At the end of the film Sakina dies, shot at a faux barrage – a 
checkpoint established by terrorists. However, Madame Osmane believes that her 
daughter was in fact shot by the military at the checkpoint. Madame Osmane’s 
husband, who left for France, comes back to bury his daughter.  
As a mujahida, Madame Osmane does not conform to the nationally 
constructed myth of mujahidates. Historian Ryme Seferdjeli describes how the 
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mujahidates are portrayed as a ‘monolithic group in contrast to male combatants and 
reduced to the status of a single female figure who is defined almost exclusively by 
her gender and nationalist identity’.627 Madame Osmane is a bourgeois figure who 
trades on her status and privileges as a mujahida to acquire wealth. She is only 
concerned with money and property and seems to be far removed from national 
concerns.628 Her husband, a mujahid, a man she chose to marry while she was 
fighting, leaves her for France, the nation that they were fighting against – doubly 
betraying his wife and his country. He also represents the elite who were able to 
leave for France when terrorism erupted and were granted a visa, which was difficult 
at that time since France restricted access, only favouring business men and 
members of the nomenklatura.629  
Madame Osmane perceives herself as being from a relatively high social 
class and this is reflected in the way she talks about the mother of her daughter’s 
fiancé with contempt, because she is a traditional woman, in a traditional outfit, and 
has a washm – a traditional tattoo that some women used to have.630 The irony is that 
the tattoo is dismissed, both by Islamists as not complying with Islamic precepts that 
forbid any symbols (many of the tattoos are crosses), and by modernists, who view it 
as inscribed in old traditions. It cannot be said that Madame Osmane is a modernist. 
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She is a conservative figure who disapproves of inter-class marriage. She even warns 
Yasmine against returning to France where she would have a lower social status than 
in Algeria: ‘Tu vas faire quoi? Caissière?’. French, in the film, is therefore 
associated with urban upper-middle class women who use it when socialising and as 
a social marker.631 
Madame Osmane is also often framed unsmiling, arguing with her tenants 
and one of the few instances where Madame Osmane is filmed smiling and in an 
open space, under a bright sun, is when she encounters her lover Sid Ali on the 
rooftop. Sid Ali lives with Kheira, the only woman from the harem who works and 
gets out; and Madame Osmane meets him when Kheira is away. Yet Madame 
Osmane continuously harasses Kheira about her relationship with Sid Ali, asking her 
‘vous êtes mariés? Où est le livret de famille?’. On the rooftop, Sid Ali expresses his 
sexual desire and gets naked in front of Madame Osmane after she refuses the kisses 
he gives her. Yet she reins in her sexual desire, stating in French ‘Non Sid Ali, non’, 
as she is constrained by the norms she imposed upon the household. 
 
 
Figure 34. Madame Osmane and Sid Ali on the terrace 
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The final scene, discussed below, is a pertinent illustration of the relationship 
between gender, language and power. Army officers bring Sakina’s coffin to the 
house. The shot is taken from outside the house, from the location where the coffin 
is laid on the ground. The bright sun is juxtaposed with the tragic situation. One of 
the army officers asks if this is Bouchama’s house (Bouchama is Madame Osmane’s 
husband's name), and Meriem replies: ‘non, ici c’est la maison Osmane’, which 
confirms Madame Osmane’s legitimate authority over the household. The army 
officer reads the statement about Sakina’s death, as a medium long shot displays the 
characters: the inhabitants of the house are gathered on one side, standing by the 
door; Madame Osmane’s husband stands on the other side, on the road, with the 
military officials – which implies that he is on ‘their side’. This is confirmed when 
he signs the death certificate of his daughter, which validates the official version of 
Sakina’s death: that the terrorists murdered her. She dismisses this version and 
accuses her husband of cowardice, suggesting that the military have the power to re-
construct the facts to which her husband is subservient. The abovementioned scene 
contains the only medium close-up in which Moknèche privileges male presence. In 
subsequent shots, men are disregarded, relegated to a second plane, and are 
gradually removed from the frame, pushed to its margins. Madame Osmane decides 
she wants to open the coffin, but the state representatives refuse to let her; she 
threatens them with her gun, shouting in French: ‘vous êtes des bourricots’ and then 
fires her gun into the air, pushing the officers back. Her face is framed in a close-up, 
with an expression full of determination, without fear. The framing includes only 





In a close-up, after Madame Osmane opens the coffin and cries, her face 
finally seems softened; her features relax, bathed with daylight. Meriem starts 
ululating, a shout of celebration that women use for marriages, births or happy 
events. During the Algerian war, women would ululate when men were captured or 
killed; those men, mujahidin, became chahid, or martyrs, when they died, and so the 
shout was celebratory and defiant. Meriem announces, ‘We are burying a bride’. 
With this statement Meriem acknowledges that Sakina is not leaving the house as a 
single woman but as a ‘respected’ woman; implying that only marriage guarantees 
respectability for women. However, the way Sakina’s coffin is covered by the 
Algerian flag indicates that Sakina has become a chahida.  
 In this final scene Madame Osmane's use of language is certainly important 
in imposing her authority, albeit accompanied by her act of firing the gun. Moknèche 
gives her total control of the space outside the house, and she rallies her tenants to 
her side. She resurrects her mujahida past in an unexpected way: both the gun and 
the French language are left over from the colonial period, which is also the anti-
colonial period; and she uses both to liberate herself from the power of the Algerian 
authorities and from the diktat of her husband. And of course, Moknèche may be 
said to use French in the same way: the film has almost no trace of Standard Arabic 
or darija, and the film uses French as a common language that reconnects the 
present with the colonial past. 
The title of Le Harem de Madame Osmane chosen by Moknèche is ironic. It 
distorts the common definition of the word harem as a ‘space occupied by women 
and ruled by a man’.632 As illustrated in the analysis of the previous scene, 
                                               
632 Hakim Abderrezak, ‘The Modern Harem in Moknèche’s Le Harem de Mme Osmane and 




Moknèche deliberately chooses to exclude men from the women’s space. He keeps 
men at the periphery of the narrative, which has the effect of making their absence 
even more acute. Moknèche creates what Hakim Abderrezak names a ‘modern 
harem’, a ‘space not only of women but for women’.633 Such a space allows women 
to speak freely and to re-conquer the public space from which men and the state 
have excluded them.  
 
Viva Laldjérie: La Maman, la Fille et la Putain 
In my first chapter, I discussed Viva Laldjérie in relation to language and its role in 
the construction of national identity. Now, I will address how the film’s use of 
French relates to its themes of gender, sexuality and power. French, I argue, allows 
the characters to articulate sexual identities that are deemed taboo in Algeria, not 
least male homosexuality and unashamed female sexuality. The characters of Viva 
Laldjérie disrupt and challenge social norms and the film’s female protagonists are 
freed from the authority of men and fathers, and use French to assert their freedom. 
The independence of the female protagonists is reflected in their lifestyle choices: 
Goucem does not marry and is the breadwinner; her friend Fifi is a prostitute who 
chooses her clients; and her mother Papicha chooses to work in a cabaret, to sing and 
dance.  
Goucem and Papicha have moved from the outskirts to the centre of Algiers. 
Their economic situation reflects what Cynthia Cockburn describes as the changing 
role of women after traumatic events.634 The situation for Algerian women had 
altered after a decade of terror: they had been attacked by terrorists and some were 
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forced to wear the veil; they had experienced limits to their freedom of movement, 
with a curfew imposed in and around Algiers. Nonetheless, women played an 
important role in providing income – even if informally – for the house.  
 Goucem appears to have no other ambition than to fulfil her sexual desires 
and to entertain herself in nightclubs. In one of the first scenes of the film, Dr Sassi, 
Goucem’s lover, and Goucem are engaged in sexual intercourse, and a medium-shot 
highlights and insists on her nudity for a few seconds. After she leaves Dr Sassi’s 
work place, Goucem goes to a night club in the suburbs of Algiers. There, wearing a 
short dress, she seduces a young man, and the two of them have sex in a disused 
toilet block. The scene is filmed from above, with two male strangers gazing at her. 
Goucem defiantly stares back at them, as if she were confronting the viewer and 
affirming her sexual freedom. Ulloa observes that the film was often understood to 
be a documentary rather than a fiction and reports how Algerian viewers were 
shocked by Goucem’s nudity and sex scenes.635 
Although Azabal, who plays Goucem, is not Algerian, her character was 
interpreted by some critics and sections of the Algerian public (see Chapter 2) to 
represent all Algerian women, and by extension Algeria itself. This asks a lot of one 
character: French female characters are rarely forced to take on such 
responsibilities.636 At the same time, there is no evidence that the Algerian public 
criticised Dr Sassi’s adulterous behaviour, even though adultery in Algeria is 
punishable by law as contrary to Islamic precepts.637  
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The Algerian attitude towards adultery relates to the association between 
women’s dishonour and national honour. Joanne Nigel argues that masculinity and 
nationalism are interlinked, and permeate patriarchal societies.638 Nationalists, in 
Nigel’s view, see themselves as defending both the family and the nation, and 
believe that ‘women’s shame is the family’s shame, the nation’s shame, the man’s 
shame’.639 The reception of Viva Laldjérie in Algeria clearly demonstrates the 
interconnectedness of nationalism, masculinity and the control of women’s 
sexuality. Pinar Ilkkaracan argues that the nationalist ‘construction of an “Islamic” 
sexual identity of women [is] at the top of [the nationalist] agenda and this control of 
women’s sexuality is a means of safeguarding patriarchy’.640 
When Goucem is in the nightclub, Sofiane, a young man who often visits 
Goucem’s shop, is seen sitting outside. The club is in the poor suburbs of Algiers 
and reflects the emergence of a nouveau riche class in Algeria. It is surrounded by 
mud in the middle of unfinished buildings and by luxurious cars. Shot from above, 
Sofiane is overlooked by two other young men, more smartly dressed than him, who 
tease him in French, asking him if he goes to the ‘parc zabologique,’ alluding to 
places of illicit sexual encounter, particularly for gay men. Zabologique is the 
association of a word in Arabic, zab, for penis with the word zoologique, the zoo, a 
place in Algiers where couples meet illicitly. Sofiane’s French is inferior to theirs 
and he does not reply. This is the only scene when a joke is made in darija, which 
the men do in a knowing and ironic way that demonstrates their Francophone 
separation from lower-class language and humour. The two young men offer to get 
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Sofiane into the club, as he is poorly dressed which indicates his lower social class to 
them. A class dynamic is established through the pair’s dominance of the frame, 
while Sofiane, remains at the edge of the frame.  
Sofiane has been seen earlier in the film, as he lives in Goucem’s 
neighborhood. She had already encountered and ignored him. Sofiane seems to be a 
hittiste: a term derived from the Arabic word hit, which means wall; the ‘iste’ is a 
French suffix which makes hittiste a hybrid noun or adjective. Hittiste therefore 
designates young men, usually unemployed, who linger in public, against a wall, all 
day as there is nothing for them to do. Sofiane’s ambition is to obtain his passport 
and a visa to go abroad and leave Algeria. Austin remarks that the street is the space 
occupied by the young population born after independence – traditionally a 
masculine space, but not always a powerful one.641  
Sofiane often goes to visit the shop where Goucem works, asking if his 
passport photographs are ready. On his visit after their encounter at the nightclub, 
Sofiane asks if his photos are ready. Goucem replies, ‘Elles seront prêtes quand tu 
seras fixé sur le sexe que tu préfères’. French is, in this scene, the empowering 
language that allows Goucem to openly mock Sofiane’s sexuality. Sofiane embodies 
the sexual ambivalence and the hopeless situation of Algerian young men: desperate 
to openly live their sexuality, already enduring many other frustrations, they have 
turned to same-sex relations because relations with women are more difficult to 
achieve. In Algeria, however, few men are openly homosexual: homosexuality and 
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adultery are both considered sins in Islam, which accords hegemonic status to 
heterosexuality within marriage.642  
 Viva Laldjérie illustrates that language allows Goucem to live her sexuality, 
and allows for same-sex relations, however social norms constrain sexuality. She is 
pressured by her mother to get married, to whom she replies, ‘qui voudra d’une fille 
de 27 ans, pas vierge qui a eu trois avortements’. Goucem is aware of the social 
stigma surrounding sexually liberated women. Same-sex relations are only discussed 
in French by upper classes, while the issue would be expressed in darija by the 
lower classes, and Sofiane is left powerless to act upon it. Hence while French 
cannot entirely overcome taboos, it brings them into focus.  
 
Délice Paloma: Dreams Are Not for Every Woman 
Délice Paloma is Nadir Moknèche’s third film and the final one of his Algerian 
trilogy. Once again, Moknèche uses the actresses Biyouna and Nadia Kaci, as well 
as Algiers as the film’s location and French as main language. Biyouna plays 
Madame Aldjéria, who is released from prison at the start of the film, which then 
documents the events that led to her arrest. The film – not least through the 
suggestive name of its protagonist – critiques Algerian social and gender relations 
and illustrates how women are prevented from accessing power. French presents 
itself, in the film, as offering opportunities for social advancement. For example, to 
Madame Aldjéria, French becomes a tool for negotiating strategies to gain power. 
However, her pursuit of social prestige and wealth is hampered by enduring 
patriarchal values and state power. While some of the female characters in the film 
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freely experience their sexuality, they do so to service and seduce men. French only 
perpetuates gender roles and assigns fixed roles to women. 
Moknèche locates Délice Paloma in Algiers, in 2006, and – by way of 
flashbacks and Madame Aldjéria’s voice-over which draws the viewer into her 
unique perspective – he uses tropes strongly associated with film noir to reconstruct 
the story. Andrew Spicer argues that film noir of the 1950s held a ‘dark mirror to 
post-war America and reflected its moral anarchy or social malaise’.643 Though 
Délice Paloma is not straightforwardly a film noir, it reflects on the malfunction of 
Algerian society and the malaise of its population. The film is sun-drenched, but its 
story is dark: it addresses the corruption that pervades every level of society and 
scrutinizes how women survive in Algeria’s newly liberalized economy.  
 
Figure 35. Délice Paloma’s poster 
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 The plot revolves around Madame Aldjéria, who has an office in central 
Algiers and is surrounded by a close clan, composed mainly of women: her deaf-
mute sister Mina (Fadila Ouabdesslam); her accomplice Scheherazade (Nadia Kaci); 
her son Riyadh (the Swedish actor Daniel Lundh); the shady lawyer Maître Jaafar 
(actor and director Lyes Salem); and a newcomer, Paloma (French-Italian actress 
Aylin Parandi). Madame Aldjéria helps people to resolve their issues: she helps 
women to get divorced by getting one of her ‘girls’ to seduce men and trap them into 
adultery so they can be forced to divorce. She also helps business-owners to get rid 
of their competition as she corrupts health services who inspect a café and close it 
for breaking hygiene rules. Each character has aspirations, Riyadh wants to leave for 
Italy to find his Italian father whom he does not known, Scheherazade wants to retire 
from work and get married, yet Madame Aldjéria’s dream overshadows them all: she 
wants to begin a new life as owner of the ‘Thermal Baths of Caracalla’, which she 
has desired since a young age. Madame Aldjéria wants to buy and restore the baths, 
though she will fail. Her shady business is revealed and she is sentenced to three 
years in prison.  
Délice Paloma obtained the avance sur recettes from the CNC and support 
for post-production from the French German television Arte, and gathered 6 million 
euros, a medium budget for a French film but a significant amount for an Algerian 
feature.644 Délice Paloma was released in France to one hundred cinemas and 
attracted over 100,000 viewers, half as many as Viva Laldjérie.645 The film’s 
application for a visa for distribution in Algeria was never answered – a subtle form 
of censorship – although it had received Algerian funding as part of the 2007 cultural 
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event ‘Alger capitale de la culture Arabe’.646 Unlike Viva Laldjérie, the use of 
French in the film did not raise any heated debate in the Algerian press. While Viva 
Laldjérie was censored for its nudity, that Délice Paloma was banned outright 
suggests that the Algerian authorities are more unsettled by investigations into their 
corruption than by supposed moral transgression.  
In the film’s opening scene Madame Aldjéria is introduced framed in a long 
tracking shot while she walks through a prison, accompanied by a policewoman who 
firmly grips her upper arm. In the next scene, she is in another policewoman’s office. 
As she returns Madame Aldjéria’s possessions, the policewoman states in darija, ‘I 
hope you enjoyed your time in prison’, and continues in French re-counting Madame 
Aldjéria’s possessions (a brush, jewellery and makeup). While Madame Aldjéria is 
dressed in sportswear, emblazoned with the Algerian flag, with her long hair split 
into two greying braids, the policewoman is in uniform, sat in front of the Algerian 
flag, symbolising her authority. The scene reveals Madame Aldjéria’s situation: she 
is demeaned, powerless and made to remain silent. It is one of the few occurrences 
where darija is used in the film, thus associating the language with state power and 
authority.  
The prison scene inverts a later scene when Madame Aldjéria is sat, dealing 
with her clients, occupying a position of power. Her financial successes are 
illustrated in her office, which is located on a terrace overlooking Algiers and a 
close-up of her jewellery and expensive clothes, as well as the money she counts. 
Madame Aldjéria’s office is prestigious and its details have been chosen carefully: a 
large desk, filing cabinets and an imposing leather chair. Algiers is often seen in 
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Délice Paloma, either from above and afar, or from closer quarters, with tight 
framing of its streets and buildings, under a bright light. The images render Algiers 
as a busy city, marking that Algeria has entered a new era after years of terrorism.  
 
Figure 36. Madame Aldjéria at her desk. 
One of Madame Aldjéria’s clients, Madame Bellil, aims to get a divorce and 
full ownership of the cinema, L’Alhambra, that she and her husband own. She had 
approached Madame Aldjéria to help her trap her husband with one of Madame 
Aldjéria’s girls, to which aim she uses Paloma, a newcomer to Madame Aldjéria’s 
clan. Paloma is young, lives in the outskirts of Algiers, and has accepted to work for 
Madame Aldjéria to financially help her family. She is recruited as a belly dancer at 
Mr Bellil’s cinema, to seduce him as well as dance in front of viewers before a film 
screening.  
When Paloma dances before the screening, her body and movements are 
captured alternatively from high angle, indicating the gaze of Mr Bellil who is 
overlooking the scene, and from the audience’s perspective in the theatre from eye 
level. The alternation of these long shots and the gazes transmit Mr Belli’s joy at 
seeing Paloma dancing and his awakening desire. Paloma further seduces Mr Bellil 
as she discusses with him, in French, her passion for belly dancing and Egyptian 




a hotel room, where a photographer and Maître Jaafar erupt into the room and accuse 
him of adultery. Paloma is different from Madame Aldjéria’s other female recruits as 
she refuses to have sexual intercourse with the clients, and hence relies on her body 
and language to seduce men. Madame Aldjéria, eventually, is the only one who 
affirms her sexuality, and she does so in French when she directly addresses the 
camera. Framed in a close-up, she reveals that she met Riadh’s father, an Italian 
man, on a beach, and have not seen him since. By directly addressing the viewer, she 
brandishes her sexual freedom and refuses to be judged, stating: ‘Et alors, il y a un 
problème?’. 
While Madame Aldjéria freely expresses her sexuality, her son Riyadh, is 
restricted by his mother. As mentioned earlier, he wants to go to Italy to find his 
father by any means. He grew up with Madame Aldjéria as a single mother. Riyadh 
nurtures many caged birds on the terrace of Madame Aldjéria’s apartment. He does 
not set them free, mirroring his mother’s behaviour: she prevents him from going to 
Italy, repeating to him in French, ‘Je ne veux pas que tu me quittes, je ne veux pas’. 
It is not so much a father figure that Riyadh wants; rather, he wants a family lineage. 
That his mother wants to own the Thermal Baths of Caracalla, named after the 
Roman emperor, gives added significance to the possibility of an Italian patrilineage 
for Riyadh, especially as he wants to leave his mother who, by her name, is 
allegorically bound to Algeria.  
While French is used most in the film, darija is the language associated with 
the Miami, a rai cabaret where Madame Aldjéria enjoys relaxing and where men and 
women gather to drink alcohol and dance. Via the cabaret, the film explores the 
relations between men and women, specifically in terms of how masculinity is 




but their attendance is harmful for their reputations. In the Miami club, Madame 
Aldjéria introduces Rafik as the maître de cérémonie. In fact, Rafik is a barrah, a 
public announcer who arranges dedications to songs requested by cabaret guests. 
The cabaret scene is filmed like a documentary and was inspired by Moknèche’s 
visits to cabarets in Algeria.647 The actor Cheb Rafik is an actual rai singer, and he 
uses darija to harangue guests without taboos in a playful way. Cheb Rafik is 
dressed in tight jeans and T-shirt, wearing makeup and jewellery which signal his 
queerness and associate him with Cheb Abdou, a real-life rai singer, known for his 
feminine outfits.  
 
Figure 37. Madame Aldjéria and Paloma at the cabaret. 
The guests compete, offering higher and higher payments, to have a song 
dedicated to themselves, their friends or their lovers, or against someone of their 
choosing. The barrah is integrated into the economic circuit of a party, to encourage 
the collection of money. The main bidding game in rai cabarets is called kuntra, 
which derives from the French word ‘contre’ as many songs will be dedicated contre 
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some of the men who are present.648 In one scene, Baya, a former employee of 
Madame Aldjéria, encourages one of her clients to bid against her. Baya is dressed in 
tight clothes, entertaining her clients and drinking. In return, Madame Aldjéria takes 
the money from a client, with his permission – women usually do not bid with their 
own money in the cabaret and use men’s money to do so – and shouts, ‘Contre 
contre Baya jusqu’au bout de la nuit’.  
The anthropologist Marc Schade-Poulsen argues that social relations in 
cabarets depend more on money than on social position.649 In fact, Schade-Poulsen 
highlights, the barrah makes money from emotion.650 The high amounts of money 
involved – Madame Aldjéria bids with millions of dinars (10,000 euros) – indicate 
also the emergence of a ‘nouveau riche’ class, which exhibits its fortune in cabarets. 
The men in the cabaret demonstrate what Sadiqi describes as traditional masculinity, 
which ‘serves to uphold patriarchal codes by requiring that males adopt dominant 
and aggressive behaviours and function in the public sphere’.651 Cheb Rafik’s songs, 
praising men and objectifying women, further reinforce masculinity and patriarchal 
values. 
At the same time, because women do not spend their own money – they are 
only the objects of the bids, objects of desire – seduction is important to bring in 
money for these women. Mernissi argues that in Muslim countries where seclusion 
and veiling are prevalent, seduction becomes a ‘structural component of human 
relations’ and a means of communication.652 Rafik’s songs name the goods which 
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women trap men into buying – refrigerators, cars, jewellery – and, as a result, the 
songs depict women as materialistic and scheming. Some songs composed do praise 
women, but only their beauty and body. On the night shown in the film, Rafik 
composes the song ‘Je pense à toi Paloma’ to honour Paloma’s beauty and body. 
Masculinity is constructed, Pedro Saez suggests, through socialization, 
whereby cultural norms and expectations are interiorized by boys through interaction 
with their peers, their families and society.653 The men in the cabaret demonstrate 
traditional masculinity; though Riyadh conforms to the demands of patriarchal 
society in his desire for a father, he is not himself an image of traditional masculinity 
as described by Saez above.654 When at the cabaret, Riyadh does not mix with the 
other men, and is framed sitting with is mother and the other women in the cabaret 
hence visually included in Madame Aldjéria’s circle of women. Riyadh does not 
work, beyond acting as bodyguard and chauffeur to his mother and her ‘girls’, who 
are active publicly and professionally.  
Andrea Khalil argues that, post-independence, ‘Algerian masculinity is 
presented through mythic images, produced by ideological discourses’.655 At 21, 
Riyadh is of a later generation to the one described by Khalil, one that witnessed the 
civil war and has neither myths nor illusions about its future in Algeria. Riyadh is 
also in love with Paloma and in an earlier scene, when they meet for the first time, a 
long shot introduces Paloma while she walks towards him as if she were dancing, 
while non-diegetic Egyptian music is heard. The camera focuses on Paloma’s body 
and movements as she dances in a sensual manner. Riyadh is unable to express his 
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love, and language does little to help him, which relates to his non-traditional 
masculinity. 
Apart from Mina, Madame Aldjéria’s deaf-mute sister, and Riyadh, all the 
members of the clan adopt new names to create new personas for themselves when 
they start working for Madame Aldjéria. In a flashback, she recounts how she met 
Scheherazade during the era of terrorism. Scheherazade was then dressed in rags and 
a headscarf. She appears to be homeless and possibly engaged in prostitution, and 
she screams at men who are trying to gain sexual favours from her, in darija. As 
they chat, Scheherazade reveals that her real name is Zouina, which means 
‘charming’ in Arabic. Her nickname, Scheherazade – after the character from 1001 
Arabian Nights – was chosen by Mme Aldjéria to evoke fantasies in men. 
Scheherazade is one of the few protagonists in the film to use darija, which 
reconnects her to her past but also reflects her lower social class. Yet under Madame 
Aldjéria’s influence, Scheherazade is transformed: she wears finer clothes and make-
up and begins to use French.   
At the beginning of the film – though before Madame Aldjéria begins the 
story of why she was imprisoned – she meets Scheherazade outside the prison after 
she has just been released. Scheherazade is veiled and married, to a bearded man, 
and has children. Her veil contrast with her wildness, exposed later in the film, and it 
seems to serve as a redemption for her wayward youth. The veil symbolises her 
repentance, whereas when women wore the veil in Moknèche’s earlier films, they 
did so as a disguise to go out (like Goucem, in Viva Laldjérie, going to a night club). 
Madame Aldjéria does not believe that Scheherazade has changed, and expresses her 
doubts, to which she replies: ‘Tout va bien, j’ai un bon mari, un bel appartement, de 




the veil and has married after Madame Aldjéria’s fall and arrest is symbolic of her 
return to patriarchal values. Scheherazade, once more Zouina, will give birth to 
twins with Bilal, her husband, thus creating the only family in the film, and 
suggesting a fatalistic return to the cycle of a religious and patriarchal authority.  
Before she goes to prison, Madame Aldjéria’s dream to revive and renovate 
the baths of Caracalla is about to be realized when she meets M. Benbaba, a former 
minister of Human Rights and National Solidarity and now President of the 
commission responsible for the redistribution of state-owned tourist attractions to 
private individuals. She pays him a bribe, which he uses to organize a méchoui, a 
roasted lamb banquet. The scene opens under a bright sun, with M. Benbaba and his 
friends gathered, alongside well-dressed upper-class women and Madame Aldjéria 
and her clan. All the guests mingle, chatting in French and laughing, and as the 
afternoon progresses and the invitees drink wine and eat lamb, M. Benbaba stands 
among his guests, singing Cheb Rafik’s song ‘Je pense à toi Paloma’. To explain 
why he knows a song from the lower-class environment of the cabaret, Benbaba tells 
Madame Aldjéria that he believes that he must always be close to the people – never 
cut off from the street. This clearly marks darija as the language of the lower 
classes, in contrast to the French used by the upper-class guests.  
During the lunch everyone eats the meat, apart from Paloma. Panning shots 
and close-ups of the state officials greedily stuffing their mouths serves as an 
allegory for Algeria’s political situation. Corruption has infiltrated the highest strata 
of state power, as represented by M. Benbaba. Later, he reveals that he knows about 
Madame Aldjéria’s unlawful activities and he wants a cut of her profits because, he 
claims, he is taking a risk in selling a state property to a mafieuse.  Madame Aldjéria 




whom – for all her own corruption – she remains subordinate due to her gender and 
class. At the banquet, M. Benbaba asks Madame Aldjéria to let Riyadh spend the 
weekend with his wife, who fancies him. Maître Jaafar tries to convince her to go 
along with the plan: his logic is that she has been so unscrupulous so far, she can 
sacrifice her son. Riyadh, however, cannot be found. He may have escaped with 
Paloma by boat. Soon, the police raid the banquet. Madame Aldjéria’s illegal 
dealings are revealed and she is taken to prison. She is punished for aspiring to 
something above her station. Speaking the same language as M. Benbaba did not 
help her.   
As a bittersweet comedy, Délice Paloma explores themes of domination, 
oppression and confinement, all in relation to gender. Even if the outcome is rather 
ominous, Délice Paloma presents female characters who are ready to do anything to 
compete on the same level as men. Madame Aldjéria’s project is to return to the 
source, to the fountain of youth that will cleanse and rejuvenate her, and her failure 
represents the difficulties that Algeria faces in starting afresh. Like young people, 
women are excluded from power and political influence, and language is of no help 
– only those with money can be heard.  
 
Les Terrasses: All Equally Desperate 
Les Terrasses is Merzak Allouache’s thirteenth feature film, from a prolific decade 
that involved a new film every two years. Les Terrasses is spread across five 
rooftops, in five emblematic districts of Algiers: Bab El Oued, the Casbah, Telemly, 
El Hamma (also known as Belcourt, a name inherited from French colonial 
presence), and Bologhine (also known as Notre-Dame d’Afrique). The film takes 




stories on these rooftops are disconnected from one another, their juxtaposition 
offering a microcosm of Algerian society.  
Allouache manipulates the rooftop spaces to include men and women in a 
domestic space usually reserved for women. Indeed, unlike his previous films, Bab 
El Oued City (1994) and Omar Gatlato (1977), in which the rooftops were spaces 
where women gathered to chat and do laundry, the rooftops in Les Terrasses become 
living spaces in El Hamma, spaces for music in Telemly, religious shrines and 
wedding venues in Bab El Oued, religious spaces in the Casbah, and places for 
torture in Bologhine. Allouache deliberately chooses the rooftops as spaces that are 
neither public nor private, but somewhere in-between that allows the scenes to be 
filmed like a huis clos, yet open to outside eyes, and not behind closed doors. 
Allouache does not offer much opportunity to locate his film historically, as if to 
suggest that the events he describes are ongoing in Algeria. The only temporal hint is 
the visit of French President François Hollande, which locates the film after 2012 






Figure 38. Les Terrasses’s poster 
The film mainly uses Algiers’s darija, with its accent, interspersed with 
French, Berber and Standard Arabic. By collapsing the boundaries of public and 
private space, and the spatial boundaries between men and women, as well as using 
everyday language, Allouache achieves a realistic effect that shows that there is no 
consignment of language to a particular space or gender. The use by men and 
women of essentially the same language – and, furthermore, darija – indicates a 
shifting power dynamic: women are seen to have the same power to speak as men 
and to appropriate the space offered to them. Les Terrasses also investigates gender 
inequalities that cannot be overcome by language due to the persistence of 
patriarchal values.  
Les Terrasses was shot within eleven days, due to the scarcity of funding and 




asked the actors to speak in a naturalistic way and gave little direction regarding 
dialogue to achieve a spontaneous language. It was difficult for Allouache to obtain 
authorization from the buildings’ inhabitants; therefore, scenes were filmed 
hurriedly, and the unrehearsed dialogue adds to the naturalistic effect – even though 
the Algerian journalist Fayçal Métaoui considered many of the film’s lines to be 
clichéd.656 However, I would argue that naturalistic language can be clichéd and use 
common expressions, and Métatoui’s view only expresses his ambivalence towards 
the expectations of how the characters should speak in an Algerian film. Even if the 
characters use clichéd language, they still convey Allouache’s authorial intention to 
bring to the forefront some of the cultural and political issues that the characters 
experience. 
With a reduced team and a handheld camera, the film’s use of shot-reverse-
shot retains the beauty of the Bay of Algiers in the background, filmed in long shots, 
while the foreground increasingly tightens on the characters, their expressions and 
multiple close-ups. The beauty of the city, of the sea, seen from the rooftops, is 
contrasted with the protagonists’ destinies. The city is seen from afar, so that the 
streets are difficult to identify, and street sounds are lost to the wind. Non-diegetic 
music is absent from the film, which adds to the feeling of realism and the 
remorseless plight of the protagonists. The terraces offer views of Algiers but also of 
buildings in decline, of dirt and cracked paint. Furthermore, the use of darija brings 
the Algerian viewer closer to the characters. These elements were considered by 
some Algerian journalists to present a negative image of Algeria, which for them 
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was part of Allouache’s effort to please foreign audiences by showing only Algeria’s 
problems.657   
The film also enquires into subjects deemed taboo in Algerian society, such 
as same-sex love between women, female sexual dissatisfaction, and, with the 
character of a raped woman, the consequences of the Black Decade. One such issue 
relating to gender is the contradictory position of women in Algerian society, 
represented by the juxtaposition of the characters of Assia (Adila Bendimerad) and 
Neila (Meriem Medjkane). While Assia is the lead singer, dressed in jeans, unveiled 
and mixing with male singers, Neila dresses in a traditional dress, veiling her head 
with a turban. She is filmed in the daylight, in the distance, as she spreads a carpet, 
signalling the domestic life she leads, forming a contrast with Assia, who starts 
rehearsing with her band. Assia is part of an all-male Gnawa fusion group that 
performs Algeria’s southern music mixed with modern sounds; she sings and plays 
the guembri, a traditional single gut-string lute.  
Assia is filmed that morning hurriedly kissing her boyfriend in the corner of 
the terrace where they rehearse, shielded from the gaze of the other men of the band. 
She is also the strong-headed leader of the band, who expresses her refusal to play at 
a venue sponsored by a commercial event because she wants to be recognised as an 
artist. She is willing to disagree with the other, male, members of the group. She 
freely says, in French, ‘Je suis une artiste’. The use of French signifies her middle-
class urban status, and she mixes it with darija to openly criticise the men of the 
group who want to play for money. Her use of language displays her confidence and 
self-assertion. 
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Figure 39. Assia and the music band 
Neila, on the other hand, is silent. She is only filmed from afar, in long shots 
when she stands on the opposite rooftop, at a distance from Assia. She gazes and 
listens to the band as they rehearse, which exasperates Assia who considers Neila’s 
gaze as intrusive. Assia tells the others that Neila sends her love poetry in Arabic 
(stating in darija ‘chiir bel arrabiya’, ‘poetry in Arabic’) and text messages, belittling 
and mocking these acts. One of the men hints in French that Neila is ‘lesbienne’, to 
which Assia replies that Neila might not even be aware of the word. These 
comments indicate the differences in social status between the women. Neila’s 
domesticity and even subservience to patriarchal values are further established when 
a male relative erupts on the rooftop and orders her to stop staring at the band and 
hits her, forcing her to go inside. This shakes Assia, who screams and orders the men 
of the band to help Neila. Yet while the men agree that it is unfair, they are unwilling 
to go and help, apparently not wanting to disturb the social order. Assia is conscious 
of the limitation of her role in this scene, since her only recourse is to scream. 
Language is unable to transcend the situation of these two women. The man on the 





Figure 40. Neila seen from Assia’s rooftop 
Neila and Assia never openly speak to one another. Later that same day, 
however, Assia is filmed whispering to Neila; the scene is shot from Assia’s point of 
view, and Neila messages Assia. The text message, written in Latin letters, states in 
darija that she has something to show to Assia in the evening. Neila’s use of the text 
message is her way of breaking the silence to which she is confined, and her use of 
darija indicates the familiarity she has now established with Assia (as well as how 
darija can also be a written language used to communicate intimate feelings). Later, 
Neila reappears on the rooftop, her hair is released, and she is dressed in a traditional 
white dress. A silent intimacy is established between Neila and Assia, with the 
camera focussing on Assia’s face as she mimes and whispers, in darija, that she 
finds Neila beautiful and that she loves her. Neila’s reaction is not filmed, only her 
feet approaching the edge of the rooftop before she jumps.  
By committing suicide, and appearing with her hair loosened, Neila reclaims 
her body and her sexuality. While suicide represents, on one level, the loss of 
agency, Neila rebels in this way against the man who oppressed her and controlled 
her body in the previous scene. Neila’s action also displays that she no longer 




messages, Neila’s actions are only seen through Assia’s point of view. Secrecy was 
Neila’s only means to reach Assia, prevented by her male guardian and by Algerian 
society at large from speaking openly. Evelyne Accad argues that in Arab-Islamic 
societies silence presides over three main areas: the female body, women’s personal 
relationships, and sexual identity.658 In the case of Neila, the three areas are 
connected: she is unable to dress as she wishes, to fully live her sexuality, and to 
have a more fulfilling relationship with Assia. Neila’s suicide underscores her 
desperation; her silence marks her powerlessness and the impossibility of openly 
expressing her love.  
The inability to fully live one’s sexuality is also tackled on another rooftop in 
Bab El Oued, a popular area. Fatiha, wearing a black niqab – a full veil that reveals 
only the eyes – is introduced as she has come to seek the help of the cheikh, a 
religious old man. The cheikh rents a small room from a drunken man who manages 
the rooftop. Upon entering the dimly lit room, the cheikh asks Fatiha to remove her 
niqab, and observes how she changed the colour of her hair, even adding that he 
prefers a darker colour. Asking Fatiha what brings her to him, Fatiha reveals in 
darija that when her husband approaches her she does not feel anything. The cheikh 
replies, ‘what do you mean?’ Fatiha is too embarrassed to reply and only repeats ‘I 
do not feel anything’. The cheikh says to Fatiha that there is an evil between her and 
her husband, the djinn lahmar (the red evil), and he needs to remove it from her. The 
cheikh then starts beating up the young woman to extract the evil from her.  
The scene is filmed in a dark interior, from the perspective of the man on the 
terrace who looks through a hole in the door, which aligns the viewer with the 
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voyeuristic gaze of this man. The man’s peeping is obstructed by the cheikh as he 
moves around, and the character’s frustration is transmitted to the viewer thus 
establishing a direct connection. As she is beaten by the cheikh, Fatiha screams. The 
cheikh is presented as a religious man whose religious authority relies partly on his 
situation as a hajj (that is, he has made the pilgrimage to Mecca), and his traditional 
dress. An earlier scene shows him glancing at the images of naked women hanging 
in the room he rents, as if to confirm his dubious religious status. The belief that 
there is an evil that prevents Fatiha from sexual pleasure assumes that male sexuality 
is active and incorruptible: it suffers no repudiation, disapproval or public 
condemnation, though the woman’s sexual dissatisfaction is seen as the sign of evil, 
and it is only through the beating of her body that it can be countered.  
Though Fatiha accepts the cheikh’s command to remove her niqab, she has 
previously shouted at the drunken man who manages the terrace when he looks at 
her. Fatiha is perfectly capable of speaking and defending herself, yet she is 
subservient to the cheikh’s authority, and she believes him. The cheikh does not need 
to use Standard Arabic or citations of the Quran: his religious status, his masculinity 
and the woman’s belief in his powers are what lead the woman to accept her beating. 
While Fatiha is being beaten up, again Allouache contrasts her situation with that of 
other women present on the same rooftop who are dressed in interior clothes, 
signalling how the rooftop belongs to the domestic sphere and not the outside world, 
a space where they can smoke freely and joke. The women assert their right to the 
space and insult in darija the drunken man in charge of the rooftop.  
The figure of the cheikh is also differentiated from the religious cleric who is 
filmed on the Casbah rooftop. The religious cleric leads the prayer then sits and 




young Tanzanian boy, who learnt the Quran and was called a cheikh. While the 
preacher is filmed, the other men remain silent. The women are kept aside looking at 
him; they are veiled and filmed behind a fenced window. No space is offered to them 
either visually or physically. They are kept at distance. The preacher praises 
Muammar El Gaddafi, describing him as a martyr – chahid. The scene reminds the 
viewer of the ongoing influence of political Islam in Algeria, and of the power of 
religious men who master Standard Arabic and the space offered to them. It also 
displays how historical facts can be twisted, such that Gaddafi becomes a hero. The 
scene is also reminiscent of the ideological capital still made by the Algerian 
government from the war of independence with the use of the chahid status. A 
ministry of chouhada (plural of chahid) has been created since independence and the 
status of the Algerian chahid is upheld in sacredness in Algerian political discourse. 
Although Allouache’s film is not directly about female sexuality, he does 
strive to make visible the consequences and the trauma inflicted on raped women. 
He chooses the character of Aïcha (actress Amel Kateb), a middle-aged woman who 
lives with her aunt and her son, Krimo, on a rooftop in Belcourt. Aïcha roams the 
rooftop, dressed in rags, her hair unleashed, and she smokes or sits staring at the sea. 
She has a deranged expression, she dresses eccentrically, and hardly speaks; we 
learn, as her aunt speaks about her, that her silence is linked to the trauma she has 
endured. As in Rachida (discussed in Chapter two), the traumatized woman is 
pushed to the margins; her links to others are severed since it is implied that her 
father does not accept her. Furthermore, her adolescent son, Krimo, born from the 
rape of his mother, is a drug addict.  
The rape of Algerian women during the Black Decade has largely been kept 




Aïcha, a space is offered to her, to be viewed and heard. Yet she is not accepted by 
her family, which reflects the ambivalent response to the trauma she lives. While she 
has welcomed her niece to live with her, Aïcha’s aunt continuously tells her that she 
is not a proper mother and that Krimo, Aïcha’s illegitimate son, will never become a 
man. Aïcha’s aunt has lived on the rooftop for decades since she lost her home. She 
has built up a small room where she, her niece and Krimo live. Aïcha’s rage and 
despair are vented when her son is attacked by the landlord who comes onto the 
rooftop to evict the family. The landlord speaks very aggressively to Aïcha’s aunt to 
remind her of the hierarchy and their social status. Krimo then gets out of the room, 
a small shack built on the roof, and attacks the landlord, who in turn starts strangling 
him. Aïcha grabs a pressure cooker and beats him to death. She remains silent, but 
her repossession of the space and the murder she commits proves that the passive 
woman has some powers of resistance and does not accept the fate inflicted upon 
her. 
Throughout the film, diegetic music in the form of Assia’s singing or chaabi 
music, at a wedding, can be heard. Allouache wrote Assia’s song: its lyrics, about a 
lack of love between people, reflect the hatred between Algerians due to jealousy, 
betrayal or treachery. The song conveys the final message of the film – that 
Algeria’s social and political situation is dire and, furthermore, its gender issues will 
not be resolved any time soon. Les Terrasses portrays a desperate situation for men 
and women alike. The film expresses this bleak verdict through all the languages 
available to it, as well as through silence. Although not all the women in the film are 
subordinated and subservient, neither men nor women have found a satisfactory 









This chapter set out to investigate the interplay between language, gender, sexuality, 
and power in a selection of films in relation to the Algerian and Moroccan social 
contexts. Another concern was to examine the extent to which the films under 
analysis confirm or challenge sociolinguistic theories around gender, language and 
power – specifically, whether a particular language (French, darija or Standard 
Arabic) can allow the characters to transcend gender stereotypes and be empowered. 
Through the films analysed, it is noticeable that in contrast to Sadiqi’s affirmation 
that darija is the maternal language confined to the private sphere, some of the films 
analysed bring darija to the forefront and valorise it as a language used equally by 
men and women domestically and in the public sphere.  
Darija is indeed no longer a marginalised language within Moroccan or 
Algerian society. Instead, it is part of daily and cultural life. Darija is the 
empowering language for women in Much Loved and Sur la planche as it gives 
agency to marginalised women and reconfigures traditional power dynamics 
between dominating men and dominated women. By rejecting polite language, and 
reclaiming vulgar darija as their own, the protagonists of Much Loved and Sur la 
planche challenge gender roles and moral and social conventions. Crude language 
and slang undermine essentialist representations of women as submissive, obedient 
and polite, and challenge hegemonic masculinities. Through darija, Badia and Noha 
in Sur la planche and Much Loved establish a social space that both parallels and 




I have summarised earlier in this chapter Lakoff’s, Coates’s and Cameron’s 
findings on gender, language, and power. Lakoff’s research was concerned with 
American middle-class suburban middle-class women of a particular era, and she 
observed that women spoke in a more polished manner than men and hence were 
powerless. It has become clear that Lakoff’s findings cannot be transposed to 
modern Morocco; they are contradicted by Badia’s and Noha’s use of darija. Darija 
allows women to use crude language and slang and in Sur la planche and Much 
Loved, it appears that they are neither more polite than the men nor less powerful. 
Coates investigated patterns of speech amongst English speaking men and women 
and concluded that there is no clear-cut distinction between masculine and feminine 
speech. Badia and Noha also speak at times like ‘men’, swearing and using taboo 
words, which suggests that Coates’s findings also apply in this different linguistic 
and cultural context. Furthermore, slang and crude language allow Noha and Badia 
to construct alternative femininities that are counterhegemonic to the norms of 
femininity imposed by Moroccan society. While Cameron’s original claim was 
concerned with American women, Much Loved and Sur la planche confirm that 
Cameron’s view can be transposed to another culture and language, which is that by 
making discursive assertions Badia and Noha claim social power.  
Yet the films that received the most praise were Agadir Bombay and Les 
Jardins de Samira. The public’s strong reaction to Much Loved alongside its 
acceptance of Les Jardins de Samira and Agadir Bombay confirm Lakoff’s view that 
women cannot use crude language without being stigmatised and are thus prohibited 
from using the same words as men. Les Jardins de Samira and Agadir Bombay 
confirm the prevalence of gender and linguistic social norms and expectations by the 




multi-layered view of how women and men spoke to express their social and sexual 
frustrations in a period marked by the ‘Arab spring’, during which, however, little 
political change has occurred in Algeria. Yet these expressions of frustration and 
discontent do not seem to have much effect: the use of darija in Les Terrasses does 
not empower any of the characters, either men or women; instead it only highlights 
the despair of Algerians who share the same language. 
Although Coates’s and Cameron’s observations were limited to English-
speaking groups, Much Loved and Sur la planche prove that when transposed to 
another cultural, social and linguistic context, these findings may still be valid. 
Indeed, one might expect language use to be systematically different in Morocco 
where gender roles are often perceived to be relatively rigid and clearly demarcated. 
Hence, while some films advance darija as a powerful language, the public’s 
reaction still maintains social norms in relation to women’s and men’s speech. 
Furthermore, the Algerian and Moroccan films highlight how Standard Arabic is still 
the most empowering language, for men, as in Les Terrasses and Les Jardins de 
Samira. When Standard Arabic is used it is linked to religious discourse, rather than 
the unifying language of the nation. Standard Arabic provides its speakers with 
prestige and respect, thus confirming Sadiqi’s findings. 
While darija is the main language of these films, it is noticeable that French 
is hardly employed in the Moroccan films studied. When French is used, it is mainly 
by women to give them social prestige. For example, the textile worker in Sur la 
planche who uses French words asserts her higher social position. Samira in Les 
Jardins de Samira uses French to assert her urban position and differentiate herself 
from her rural husband. Noha in Much Loved modulates her language to her gender 




submissive image of a powerless woman. French, in these films, thus conforms to 
Sadiqi’s view that French provides women with access – or at least, temporary 
access – to a better social class while remaining unthreatening to men.  
Noticeably, the situation radically changes when French is used in 
Moknèche’s trilogy. The director refuses to confine French to a marginal language 
used in Algeria by the urban educated class, and his narratives play out in a context 
where French is used by all the characters. Contrary to Sadiqi’s affirmation about the 
use of French and the prestige it confers, in Moknèche’s films French loses its 
association with prestige for women, and men are threatened by women who speak 
French. Moknèche also shows that while French allows characters to openly display 
different sexual identities, the characters are nonetheless constrained by social and 
cultural norms.  
The questions I have asked throughout the chapter are whether, and to what 
extent, language emerges plausibly as a valuable tool to resist patriarchal dominance, 
as well as which language would achieve this aim. What is noticeable, above all, is 
that these films pose the question of gender, sexuality and language, at times in a 
provocative and destabilising manner for the Algerian and Moroccan public. Even if 
the answers some of the films provide are relatively bleak, the films studied have 
shown that darija and French are means by which the structures of patriarchy could 
be put on display. These languages, and noticeably not Standard Arabic, allow for 
multiple possibilities of derailing gender and sexual norms and the cultural 







This thesis has explored the politics of language in a selection of Algerian and 
Moroccan films produced between 1999 and 2015. The introduction historicised the 
politics of Standard Arabic, darija and French in Algeria and Morocco since 
independence, before summarising recent scholarship on language in films. The 
introductory chapter further contextualised the politics of Arabisation and I located 
Algerian and Moroccan cinemas in the broader academic debate on national cinema 
and pointed to the role of language in establishing the relation between film and 
national identity. Taking a thematic approach, I then divided the remaining of the 
thesis into three chapters. Chapter Two dealt with language and national identity and 
explored what each language came to represent over the years. I argued that when 
films use more than one language, this can be understood as a challenge to any 
conception of Algerian or Moroccan identity that binds it to a singular language or 
religion (typically, Standard Arabic and Islam).  
In Chapter Three, I added religion and politics to these complex 
interrelations. In Algerian films, I exposed how both French and darija were used to 
express the trauma experienced by men and women during the Black Decade. While 
darija was spoken by all the protagonists in the films of the Black Decade, French 
and Standard Arabic bore the ideological tensions that were at stake during that 
traumatic period, and I established that neither French nor Standard Arabic were 
exclusively used by any competing faction – Islamists or their opponents. In the 
Algerian and Moroccan films analysed, I demonstrated that slang darija was the 
language used by young people when articulating their despair. Darija was the 




women. Finally, I discussed how Standard Arabic is ideologically bound to Islam 
and to the religious ideology that pervades everyday life in Algeria and in Morocco. 
Chapter Four further investigated gender, power, and sexuality, drawing on 
theoretical research in sociolinguistics on language, gender and power. I argued that 
the films’ reception confirmed the linguistic and gendered expectations of men and 
women. In some of the films, women used chaste language, and did not display any 
sexual desire, while men could use crude and vulgar language while boasting about 
their sexuality. The films also demonstrated the shortcomings of attempting to assign 
specific functions to individual languages: French and darija both allowed linguistic 
and sexual norms to be defied, to empower men as well as won, while both 
languages were also used, elsewhere, to assert patriarchal values. 
In this thesis, we have seen too that diegetic and non-diegetic music is also 
inspired by the multi-linguistic scenes of Algeria and Morocco. The films use 
different genres: rai, Andalus, songs from the Algerian south, Berber music, rock, 
Middle Eastern music and electronic and jazz compositions. In Où Vas-tu Moshé?, 
Jewish and Muslim conviviality in Morocco is re-enacted through music: musical 
exchange and cross-faith friendship are placed back into Moroccan history. Alla’s 
oud or the Berber song in Barakat! indicate the persistence of local musical 
traditions that are core components of cultural identity. The plurality of musical 
genres, diegetic and non-diegetic, in these films is evidence of hybridity and 
transnationalism, which cannot be accurately conveyed through just one musical 
form. In this way, the musical diversity mirrors Algeria and Morocco’s 
multilingualism, and part of its own diversity is linguistic. 
The corpus of films also illustrates that a range of Algerian and Moroccan 




thematic originality in addressing diverse social, political, and religious issues as 
well as tackling taboo subjects. These directors also celebrate their countries’ 
multilingualism, rejecting a homogenous language and embracing a multiplicity of 
identities. Téguia, Kilani, Moknèche, Marrakchi and Ayouch venture further than 
others in expressing a harsh critique of society, of patriarchal traditions, by using 
slang, crude language, darija and French, bringing attention to the marginalised, 
opening a debate on the public scene to foster a more inclusive society. Others, such 
as Chraibi, Bakir, Lahlou, Bachir Chouikh and Salmy, include in their films a far 
more consensual language (either French or darija) that maintains gender and class 
boundaries. Hence, both male and female, Algerian and Moroccan directors use 
French, crude darija, slang and Standard Arabic as well as polite, chaste language. 
Although scholars who analyse Algerian and Moroccan films tend to divide 
them between female and male directors, it is in fact difficult to assert that there is a 
significant correlation between a choice of language or subject and a director’s 
gender, as this thesis has conclusively shown that the use of darija and French cuts 
across genders. Similarly, scholars have ‘tended to divide and pit Arabophone 
against Francophone’, either in relation to film or literature, implying that language 
leads filmmakers and writers to express different views – French as the language of 
modernity and Arabic as the language maintaining patriarchal traditions.659 This 
thesis has however established that dividing Algerian and Moroccan filmmakers into 
Arabophone or Francophone is fruitless as their use of different languages did not 
coincide with different thematic choices. Finally, one noticeable distinction between 
Algerian and Moroccan filmmakers, either female or male, is that Algerian 
filmmakers included French more readily in their films. While French is mainly the 
                                               




upper classes’ language, associated with higher education in Moroccan films, it has 
been appropriated by other classes as well as mixed with darija in Algerian films. 
While the latter shows the desire of Algerian filmmakers to integrate French and 
assert more forcefully Algeria’s linguistic pluralism, it also reflects a difference in 
linguistic practice between the two countries in this era. 
In relation to scholarly studies of literature in the Maghreb, the scholar 
Madeleine Dobie observes that texts in French are widely studied by critics who 
ignore texts produced in Arabic. Hence, those readers cannot compare how literary 
works from the same region, but in different languages, respond differently to social 
and political events.660 In film criticism, by contrast, as I suggested in the 
introduction, critics are often uninhibited about discussing films in languages they do 
not speak or understand. But in both spheres, the upshot is that critics repeatedly fail 
to give due weight to a certain multilingual reality – that is, to multilingualism as an 
important part of that reality – and to the question of how widely different 
worldviews become associated with different languages and varied linguistic 
practices. In this thesis, I have argued that the study of language in films matters, 
particularly in films from multi-lingual countries, since it enables us to account for 
all the forms of expression and experiences these languages allow. By studying 
films’ use of darija, in conjunction with films in French and Standard Arabic, I have 
exposed the ideologies of language as well as linguistic stereotyping; darija is no 
longer an illegitimate language as since 1999 it has been widely used in films and is 
gaining in power; French is not only an elitist language used by the upper-classes but 
can be appropriated by Algerians and Moroccans from varied backgrounds (although 
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not necessarily all backgrounds); and Standard Arabic remains a powerful vehicle of 
religious and state ideology – mainly spoken by men – and, in some cases, a 
language associated with punishment, deception and corruption. The films 
investigated, therefore, resist any ideology that homogenises Algerian or Moroccan 
identity – particularly where that might involve an official language, in particular, 
Standard Arabic, superseding other languages; and at the same time, they complicate 
and challenge any clear – and potentially divisive – conception of the link between a 
particular language and a particular set of ideologies and identities. As well as 
emphasising the linguistic diversity of the Maghreb, then, and of the cinemas of 
Algeria and Morocco, my aim was to show that Francophone films and Arabophone 
films are often engaged with similar issues, in all their complexity. Similarly, 
Algerian and Moroccan cinemas are in dialogue with one other, both inscribed 
within transnational North African and global cinema.  
If the films in this corpus have revealed the central role of language in films, 
it is worth reflecting upon how the scope of this project could be widened for future 
research. I argued in the introduction that one of the principal limitations was the 
exclusion of films in Berber languages due to my own inability to speak the 
language and thus understand them. Undoubtedly, though, further study of Berber-
speaking films would shed light on the integration of Berber communities in the two 
countries, illuminating issues of national identity, politics and gender as well as 
linguistic practice itself. I hope, nonetheless, that this thesis has shown that it is time 
for critics and commentators inside and outside the Maghreb to acknowledge fully, 
and indeed to celebrate, Algeria’s and Morocco’s multilingualism, and to analyse 
films in French alongside films in Standard Arabic, Berber languages and darija, in 




significance of diverse linguistic practices in their historical, political and cultural 
contexts. I hope also that this thesis has equally demonstrated the relevance of 
inserting language into the study of film, more widely, and as such could also offer 
new avenues for examining a diverse range of national, trans-national and regional 
cinemas, starting with Tunisia for further comparison, and broadly ‘Maghrebi’ films 
made in France – examining how Arabic languages, darija, and accents are used in 
conjunction with French. On a wider scale still, I hope to have shown that 
multilingualism may at times be obscured by the ideology of a ‘national language’ 
(or indeed, as touched upon in chapter One, by the idea of a ‘national cinema’). 
Further study of diverse cinemas, including those of the Maghreb, may cast yet new 
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